TL;DR
This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that "erga omnes" (obligations owed to all) norms in international law necessarily improve enforcement. Using a game-theoretic model, the authors demonstrate that these norms can paradoxically reduce enforcement by increasing the incentive for states to free-ride on the actions of others.
What Problem Does This Paper Address?
International law often distinguishes between norms that create obligations between specific states (two-party norms) and those that are owed to the international community as a whole ("erga omnes" norms). The prevailing view, notably articulated by Eric Posner, suggests that erga omnes norms are beneficial because they broaden the scope of states that can legitimately respond to violations, thereby increasing the likelihood of enforcement. This paper questions this assumption, asking: under what conditions might erga omnes norms actually hinder enforcement? The authors explore why some international legal norms are treated as erga omnes while others are not, and critically examine the predicted positive impact of erga omnes rules on enforcement.
Methods
The paper employs a formal game-theoretic model to analyze the enforcement of international law under different normative regimes. Specifically, it compares a "two-party norm" scenario with an "erga omnes norm" scenario. The model assumes states are rational actors seeking to maximize their payoffs, which are influenced by the benefits of successful retaliation against an aggressor and the costs associated with countermeasures (direct and reputational). The core of the analysis involves setting up payoff functions for states and deriving optimal investment strategies in mobilization (which increases the probability of successful retaliation). This is done by calculating expected payoffs and finding first-order conditions for optimal investment in a Nash equilibrium.
Datasets
Not discussed in the paper.
Key Insights and Ideas
- Challenging Conventional Wisdom: The paper directly confronts the widely held belief that erga omnes norms enhance international law enforcement.
- The Free-Riding Problem: The central insight is that erga omnes norms can exacerbate the free-riding problem. When multiple states are entitled to retaliate, individual states may be tempted to let others bear the costs of enforcement, hoping to benefit from a successful outcome without incurring the investment.
- Reduced Incentive for Individual Action: Under a two-party norm, a single state (Y) has a clear incentive to invest in retaliation if it is the only one entitled to do so. With erga omnes norms, a potential enforcer (Z) might free-ride on Y's efforts, leading to a lower overall probability of enforcement if Z's investment is not sufficiently incentivized.
- The Role of Externalities: While Posner argues that erga omnes norms emerge in areas with high externalities, this paper suggests that even in such cases, the enforcement mechanism might be weakened by the increased potential for free-riding.
- Implications for Real-World Cases: The authors suggest their findings might help explain why certain egregious violations, like genocide, persist despite being governed by erga omnes norms.
Key Results
The paper's quantitative results are derived from its game-theoretic model:
- Under a two-party norm, the model predicts an enforcement probability of 99%. This high probability stems from state Y's strong incentive to invest in mobilization when it is the sole legitimate enforcer.
- Under an erga omnes norm, the model predicts an enforcement probability of 35%. This significant decrease is attributed to the introduction of free-riding incentives for state Z.
- The authors conclude that erga omnes rules can reduce the enforcement probability compared to two-party rules.
Limitations and Future Work
- Model Simplifications: The model relies on several simplifying assumptions, such as perfect information about payoffs, a specific functional form for the probability of successful retaliation, and a symmetric Nash equilibrium where both potential enforcers invest identically. The authors acknowledge that real-world scenarios are far more complex.
- "Dafour" vs. "Dafour": A minor note in the text indicates a potential typo correction ("Dafour" to "Dafour"), suggesting a need for careful proofreading in academic work.
- Future Directions: The paper implicitly suggests that a more nuanced understanding of when erga omnes norms are beneficial is needed. It hints that perhaps limiting intervention to specific actors (e.g., only neighbors in cases of genocide) might be more effective by eliminating the prospect of global free-riding. Further research could explore how imperfect information, varying degrees of externalities, and different types of international actors affect the enforcement dynamics of erga omnes norms.
Summary updated