Equilibrium in Labor Markets with Few Firms

Reshef Meir, Moshe TennenholtzarXiv 2013 · arXiv

Abstract

This paper investigates the stability of labor markets where a small number of firms compete for workers with unique, synergistic skills. By extending the classical Kelso-Crawford model to scenarios that violate standard "gross substitutes" conditions, the authors provide new theoretical guarantees for the existence of stable equilibria in two-firm markets and demonstrate empirical resilience in more complex hiring scenarios through extensive simulations.

Introduction

In classical labor market models, firms are assumed to maximize profit under the "gross substitutes" (GS) condition: if one worker's wage rises, the firm should not fire another worker whose wage remains unchanged. While the GS condition ensures the existence of a stable "core" (an outcome where no group of agents has an incentive to deviate), it fails to capture real-world synergies common in high-skill industries. For instance, in a startup environment, the value of a lead engineer may depend entirely on the presence of a specific product manager. This paper addresses the "Few Firms" case, exploring whether stable salaries and worker assignments can still be found when such complex synergies exist.

Theoretical Framework

The authors model the market as a two-step competition game. First, firms simultaneously commit to salary offers for every worker. Second, workers simultaneously choose which firm to join based on the highest offer. The study focuses on two specific production functions:

  • Weighted Games: Workers possess specific "weights" (e.g., experience), and firm value is a submodular function of the total weight recruited.
  • Social Network Games: Workers act as "influencers" in a graph, where firm value is determined by the total reach of the hired set.

The authors seek to identify Pure Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (PSPE), demonstrating that these are equivalent to the market's "core" and to Walrasian equilibria in combinatorial auctions.

Key Insights and Connecting the Dots

A significant contribution of this work is the unification of disparate fields. The paper demonstrates that Labor Economics (the KC model), Game Theory (PSPE), and Auction Theory (Walrasian equilibrium) are mathematically equivalent within this context.

Conceptual mapping between labor market models, game theory, and auction theory.

Beyond this mapping, the authors establish a "Two-Firm" guarantee: for two symmetric firms in a weighted game, a stable equilibrium always exists, even when gross substitutes are violated. In social network models, stability is guaranteed for two firms if the network is "2-sparse" (where no node is influenced by more than two workers).

Empirical Results

To test the limits of their theoretical findings, the authors conducted simulations using synthetic datasets ($D_1, D_2, D_3$) involving 5–14 workers with varying weights and production functions.

  • Resilience in 3-Firm Games: While theoretical guarantees are harder to establish for three or more firms, simulations of 3-firm weighted games found a PSPE in over 99% of instances (all but 4 out of 6,000+).
  • Heuristic Success: A "unit payoff" heuristic—calculating a price per unit of weight based on marginal contributions—resulted in a stable PSPE in nearly all tested cases.
  • Revenue Distribution: For power-law production functions ($v(w) = w^\alpha$), firms typically retain a fraction $(1-\alpha)$ of the value produced, while workers split the remaining $\alpha$.

Limitations and Future Directions

Despite the strong empirical results, the authors provide a counter-example (Proposition 4.3) showing that a PSPE is not guaranteed for three or more firms with arbitrary weights. Furthermore, the current model assumes symmetric firms and ignores externalities, such as a firm's desire to prevent a competitor from hiring a specific individual. Future research may explore more flexible payoff schemes, such as production-based bonuses, to restore equilibrium in cases where fixed salaries fail.

Summary updated

Abstract

We study competition between firms in labor markets, following a combinatorial model suggested by Kelso and Crawford [1982]. In this model, each firm is trying to recruit workers by offering a higher salary than its competitors, and its production function defines the utility generated from any actual set of recruited workers. We define two natural classes of production functions for firms, where the first one is based on additive capacities (weights), and the second on the influence of workers in a social network. We then analyze the existence of pure subgame perfect equilibrium (PSPE) in the labor market and its properties. While neither class holds the gross substitutes condition, we show that in both classes the existence of PSPE is guaranteed under certain restrictions, and in particular when there are only two competing firms. As a corollary, there exists a Walrasian equilibrium in a corresponding combinatorial auction, where bidders' valuation functions belong to these classes. While a PSPE may not exist when there are more than two firms, we perform an empirical study of equilibrium outcomes for the case of weight-based games with three firms, which extend our analytical results. We then show that stability can in some cases be extended to coalitional stability, and study the distribution of profit between firms and their workers in weight-based games.
BibTeX
@misc{meir2013equilibrium,
  author = {Reshef Meir and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  title = {{Equilibrium in Labor Markets with Few Firms}},
  year = {2013},
  eprint = {1306.5855},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/1306.5855},
}
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