Formulating Operating System Anonymization by Monolithic Keyring Subsystem Fabrication

Ujas Dhami, Nisarg ShahInternational Journal of Science and Research (IJSR) 2022 · DOI

Abstract

The monolithic kernel is a widely used architecture for ARM-based systems and Linux distributions. However, because all instructions reside within a shared kernel space, these systems are inherently vulnerable to memory leaks that can facilitate the cross-transaction of sensitive information. This research proposes a method to lock specific kernel sections using a fabricated keyring subsystem, thereby confining the kernel and preventing the exposure of personal data during volatile sessions.

Introduction

Standard operating systems, including those running in "Live" or volatile modes, often leave persistent digital footprints on host hardware. Monolithic kernels are particularly susceptible to forensic recovery because they do not inherently compartmentalize sensitive data during execution. Traditional systems maintain logs, caches, and command histories that remain accessible even after a session ends, posing a significant risk to user anonymity.

To address these vulnerabilities, we introduce NIJAS OS, a volatile Linux-based operating system designed for absolute anonymity. By leveraging the Linux Keyring Subsystem and aggressive memory-wiping protocols, NIJAS OS creates a "zero-footprint" environment that ensures no forensic traces are left on either the host hardware or the bootable deployment medium.

Methodology

NIJAS OS is developed using Linux Mint libraries and the standard Linux Kernel as its foundation. The architecture integrates several security layers to ensure data volatility and kernel isolation.

Keyring Subsystem Fabrication

The core of the system's security is the fabrication of the Linux Keyring Subsystem to fragment the kernel space into isolated "domes." By securing authentication and encryption keys within these compartments, the system ensures that any potential memory leak is confined, preventing it from exposing context-sensitive data to other parts of the kernel.

Volatility and Anti-Forensic Measures

The OS operates entirely from a USB drive with zero data persistence to the host's Hard Disk Drive (HDD). Key components include:

  • Memory Wiping: The sdmem tool is integrated into system cron jobs to perform periodic RAM cleaning.
  • Cache Management: Automated systemctl commands are used to drop PageCache, dentries, and inodes.
  • LSM Integration: The Linux Security Module (LSM) suite is implemented to provide a three-layer security architecture.
  • Anonymity Suite: Automated tools manage DNS rotation, IP masking, MAC spoofing, and User-agent randomization.

The "Demolition" Script

A custom shutdown sequence, referred to as the "Demolition" script, is executed to clear RAM, delete all system logs, wipe terminal history, and destroy temporary resources, ensuring a clean exit that leaves no usable forensic data.

Results and Evaluation

The system was tested across various hardware configurations, ranging from 2GB RAM dual-core systems to 8GB RAM quad-core setups.

Storage and Portability

Through the application of a PKZIP codec, the system's ISO size was successfully reduced from 7.42 GiB to 3.11 GiB. This reduction significantly enhances the portability of the OS for USB deployment without compromising core functionality.

Leak Prevention and Stability

Quantitative analysis of the Dynamic Memory Allocation (DMA) unit demonstrated that memory leakage remained near zero bytes, even during the execution of resource-intensive applications. Furthermore, the system proved highly stable on low-end hardware (2 GiB RAM), indicating that high-level anonymity does not require specialized, high-performance computing power.

Discussion and Conclusion

NIJAS OS demonstrates that kernel compartmentalization is an effective strategy for mitigating the risks inherent in monolithic architectures. By "doming" the kernel and implementing randomized memory locations for session history, the system significantly increases the difficulty of memory-scraping attacks. Additionally, by restricting native driver caching, the system prevents hardware-level traces from being cached by the host.

While the system offers a powerful tool for journalists, researchers, and intelligence personnel, its potential for misuse necessitates a cautious approach to distribution. Future development will focus on reducing reliance on third-party anonymity servers and further streamlining the user interface for non-technical users within the KDE Plasma environment.

Summary updated

Abstract

The monolithic kernel is a widely used kernel when building ARM architectures and Linux distributions. With all instructions being in the kernel space, it is insecure, and can easily perform cross-transactions of sensitive information when under a memory leak, thus, it is vital to lock certain sections of the kernel to confine it from exposing personal information to risk. Investigation:
BibTeX
@article{dhami2022formulating,
  author = {Ujas Dhami and Nisarg Shah},
  title = {{Formulating Operating System Anonymization by Monolithic Keyring Subsystem Fabrication}},
  journal = {International Journal of Science and Research (IJSR)},
  year = {2022},
  doi = {10.21275/sr22131160746},
}
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