Duopoly Price Competition in Wireless Sensor Network-Based Service Provision

Xianwei Li, Liang Zhao, Zhenyu Zhou, Bo Gu, Guolong Chen, Fanyong Cheng, Haiyang ZhangSensors 2018 · DOI

TL;DR

This paper models the competition between two service providers (SPs) in an Internet of Things (IoT) market that relies on Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). It analyzes two pricing competition scenarios – a simultaneous Noncooperative Strategic Game (NSG) and a sequential Stackelberg Game (SG) – to understand how SPs set prices and how users choose services, ultimately aiming to maximize their profits.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

The Internet of Things (IoT) is rapidly expanding, creating new markets for services built upon data from Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). However, the economic models and competitive dynamics within these emerging IoT markets are not yet fully understood. Specifically, this paper addresses how two competing service providers (SPs) should strategically set prices for their WSN-based services to attract end-users and maximize their own profits. It considers a market structure where WSNs collect data, SPs purchase and process this data to offer services, and end-users decide which SP to subscribe to based on price and service quality. The authors aim to provide a theoretical framework for understanding this competitive landscape, considering different market interaction models.

Methods

The core of this paper is a game-theoretic modeling approach. The authors employ a two-stage Stackelberg game framework to represent the interaction between the two SPs and end-users.

  • Stage 1 (SP Pricing): The two SPs set their service prices. This stage is analyzed under two distinct competition models:
  • Noncooperative Strategic Game (NSG): Both SPs set their prices simultaneously, without knowledge of the other's price.
  • Stackelberg Game (SG): One SP (SP1) acts as the leader and sets its price first, anticipating the response of the other SP (SP2), who then acts as the follower and sets its price.
  • Stage 2 (User Choice): End-users, with heterogeneous willingness-to-pay (WTP) for service quality, observe the prices and service rates (data rates, R1 and R2) and choose the SP that maximizes their utility. The utility function is defined as $U_{k,i} = \theta_k R_i - p_i$, where $\theta_k$ is the user's WTP, $R_i$ is the service rate of SPi, and $p_i$ is the subscription price of SPi.
  • Equilibrium Analysis: The authors derive Nash Equilibrium prices for the NSG and Stackelberg Equilibrium prices for the SG. They use backward induction to solve the Stackelberg game.
  • Numerical Simulations: Extensive simulations are conducted to analyze the impact of various parameters (data rates, cost factors) on user distribution, equilibrium prices, and SP profits under both NSG and SG scenarios.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper. The study relies on theoretical modeling and simulation rather than empirical datasets.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Competition Scenarios Matter: The choice between simultaneous (NSG) and sequential (SG) pricing significantly impacts both SPs' prices and profits, as well as user distribution.
  • Quality Drives Advantage: Higher data rates (service quality) generally lead to higher equilibrium prices and attract more users, especially for the SP offering superior quality.
  • Leader vs. Follower Dynamics: In the Stackelberg game, the leader (SP1) can leverage its first-mover advantage to potentially secure higher profits, but the follower (SP2) can still compete effectively by strategically responding.
  • Cost Structure is Crucial: The cost factor $\beta$, which influences the price of resources based on aggregate data rate, has a more significant impact on SP profits than the base cost factor $\alpha$.
  • User Heterogeneity is Key: The model explicitly accounts for users' varying willingness-to-pay for service quality, which is fundamental to understanding their subscription decisions.

Key Results

  • User Distribution: In the $R_1 > R_2$ case, SP1 generally attracts more users than SP2 due to its higher quality. The SG scenario tends to favor SP2 in terms of user numbers, while NSG favors SP1.
  • Equilibrium Prices: Both SPs tend to set higher equilibrium prices in the SG scenario compared to the NSG scenario. SP1, with higher quality, consistently sets higher prices than SP2.
  • Profits: SP1, due to its higher service quality, generally achieves higher profits than SP2 in both scenarios. Increasing the quality of service ($R_1$ or $R_2$) generally leads to increased profits for both SPs.
  • Cost Impact: The cost factor $\beta$ has a more pronounced effect on SP profits than $\alpha$. Higher $\beta$ values can significantly reduce profits, especially for the SP with lower service quality.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Static vs. Dynamic: The current model focuses on a static scenario. The authors acknowledge that a dynamic scenario, where data rates and user preferences change over time, would be a valuable extension.
  • Duopoly Focus: The paper is limited to a duopoly market (two SPs). Extending the analysis to an oligopoly market with more than two SPs is suggested.
  • Cooperation: The paper focuses on competition. Future work could explore scenarios where SPs cooperate, perhaps through forming coalitions, to improve their collective profits.
  • User Preferences: While user WTP is considered, the model could be expanded to include more complex user preferences and behaviors.
  • Evolutionary Game Theory: The authors suggest applying evolutionary game theory to model dynamic scenarios with changing user preferences and service offerings.

Summary updated

Abstract

The Internet of Things (IoT) is emerging as a new communication paradigm and has attracted a significant amount of attention from both academic and engineering communities. In this paper, we consider an IoT market where three roles exist: Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), two service providers (SPs) and end users. The WSNs are responsible for sensing and providing data to the two SPs. Based on the sensed data from WSNs, the two SPs compete to provide services to the end users. We model the relationship between the two SPs and end users as a two-stage Stackelberg game, where the two SPs set the prices for their services firstly, and then the end users decide which SP to choose. Specifically, we consider two price-competition scenarios of the two SPs, which are engaged in two games, one is a noncooperative strategic game (NSG) where the two SPs set the prices for services simultaneously, the other is a Stackelberg game (SG) where SP1 who sets the price first is the leader and SP2 who sets the price after is the follower. Each user decides whether and which SP to purchase services from based on prices and service rates. An equilibrium is achieved in each of the two scenarios. Numerical results are conducted to verify our theoretical analysis.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{li2018duopoly,
  author = {Xianwei Li and Liang Zhao and Zhenyu Zhou and Bo Gu and Guolong Chen and Fanyong Cheng and Haiyang Zhang},
  title = {{Duopoly Price Competition in Wireless Sensor Network-Based Service Provision}},
  booktitle = {Sensors},
  year = {2018},
  doi = {10.3390/s18124422},
}
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