Dynamic Game of the Dual-Channel Supply Chain Under a Carbon Subsidy Policy

Yi Tian, Li Zhao, Meihong ZhuInt. J. Bifurc. Chaos 2022 · arXiv

Abstract

This paper investigates the complex dynamics of a dual-channel supply chain—comprising one manufacturer and two retailers (online and offline)—operating under a government carbon subsidy policy. By applying dynamic game theory, the study analyzes three distinct market power structures: Nash equilibrium, Manufacturer-dominated Stackelberg (MS), and Retailer-dominated Stackelberg (RS). The findings reveal that while carbon subsidies successfully promote green product adoption, they can also trigger market instability and "chaos" if price adjustments are too aggressive. The research identifies the Manufacturer-dominated model as the most stable and proposes chaos control mechanisms to restore market equilibrium.

Introduction

As global economies transition toward "Carbon Neutrality," government subsidies have become a primary tool for incentivizing low-carbon manufacturing. Simultaneously, the retail landscape has evolved into a dual-channel model where manufacturers utilize both traditional offline stores and direct online platforms. This paper addresses a critical gap in existing literature by examining how these government interventions interact with various market power structures to affect pricing stability and overall supply chain profitability.

Comparison of this study with existing literature

As shown in the literature comparison above, this study is unique in its comprehensive integration of dual-channel dynamics, multiple game-theoretic models, government regulation, and dynamic game analysis.

Methodology

The researchers constructed a mathematical model involving a manufacturer and two retailers. To account for real-world limitations, the model assumes "bounded rationality," where players adjust prices dynamically based on previous profit outcomes rather than having perfect information. The system was analyzed under three scenarios:

  1. Nash Game (NG): Simultaneous decision-making with equal power.
  2. Manufacturer-dominated Stackelberg (MS): The manufacturer leads by setting wholesale prices.
  3. Retailer-dominated Stackelberg (RS): Retailers lead by setting sales commissions.

Long-term system behavior was evaluated using bifurcation diagrams and Largest Lyapunov Exponents (LLE) to identify thresholds where stable pricing collapses into unpredictable chaos.

Key Insights and Results

Stability and Market Power

The analysis indicates that market stability is highly sensitive to the power structure. The system remains stable for the longest duration when the manufacturer dominates (MS model). In contrast, the Retailer-dominated (RS) model is prone to earlier bifurcation, where wholesale prices fluctuate wildly even if retailers attempt to keep their commissions steady.

The Impact of Subsidies

While carbon subsidies increase the sales of green products, they also heighten market complexity. High consumer preference for green products ($\lambda$) or specific channels ($\eta$) can act as volatility triggers, pushing the system toward chaotic states. For instance, in the RS model, the system hits a critical bifurcation point when channel preference reaches a specific threshold.

Profitability Analysis

Contrary to the intuition that a dominant position yields the best results for the whole system, numerical simulations show that total supply chain profit ($\pi_{SC}^*$) is maximized under the Nash Game (NG) model, where players act simultaneously.

Numerical results for different game models

As illustrated in the table above, the Nash model achieves a total profit of 1.159, significantly higher than the 1.073 achieved in both the MS and RS models. This suggests that decentralized, simultaneous competition may be more efficient for the supply chain as a whole than hierarchical dominance.

Chaos Control and Management Implications

To mitigate market instability, the authors tested chaos control methods, including parameter adjustment and delayed feedback control. By introducing a control parameter (e.g., $v = 0.6$), managers can effectively suppress chaotic price fluctuations and return the system to a steady state. This provides a practical "mathematical safety net" for firms operating in volatile, subsidy-driven markets.

Conclusion

This research highlights the delicate balance between promoting environmental goals and maintaining market stability. While subsidies are effective, they require careful management of price adjustment speeds to avoid chaotic outcomes. Future research should consider stochastic demand factors and compare these subsidy results against other policy instruments like carbon taxes or cap-and-trade systems.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@article{tian2022dynamic,
  author = {Yi Tian and Li Zhao and Meihong Zhu},
  title = {{Dynamic Game of the Dual-Channel Supply Chain Under a Carbon Subsidy Policy}},
  journal = {Int. J. Bifurc. Chaos},
  year = {2022},
}
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