Abstract
Airdrop is a crucial concept in tokenomics. Startups of decentralized applications (DApps) reward early supporters by airdropping newly issued tokens up to a certain amount as a free giveaway. This naturally induces greedy hackers, called Sybils, to create multiple accounts for more shares. Most airdrops have prerequisites for qualification, in which utilizing these DApps is unsurprisingly the principal. One particular characteristic of DApps is to implement users' interactions with them in the form of token transfer transactions or smart contract calling transactions on public blockchains. We argue that these individual transactions could reveal underlying signatures of their sending accounts. Specifically, accounts controlled by the same Sybil may exhibit some common behaviors. A careful analysis of Sybil's behaviors shows that accounts controlled by the same Sybil may produce similar DApp activities and regular token transfer patterns. We model the transactions as graphs by representing accounts as vertices and transactions as edges. When multiple accounts receive tokens from the same Sybil to conduct interactions with DApps, we inspect the graphs for these activities and patterns to detect suspicious accounts. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method in a recent airdrop by presenting the suspicious accounts controlled by Sybils. All the detected accounts exhibit similar interaction activities and regular transfer patterns.
Introduction
In the decentralized application (DApp) ecosystem, "airdrops" serve as a primary mechanism for rewarding early adopters and bootstrapping liquidity. By distributing native tokens to users who have previously interacted with the protocol, startups aim to decentralize governance and incentivize long-term participation. However, the financial allure of these giveaways attracts "Sybil attacks," where a single entity operates numerous pseudonymous accounts to capture a disproportionate share of the rewards. This behavior undermines the fairness of token distribution and threatens the underlying tokenomics by creating artificial demand and potential sell-side pressure.
Methodology
Detecting Sybil accounts is challenging due to the inherent anonymity of blockchain addresses. This paper proposes a systematic framework that identifies coordinated behavior through two primary lenses: DApp interaction sequences and token transfer graph patterns.
DApp Activity Similarity
Even when attackers attempt to randomize their actions, the necessity of meeting specific eligibility criteria often results in highly similar behavioral sequences. The framework represents these interactions as sets of "activity pairs" (e.g., swapping followed by staking). By utilizing the Jaccard similarity coefficient, the system quantifies the behavioral overlap between accounts. These similarity scores then feed into a DBSCAN (Density-Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with Noise) algorithm, which groups accounts with suspiciously identical interaction signatures without requiring a predefined number of clusters.
Token Transfer Patterns
Sybil accounts require "gas" (native tokens like ETH) to execute transactions. The movement of these funds from a central source to "worker" accounts often follows distinct geometric patterns on the transaction graph.
- Sequential Pattern: Funds are moved in a chain-like fashion, where a treasury account sends tokens to Account A, which then passes a portion to Account B, and so on. Sequential token transfer pattern Source, p. 5
- Radial (Star) Pattern: A central treasury account distributes funds directly to a large set of worker accounts simultaneously, resembling a hub-and-spoke model. Radial (star) token transfer pattern Source, p. 5
By overlaying these graph patterns onto the behavioral clusters identified in the previous step, the framework can confirm the presence of coordinated Sybil groups with high confidence.
Experimental Evaluation
The framework was tested using real-world data from the Hop Protocol airdrop, encompassing transactions across Ethereum and several Layer 2 networks (Arbitrum, Optimism, Polygon, and Gnosis). The dataset included over 43,000 eligible addresses, with a baseline of 10,253 Sybils previously identified by the Hop team.
Key Results
The analysis revealed that Sybil accounts often fall into the "efficiency trap." On networks like Arbitrum, clusters were found with Jaccard similarity coefficients near 1.0, indicating perfectly identical behavior across dozens of accounts. The algorithm successfully pinpointed specific treasury accounts that served as the funding hubs for these clusters. For instance, one identified group of over 20 addresses performed the exact same sequence of four interactions with nearly identical token amounts.
Discussion and Future Work
A significant challenge in graph-based detection is the "CEX False Positive," where centralized exchange hot wallets mimic radial funding patterns. Preprocessing steps, such as whitelisting known exchange addresses, are essential. Future research will focus on unsupervised detection methods to identify Sybils before airdrop announcements and the integration of off-chain social data (e.g., Discord or Twitter links) to improve accuracy. Additionally, as DApp user bases scale, optimizing graph traversal algorithms will be critical for maintaining computational efficiency.
Conclusion
By combining behavioral clustering with transaction graph analysis, this framework provides a robust defense against Sybil attacks in airdrops. Identifying the "funding link" remains the most effective way to unmask coordinated attackers, ensuring that rewards are distributed to genuine community members.
Summary updated