Fingerprinting SDKs for Mobile Apps and Where to Find Them: Understanding the Market for Device Fingerprinting

Michael A. Specter, Mihai Christodorescu, Abbie Farr, Bo Ma, Robin Lassonde, Xiaoyang Xu, Xiang Pan, Fengguo Wei, Saswat Anand, Dave KleidermacherarXiv 2025 · DOI · arXiv

Introduction

Mobile device fingerprinting—the practice of collecting hardware and software attributes to uniquely identify users without their consent—represents a significant challenge to digital privacy. Unlike cookies or advertising IDs, these "digital exhausts" are nearly impossible for users to reset or clear. While platform owners have introduced privacy labels and restricted certain APIs, the actual market dynamics of fingerprinting remain poorly understood. This research, a collaboration between Google and Georgia Tech, provides the largest-scale analysis to date, examining over 228,000 SDKs and 178,000 apps to quantify who is collecting this data and why.

Methodology

To map the fingerprinting ecosystem, the researchers developed a sophisticated multi-stage pipeline designed to move beyond simple data collection identification and toward quantifying market impact.

The multi-stage analysis pipeline used to identify and categorize fingerprinting SDKs.

The process began with Seed Set Extraction, where 14 SDKs known for fingerprinting were reverse-engineered to identify over 500 unique "signals." The technical centerpiece of the study is CoFlow Analysis, a specialized form of static analysis. Unlike standard taint analysis, CoFlow identifies "crossover flows"—instances where multiple high-entropy data sources converge into a single network exfiltration point. This convergence is a high-confidence indicator of fingerprinting. Finally, the team employed a codebook approach to categorize SDK families and matched them against real-world applications using fine-grained code similarity metrics.

Datasets

The study utilized three primary data sources:

  • SDK Dataset: 228,598 unique SDKs crawled from Maven repositories.
  • App Dataset: 178,054 Android applications from the Google Play Store, focusing on those with over 10,000 active installs to ensure market relevance.
  • Signal Library: A compiled list of over 500 individual APIs and system properties (e.g., battery level, sensor data) used for fingerprinting.

Key Insights and the "Ads" Misconception

A primary finding of this research is that device fingerprinting is not merely an "advertising problem." While industry interventions often target the ad sector, the data reveals a much broader distribution of tracking behavior.

Distribution of fingerprinting behavior across SDK categories, showing that advertising accounts for less than a third of the ecosystem.

Advertising SDKs account for only 30.56% of fingerprinting behavior. A significant portion originates from "Unclear" SDKs (23.92%)—those lacking public documentation—and Security/Authentication tools (11.7%). This highlights a massive transparency gap in the mobile supply chain.

Furthermore, the study identified a Popularity Paradox: apps containing fingerprinting SDKs are disproportionately successful. In 23 different app categories, apps with fingerprinting behavior were approximately 10 times more popular by install volume than their non-tracking counterparts. This suggests that fingerprinting is deeply embedded in the most successful segments of the app market.

Market Reach and Risk

The prevalence of fingerprinting varies significantly by category, but its overall reach is extensive. On average, 39.4% of apps in any given category contain at least one fingerprinting SDK. However, in high-risk categories such as "Dating," "Games," or "Comics," the probability of an app containing a fingerprinting SDK exceeds 80%.

This ecosystem also facilitates cross-app tracking. Because the same fingerprinting SDKs are often shared across different app categories (e.g., a single SDK appearing in both a health app and a gaming app), third parties can link a user's identity across vastly different contexts, effectively bypassing platform-level privacy protections.

Conclusion and Future Work

While this static analysis provides a comprehensive view of the market, it may miss SDKs using heavy obfuscation or dynamic code loading. Additionally, while the study identifies what data is exfiltrated, determining intent remains difficult; for example, a security SDK might use fingerprinting for legitimate bot detection rather than invasive tracking.

The researchers suggest that future privacy efforts should include "nutrition labels" for SDKs themselves, helping developers understand the privacy implications of the third-party code they integrate into their applications. Expanding this analysis to iOS remains a critical next step for future research.

Summary updated

Abstract

This paper presents a large-scale analysis of fingerprinting-like behavior in the mobile application ecosystem. We take a market-based approach, focusing on third-party tracking as enabled by applications' common use of third-party SDKs. Our dataset consists of over 228,000 SDKs from popular Maven repositories, 178,000 Android applications collected from the Google Play store, and our static analysis pipeline detects exfiltration of over 500 individual signals. To the best of our knowledge, this represents the largest-scale analysis of SDK behavior undertaken to date. We find that Ads SDKs (the ostensible focus of industry efforts such as Apple's App Tracking Transparency and Google's Privacy Sandbox) appear to be the source of only 30.56% of the fingerprinting behaviors. A surprising 23.92% originate from SDKs whose purpose was unknown or unclear. Furthermore, Security and Authentication SDKs are linked to only 11.7% of likely fingerprinting instances. These results suggest that addressing fingerprinting solely in specific market-segment contexts like advertising may offer incomplete benefit. Enforcing anti-fingerprinting policies is also complex, as we observe a sparse distribution of signals and APIs used by likely fingerprinting SDKs. For instance, only 2% of exfiltrated APIs are used by more than 75% of SDKs, making it difficult to rely on user permissions to control fingerprinting behavior.
BibTeX
@misc{specter2025fingerprinting,
  author = {Michael A. Specter and Mihai Christodorescu and Abbie Farr and Bo Ma and Robin Lassonde and Xiaoyang Xu and Xiang Pan and Fengguo Wei and Saswat Anand and Dave Kleidermacher},
  title = {{Fingerprinting SDKs for Mobile Apps and Where to Find Them: Understanding the Market for Device Fingerprinting}},
  year = {2025},
  eprint = {2506.22639},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.22639},
}
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