Abstract
We study the effects of endogenous cost formation in the classic Cournot oligopoly through an extended two-stage game. The competing Cournot firms produce low-cost but limited quantities of a single good and must procure additional units from a strategic supplier. By modeling this interaction, we identify how market uncertainty and internal production limits influence wholesale pricing and market efficiency. Our analysis utilizes the Mean Residual Life (MRL) function to characterize equilibria and reveals that "incoordination stockouts" represent a significant source of market failure.
Introduction
The Cournot model remains a cornerstone of industrial organization, providing a framework for understanding how firms compete on quantity. However, a persistent limitation of the classic model is the assumption of a fixed, exogenous marginal cost. In modern supply chains, costs are rarely static; they are the result of strategic interactions between upstream suppliers and downstream retailers. This paper addresses this gap by "endogenizing" the cost parameter, transforming it from a pre-set variable into a result of a strategic game.
The Two-Stage Game Framework
The researchers propose a model where retailers face a dual sourcing problem: they possess a limited internal capacity ($T$) to produce goods at zero marginal cost but must turn to an external supplier for any additional quantity needed to meet market demand. This interaction is structured as a two-stage game:
- Stage 1 (The Supplier): A revenue-maximizing supplier, acting as a monopolist for the external supply, sets a wholesale price ($w$).
- Stage 2 (The Retailers): A set of Cournot firms observe the wholesale price and their own internal capacities. They then simultaneously decide their total production and order quantities.
The model is analyzed under two distinct information environments: complete information, where the supplier has full knowledge of the market demand curve, and incomplete information, where the supplier only knows the probability distribution of potential demand.
Methodological Innovation: Mean Residual Life
A significant contribution of this research is the application of the Mean Residual Life (MRL) function—a tool typically found in reliability engineering—to economic theory. In its original context, MRL predicts the expected remaining life of a component given it has survived up to time $t$.
In this paper, the authors repurpose MRL to characterize the supplier's optimal pricing strategy. The supplier’s profit margin is shown to be a fixed point of a mathematical translation of the expected additional demand. By using the MRL function, the authors can determine the uniqueness of the equilibrium. Specifically, if the demand distribution exhibits a "Decreasing Mean Residual Life" (DMRL)—a property common to many standard distributions—the supplier’s optimal price is unique and mathematically tractable.
Key Insights and Market Dynamics
The Incoordination Stockout
One of the most striking findings is the phenomenon of the "incoordination stockout." Under conditions of uncertainty, a supplier may set a wholesale price that is too high for retailers to justify an order, even if a lower price would have been mutually beneficial. This lack of coordination between the supplier's price-setting and the retailers' quantity-setting leads to a market failure where demand goes unserved despite the presence of willing buyers and sellers.
The Capacity Effect and Consumer Surplus
The research highlights the strategic role of internal production limits. As retailers' internal capacities ($T$) increase, the supplier is forced to lower the wholesale price to remain a viable source of additional stock. This "capacity effect" suggests that even if retailers do not use their full internal capacity, the mere existence of higher capacity exerts downward pressure on wholesale prices, ultimately benefiting consumers through lower market prices and increased surplus.
Demand Shape vs. Mean
Contrary to intuition, a higher average market demand does not automatically lead to higher wholesale prices. The authors demonstrate that the "shape" of the uncertainty (the specific distribution and its MRL properties) is a more significant determinant of the equilibrium price than the mean value of the demand.
Results and Simulations
The authors validated their theoretical findings through numerical simulations using various probability distributions, including Uniform, Exponential, Gamma, Beta, and Pareto. Key results include:
- Equilibrium Characterization: The derivation of a unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for both deterministic and stochastic demand.
- Efficiency Bounds: For DMRL distributions, the probability of an incoordination stockout is bounded by approximately 63.2% ($1 - e^{-1}$).
- Supplier Profit Trends: While an increase in the number of retailers initially boosts supplier profits due to a larger customer base, a "crowding out" effect eventually occurs. As the aggregate internal capacity of many retailers grows, the need for external procurement diminishes, causing supplier profits to decline.
Conclusion and Future Directions
This paper provides a robust framework for endogenizing costs in oligopolistic competition. By moving away from fixed costs and incorporating strategic supply chain interactions, it offers a more realistic view of market behavior.
However, several avenues for future research remain. The current model assumes a linear demand function and a monopoly supplier. Future work could explore non-linear demand curves and "upstream competition" among multiple suppliers. Additionally, allowing retailers to strategically choose their capacity levels in a pre-game stage or extending the model to a multi-period game would further refine our understanding of how strategic costs shape market outcomes.
Summary updated