Factors Influencing Intergovernmental Cooperation on Emission Reduction in Chengdu-Chongqing Urban Agglomeration: An Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective

Jingyu Liu, Meng Wei-dong, Bo Huang, Yuyu LiInternational Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 2022 · DOI

TL;DR

This paper uses evolutionary game theory to model how local governments in the Chengdu-Chongqing region decide whether to cooperate on emission reduction. It finds that while cooperation is beneficial, factors like externalities, free-riding, and the design of carbon tax policies significantly influence their decisions. The study suggests that dynamic carbon taxes and targeted subsidies can encourage more cooperation.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

China, as the world's largest emitter of carbon dioxide, has committed to ambitious emission reduction targets. However, achieving these goals requires coordinated action, especially in rapidly developing urban agglomerations like Chengdu-Chongqing. This region faces the challenge of balancing economic growth with environmental protection. The paper addresses the critical question of how to foster intergovernmental cooperation on emission reduction among local governments within such a region. It highlights that traditional, fragmented governance models are insufficient and that regional alliances are necessary. The core problem is understanding the complex interplay of factors that drive or hinder local governments' willingness to engage in cooperative emission reduction, particularly in the context of China's unique development stage and policy landscape.

Methods

The study employs evolutionary game theory to model the strategic interactions between local governments regarding emission reduction. They construct several evolutionary game models:

  • Two-government model without carbon tax: This establishes a baseline to understand the fundamental dynamics of cooperation, defection, and the influence of externalities.
  • Two-government model with dynamic carbon tax: This introduces a dynamic carbon tax policy, exploring how penalties for non-cooperation affect strategic choices.
  • Three-government model without carbon tax: This extends the analysis to a more complex scenario, considering the impact of an intermediate city and diminishing returns from cooperation.

The models analyze the expected payoffs for governments choosing either "Cooperation" or "Not Cooperation" strategies. Replication dynamic equations are used to simulate the evolution of these strategies over time, identifying stable equilibrium points (Evolutionary Stable Strategies or ESS). Stability analysis of these equilibrium points is conducted using Jacobian matrices. Numerical simulations are then performed to visualize the influence of various parameters (like carbon tax levels, externalities, and benefits/costs of cooperation) on the probability of governments choosing cooperative strategies.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper. The study relies on theoretical modeling and numerical simulations rather than empirical data from specific datasets.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Cooperation is a balancing act: The decision to cooperate hinges on a delicate balance between the benefits of collaboration (synergistic revenue) and the costs (implementation costs, externalities).
  • Externalities are a double-edged sword: While positive externalities from one government's cooperation can benefit others, they can paradoxically decrease the willingness of the other government to cooperate if their own net benefits from non-cooperation remain higher. This highlights the complexity of managing spillover effects.
  • Free-riding undermines cooperation: The "free-rider" problem, where some governments benefit from others' efforts without contributing, significantly reduces the effectiveness of cooperative emission reduction.
  • Dynamic carbon tax as a powerful tool: A dynamic carbon tax policy, by imposing penalties on non-cooperative governments, can significantly increase their willingness to cooperate. The effectiveness of the tax depends on its size and how it's implemented.
  • Resource endowment matters: Governments with different resource endowments (e.g., varying forest coverage) will respond differently to incentives and penalties, influencing their cooperative strategies.

Key Results

  • Benefits and costs are primary drivers: Increased synergistic benefits from cooperation generally lead to a higher willingness to cooperate. However, the impact of costs and externalities can vary, leading to different probabilities of cooperation.
  • Externalities can decrease cooperation: When a government's positive externality from cooperation is high, it can paradoxically lead to a decrease in its own willingness to cooperate if its net benefits from non-cooperation are still greater.
  • Carbon tax incentivizes cooperation: The presence of a dynamic carbon tax policy demonstrably increases the likelihood of local governments opting for cooperative emission reduction strategies compared to a scenario without it. Higher carbon tax penalties lead to a greater likelihood of cooperation.
  • Policy recommendations: The study suggests that to enhance intergovernmental cooperation, policymakers should aim to reduce the negative impacts of externalities, potentially through subsidies for cooperative governments and stronger penalties for free-riders. Optimizing the carbon tax system is also crucial.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Simplified models: The models, while insightful, simplify complex real-world scenarios. They assume perfect information and rational decision-making, which may not always hold true for local governments.
  • Focus on two/three governments: The analysis primarily focuses on two or three governments. Extending the model to a larger number of interacting entities could provide a more comprehensive picture of regional dynamics.
  • Generalizability: While the Chengdu-Chongqing region is used as a case study, the findings' direct applicability to other regions with different economic structures, resource endowments, and governance frameworks might vary.
  • Future Work: The authors suggest further research could explore the impact of information asymmetry and search costs more deeply, as well as investigate the role of regional emission reduction exchange platforms and technology sharing mechanisms in fostering cooperation. They also point to the need for more nuanced policy design to effectively internalize externalities and encourage collaborative emission reduction.

Summary updated

Abstract

In this study, we introduced the realistic problem of a dynamic carbon tax, built several evolutionary game models for cooperative emission reduction by local governments, and determined the factors that influence governments' willingness to cooperate in emission reduction. The findings revealed that, first, the probability of governments opting for cooperative emission reduction strategies increases at different rates depending on the benefits and costs of cooperation. Second, externalities influence governments' willingness to cooperate in emission reduction during cooperative carbon emission reduction. Furthermore, the emergence of a free-riding situation reduces the effectiveness of intergovernmental cooperation in reducing carbon emissions. Third, carbon tax policy can influence the likelihood that local governments will choose cooperative emission reduction, and different carbon tax sizes have different effects on their willingness to choose cooperative emission reduction.
BibTeX
@article{liu2022factors,
  author = {Jingyu Liu and Meng Wei-dong and Bo Huang and Yuyu Li},
  title = {{Factors Influencing Intergovernmental Cooperation on Emission Reduction in Chengdu-Chongqing Urban Agglomeration: An Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective}},
  journal = {International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health},
  year = {2022},
  doi = {10.3390/ijerph192214848},
}
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