Feedback to the European Data Protection Board's Guidelines 2/2023 on Technical Scope of Art. 5(3) of ePrivacy Directive

Cristiana Teixeira Santos, Nataliia Bielova, Vincent Roca, Mathieu Cunche, Gilles Mertens, Karel Kubicek, Hamed HaddadiarXiv 2024 · DOI · arXiv

Abstract: This paper summarizes a formal technical response by privacy researchers to the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) regarding draft Guidelines 2/2023. The response identifies critical "blind spots" in the legal definitions of "terminal equipment" and "access," arguing for broader interpretations to encompass modern tracking techniques like browser fingerprinting, virtualized environments, and link decoration.

Introduction

The ePrivacy Directive, specifically Article 5(3), serves as the primary legal framework for protecting the confidentiality of terminal equipment in the EU. While often reduced to the "cookie law," its scope extends to any storage or access of information on a user's device. As tracking technologies evolve, the EDPB's draft Guidelines 2/2023 aim to clarify this scope. However, a coalition of privacy experts from institutions like Inria, ETH Zurich, and Imperial College London argues that the current draft contains technical inaccuracies and narrow definitions that could leave users vulnerable to modern tracking methods.

Broadening the Definition of Terminal Equipment

A central critique involves the definition of "terminal equipment." The researchers advocate for including virtualized environments, such as cloud-based smartphone emulators (SaaS). If a user interacts with a virtual device, the privacy protections should be equivalent to those of a physical device. Furthermore, the status of "relays"—such as routers, VPN endpoints, and proxies—remains a gray area. If these intermediaries can be fingerprinted or used to identify users, the researchers suggest they should fall within the Directive's scope.

The researchers highlight that "accessing" information does not always require an active "pull" from a tracker. "Passive" access occurs when a browser automatically transmits information (e.g., IP addresses, User Agent strings) that is then used for fingerprinting. The response argues that such practices must be considered "gaining access" under the law.

Similarly, "link decoration"—the practice of embedding tracking IDs in URLs (e.g., website.com?user_id=123)—is identified as a significant loophole. When a user clicks a decorated link, the receiving entity gains access to a stored identifier, which should trigger the protections of Article 5(3).

The On-Device Processing Contradiction

One of the most significant technical points raised is the ambiguity regarding on-device processing. The draft guidelines appear inconsistent: one section suggests that storing malicious software is covered even without data exfiltration, while another implies the law only applies if information leaves the device.

Figure 1: Illustration of identifier storage, transformation, and transmission between entities via a user's device.

As shown in Figure 1, tracking often involves a multi-stage process where an identifier is stored (1), transformed locally (2), and then sent to a third party (3). The researchers argue that the act of storage and the subsequent access to even a "transformed" or "hashed" version of that identifier constitutes a breach of confidentiality if done without consent, regardless of whether the original raw identifier ever leaves the device.

Recommendations for the EDPB

The researchers provide several concrete recommendations to refine the guidelines:

  • Expand "Information": Clarify that it includes all technical identifiers (e.g., network flags), not just personal data.
  • Clarify "Storage": Explicitly include hardware-bound identifiers like MAC addresses and data in volatile memory.
  • Refine "Gaining Access": Include browser fingerprinting and the exfiltration of auto-filled data from password managers as forms of access.
  • Correct IoT Technicalities: Ensure the guidelines accurately reflect how IoT devices and SIM cards interact with networks (e.g., clarifying that cellular network interfaces, not SIM cards alone, send data).

Conclusion

The feedback emphasizes that legal frameworks must keep pace with technical reality. By addressing these "blind spots," the EDPB can ensure that Article 5(3) remains a robust shield against intrusive tracking in an increasingly complex digital ecosystem. The final guidelines will determine whether modern engineering can bypass fundamental privacy rights or if the law will adapt to protect users across all forms of digital interaction.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@misc{santos2024feedback,
  author = {Cristiana Teixeira Santos and Nataliia Bielova and Vincent Roca and Mathieu Cunche and Gilles Mertens and Karel Kubicek and Hamed Haddadi},
  title = {{Feedback to the European Data Protection Board's Guidelines 2/2023 on Technical Scope of Art. 5(3) of ePrivacy Directive}},
  year = {2024},
  eprint = {2402.02877},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.02877},
}
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