Abstract: In media markets, consumers spread their attention to several outlets, increasingly so as consumption migrates online. The traditional framework for competition among media outlets rules out this behavior by assumption. We propose a new model that allows consumers to choose multiple outlets and use it to study the effects on advertising levels and the impact of entry and mergers. We identify novel forces which reflect outlets' incentives to control the composition of their customer base. We link consumer preferences and advertising technologies to market outcomes. The model can explain several empirical regularities that are difficult to reconcile with existing models. (JEL D42, D43, L12, L13, L82, L86, M37)
Introduction: The Shift to Multi-Homing
For decades, the economic analysis of media markets was dominated by the "Hotelling" framework. This model assumes that consumers are "single-homers"—they choose one outlet, such as the New York Times or the Wall Street Journal, but rarely both. In this paradigm, media outlets compete fiercely for exclusive "eyeballs," and any increase in competition typically leads to a decrease in advertising levels as outlets try to attract viewers by reducing the "nuisance" of ads.
However, the digital age has fundamentally changed how we consume media. Modern consumers are increasingly "multi-homers," browsing multiple news sites, social media platforms, and streaming services. Data from Comscore highlights this reality: the reach of major advertising networks like Google and Yahoo overlaps significantly. Most internet users are reached by multiple major networks, meaning advertisers can reach the same individual through various channels.
Existing models struggle to explain why advertising levels often increase when new competitors enter a market—a phenomenon sometimes called the "Fox News Puzzle." This paper addresses this gap by proposing an "either or both" model of competition that accounts for overlapping viewerships and the strategic incentives they create.
The "Either or Both" Theoretical Framework
The authors develop a theoretical four-stage game to model this environment. First, outlets simultaneously set their total advertising capacity. Second, heterogeneous viewers choose to join one outlet, both, or neither, based on their content preferences and their dislike of ads (the "nuisance cost"). Third, outlets offer menus of contracts (consisting of price and ad intensity) to advertisers. Finally, homogeneous advertisers decide which contracts to accept.
Central to this model is a bivariate probability distribution representing viewer preferences. This allows the researchers to tune the correlation between how much a viewer likes Outlet A versus Outlet B. Furthermore, the model incorporates "informative advertising" technology, where the probability of a viewer being "reached" by an ad follows a concave function, reflecting the diminishing returns of repeated exposures.
Competitive Forces: Duplication vs. Business-Sharing
The core contribution of the paper is the identification of two countervailing forces that emerge specifically when viewership overlaps:
- The Duplication Effect (Downward Pressure): When a viewer sees the same advertisement on two different platforms, the second exposure is inherently less valuable to the advertiser due to diminishing returns. This reduces the price an advertiser is willing to pay for a slot on a second platform, incentivizing duopolists to provide fewer ads than a monopolist would to maintain higher prices.
- The Business-Sharing Effect (Upward Pressure): This is a more subtle, strategic force. In a monopoly, every viewer lost due to high ad volume is an "exclusive" viewer lost. In a duopoly, many of the viewers lost are "shared" viewers who also visit the competitor. Because shared viewers are less valuable to an individual outlet (their "rent" is competed away), the outlet is less afraid to annoy them with ads. This pushes advertising levels up.
The balance between these forces depends on the correlation of viewer preferences. If preferences are positively correlated (e.g., fans of ESPN are likely to also watch Fox Sports), the duplication effect dominates, and entry leads to lower ad levels. Conversely, if preferences are negatively correlated (e.g., MSNBC vs. Fox News), the business-sharing effect dominates, and entry leads to higher ad levels.
Empirical Validation and the "Fox News Puzzle"
The paper validates these theoretical findings using a dataset from the U.S. Cable TV Industry (1989–2002), covering 68 basic cable channels. The results provide a theoretical explanation for the "Fox News Puzzle": the entry of diverse, ideologically distinct channels in the 1990s (negative correlation) triggered the business-sharing effect, causing overall advertising levels to rise despite increased competition.
Regression analysis further supports the model's nuances. While entry generally increased ad levels across the board, this increase was significantly smaller—or even negative—in genres like "Sports" or "Movies & Series." In these segments, viewer preferences are more likely to be positively correlated, allowing the duplication effect to temper or reverse the upward pressure on ad levels.
Policy Implications and Conclusion
The "either or both" model has significant implications for antitrust and welfare analysis. Contrary to standard intuition, the authors demonstrate that a merger between two outlets can actually reduce advertising levels. If overlapping viewers are harder to inform than exclusive ones, a merger might improve viewer welfare by reducing redundant ad exposure.
While the model assumes advertiser homogeneity and exogenous content quality, it provides a robust new lens for understanding the complex dynamics of modern, multi-homed media markets. Future research may build on this by exploring how outlets strategically choose their content types to manipulate audience correlation and competitive outcomes.
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