Entrepreneurial Reluctance: Talent and Firm Creation in China

Chong‐En Bai, Ruixue Jia, Hongbin Li, Xin Wang2021 · DOI

Abstract

The theoretical literature has long noted that talent can be used in both the entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial sectors, and its allocation depends on the reward structure. We test these hypotheses by linking administrative college admissions data for 1.8 million individuals with the universe of firm registration records in China. Within a college, we find that individuals with higher college entrance exam scores—the most important measure of talent in this context—are less likely to create firms, but, when they do, their firms are more successful than those of their lower-score counterparts. Additional survey data suggest that higher-score individuals enjoy higher wages and are more likely to join the state sector. Moreover, the score-to-firm creation relationship varies greatly across industry, according to the size of the state sector. These findings suggest that the score is positively associated with both entrepreneurial ability and wage-job ability, but higher-score individuals are attracted away by wage jobs, particularly those of the state sector.

Introduction

Economists have long argued that a nation's long-term economic growth is dictated by the allocation of its most talented citizens. Ideally, talent flows into productive entrepreneurship, creating new value and driving innovation. However, if the reward structure of a society favors "rent-seeking"—activities that shuffle existing wealth through bureaucracy or state-controlled entities—the most capable individuals may opt for the stability of the state over the risks of the market.

China provides a unique laboratory for this question. While it possesses a massive and dynamic private sector, it also maintains a dominant state sector that controls vital resources and offers prestigious, stable employment. This paper investigates whether China's "best and brightest" are becoming entrepreneurs or if they are being lured away by the safety and influence of the state.

Data and Methodology

To analyze this phenomenon, the researchers linked three massive datasets to create a comprehensive picture of talent and career trajectories in China:

  1. Administrative College Admissions: A 20% random sample (1.8 million individuals) of the Gaokao (National College Entrance Exam) records from 1999–2003.
  2. Firm Registration Records: The universe of all firms registered in China through February 2015, totaling 28 million firms.
  3. College Graduate Surveys: A supplemental survey of approximately 30,000 students from 90 colleges to capture nuances in wages, job types, and personal traits.

The study employs a "within-college" comparison strategy. By comparing students who attended the same university but achieved different Gaokao scores, the authors control for institutional reputation and alumni networks. To address selection bias—the fact that firm success is only observable for those who choose to start a business—the authors utilized a Heckman two-stage estimation with an Instrumental Variable (IV) based on the "entrepreneurial propensity" of a student's college peers from different home provinces.

The Paradox of Talent: Entry vs. Performance

The study reveals a striking "Talent Paradox." Higher Gaokao scores are negatively correlated with the decision to start a firm. Specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase in exam scores is associated with a 10% lower probability of creating a firm.

However, academic talent is not a liability for those who do enter the market. For the high-scorers who choose entrepreneurship, their firms are significantly more successful. A one-standard-deviation increase in the founder's score leads to a 10% increase in the probability of the firm expanding or investing outside its home province. These firms are also larger and more likely to eventually go public. This suggests that academic talent, as measured by the Gaokao, represents a "general ability" that translates effectively into entrepreneurial success, debunking the myth that top students are merely narrow specialists.

The Opportunity Cost of Brilliance

If high-scorers are better at running businesses, why do they avoid starting them? The data suggests the answer lies in the "outside options" available to elite graduates. High-scorers receive higher starting wages in the labor market and face a significantly higher probability of landing "ideal" jobs in the state sector (government or state-owned enterprises). For these individuals, the relative likelihood of joining the state sector is 30% higher than the likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur.

The influence of the state is further evidenced by industry-level variance. In sectors where the state has a heavy presence, such as construction or mining, the negative relationship between talent and entrepreneurship is 15 times stronger than in the IT industry, where the private market is the primary driver of growth. This indicates that the state sector acts as a powerful magnet, pulling talent away from independent firm creation, particularly in industries where state penetration is high.

Conclusion

The findings suggest that in China, the most talented individuals possess high ability for both wage employment and entrepreneurship. However, the current reward structure—characterized by high wages and stability in the state sector—creates a high opportunity cost that discourages the most capable from pursuing entrepreneurial ventures. While the Gaokao score is a powerful proxy for talent, it also reflects socioeconomic advantages that may influence these career choices. As China moves toward an era of "Common Prosperity" and increased regulation of its tech sector, the incentives for talent allocation may continue to shift, warranting further study into how these dynamics evolve over time.

Summary updated

Abstract

The theoretical literature has long noted that talent can be used in both the entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial sectors, and its allocation depends on the reward structure.We test these hypotheses by linking administrative college admissions data for 1.8 million individuals with the universe of firm registration records in China.Within a college, we find that individuals with higher college entrance exam scores -the most important measure of talent in this context -are less likely to create firms, but, when they do, their firms are more successful than those of their lower-score counterparts.Additional survey data suggest that higher-score individuals enjoy higher wages and are more likely to join the state sector.Moreover, the score-to-firm creation relationship varies greatly across industry, according to the size of the state sector.These findings suggest that the score is positively associated with both entrepreneurial ability and wage-job ability but higher-score individuals are attracted away by wage jobs, particularly those of the state sector.
BibTeX
@misc{bai2021entrepreneurial,
  author = {Chong‐En Bai and Ruixue Jia and Hongbin Li and Xin Wang},
  title = {{Entrepreneurial Reluctance: Talent and Firm Creation in China}},
  year = {2021},
  doi = {10.3386/w28865},
}
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