Dynamic access pricing control for fair and stable resource sharing

Chris King, Homayoun Hamedmoghadam, Christos G. Cassandras, Fabian Wirth, Robert ShortenarXiv 2025 · DOI · arXiv

Abstract

We consider the use of pricing as a regulatory mechanism when an unknown number of autonomous agents compete for access to a shared resource (possibly limited in volume or capacity). In standard dynamic pricing control systems, an increasing price is used to balance supply and demand for a resource in a constrained environment. A major drawback of dynamic pricing is that it is socially regressive, i.e., unfair, as such systems favour price-insensitive (unresponsive) traffic and control the demand at the expense of price-sensitive (responsive) traffic. We tackle this fundamental issue by proposing a new form of pricing that strikes a balance between using price as a control mechanism to manage demand for a resource and ensuring fair access to the resource for both price-sensitive and insensitive traffic. Our system gives rise to a switched non-linear ODE model, the stability of which is equivalent to ensuring the fairness properties of the pricing control system. Simulations illustrate this stability-fairness tradeoff and with the results demonstrating the effectiveness of the overall design.

Introduction

Dynamic pricing, often referred to as "surge pricing," has become a standard tool for managing demand in various sectors, from ride-sharing to energy grids. The underlying economic principle is straightforward: as demand approaches capacity, prices rise to incentivize some users to defer or cancel their requests, thereby stabilizing the system. However, this approach is inherently "socially regressive." By using price as the primary control signal, these systems effectively prioritize users with higher willingness (or ability) to pay, often excluding price-sensitive individuals from essential services during peak demand.

This paper addresses the ethical and functional limitations of standard surge pricing. We propose a novel control mechanism that ensures "fair coexistence" between price-sensitive (responsive) and price-insensitive (unresponsive) users, even when the system operator cannot directly distinguish between them.

Methods

The proposed framework models the resource environment using three interconnected state variables representing different user pools and the resource itself:

  1. Responsive Pool ($R$): Users whose participation is contingent on the current price.
  2. Unresponsive Pool ($U$): Users who require the resource regardless of the price.
  3. Active Queue ($q$): The current utilization level of the shared resource.

The dynamics of these pools are governed by a set of Ordinary Differential Equations (ODEs) that account for arrival rates ($K_R, K_U$), admission rates ($\alpha(q)$), and the pricing function ($f(q)$).

System model representing the interaction between responsive (R) and unresponsive (U) user pools and the active resource queue (q).

The core innovation lies in the design of the Pricing Function $f(q)$. Unlike traditional monotonic pricing, we introduce a "switched" non-linear approach:

  • Normal Mode: At lower congestion levels, the price increases with $q$ to regulate demand effectively.
  • Competitive Mode: Once congestion exceeds a specific threshold ($q_m$), the pricing strategy shifts. The price may either level off ("saturated pricing") or actually decrease ("vanishing pricing").

This counter-intuitive strategy—lowering prices during peak scarcity—is based on the observation that if a surge is driven by unresponsive users, further price increases fail to regulate demand and only serve to unfairly exclude responsive users.

Key Insights and Stability Analysis

The system is designed as a switched non-linear ODE. Using Lyapunov theory and the Poincaré-Bendixson theorem, we demonstrate that the high-congestion regime can be treated as an "unstable equilibrium." This creates a restorative force: when the temporary burst of unresponsive demand subsides, the system's internal dynamics naturally push it back toward a stable, low-congestion, and low-price state.

This approach solves the "observability problem." By adjusting the pricing function based on total queue size rather than individual user types, the system maintains fairness without requiring intrusive data on user sensitivity.

Results and Discussion

Numerical simulations were conducted to validate the model against standard linear surge pricing. Key findings include:

  • Improved Fairness: Under the proposed mechanism, the admission ratio for price-sensitive users remains significantly higher during demand spikes compared to standard models.
  • System Recovery: Both "vanishing" and "saturated" pricing models successfully managed queue sizes during surges and enabled rapid recovery to normal operation once excess demand ceased.
  • Reduced Exclusion: Metrics tracking "accumulated exits" showed that fewer responsive users were forced out of the system, mitigating the "access poverty" typically associated with surge pricing.

Conclusion

This research presents a paradigm shift in dynamic pricing, moving from pure demand management to a framework that balances stability with social fairness. By intentionally limiting the use of price as a control signal during extreme congestion, we can prevent the permanent exclusion of price-sensitive populations. Future work will focus on optimizing the threshold parameters ($q_m$) and extending the model to accommodate a broader spectrum of user price sensitivities beyond the binary responsive/unresponsive classification.

Summary updated

Abstract

We consider the use of pricing as a regulatory mechanism when an unknown number of autonomous agents compete for access to a shared resource (possibly limited in volume or capacity). In standard dynamic pricing control systems, an increasing price is used to balance supply and demand for a resource in a constrained environment. A major drawback of dynamic pricing is that it is socially regressive, i.e., unfair, as such systems favour price-insensitive (unresponsive) traffic and control the demand at the expense of price-sensitive (responsive) traffic. We tackle this fundamental issue by proposing a new form of pricing that strikes a balance between using price as a control mechanism to manage demand for a resource and ensuring fair access to the resource for both price-sensitive and insensitive traffic. Our system gives rise to a switched non-linear ODE model, the stability of which is equivalent to ensuring the fairness properties of the pricing control system. Simulations illustrate this stability-fairness tradeoff and with the results demonstrating the effectiveness of the overall design.
BibTeX
@misc{king2025dynamic,
  author = {Chris King and Homayoun Hamedmoghadam and Christos G. Cassandras and Fabian Wirth and Robert Shorten},
  title = {{Dynamic access pricing control for fair and stable resource sharing}},
  year = {2025},
  eprint = {2507.17939},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.17939},
  howpublished = {arXiv},
}

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