$DPOT_{L_0}$: Concealing Backdoored model updates in Federated Learning by Data Poisoning with $L_0$-norm-bounded Optimized Triggers

Yujie Zhang, Neil Zhenqiang Gong, Michael K. ReiterOpenReview 2025 · Submission to ICML 2025 · Rejected · OpenReview

Abstract

Traditional backdoor attacks in Federated Learning (FL) that rely on fixed trigger patterns and model poisoning exhibit deficient attacking performance against state-of-the-art defenses due to the significant divergence between malicious and benign client model updates. To effectively conceal malicious model updates among benign ones, we propose $DPOT_{L_0}$, a backdoor attack strategy in FL that dynamically constructs a per-round backdoor objective by optimizing an $L_0$-norm-bounded backdoor trigger, making backdoor data have minimal effect on model updates and preserving the global model's main-task performance. We theoretically justify the concealment property of $DPOT_{L_0}$'s model updates in linear models. Our experiments show that $DPOT_{L_0}$, via only a data-poisoning attack, effectively undermines state-of-the-art defenses and outperforms existing backdoor attack techniques on various datasets.
BibTeX
@misc{zhang2025dpot,
  author = {Yujie Zhang and Neil Zhenqiang Gong and Michael K. Reiter},
  title = {{$DPOT\_\{L\_0\}$: Concealing Backdoored model updates in Federated Learning by Data Poisoning with $L\_0$-norm-bounded Optimized Triggers}},
  year = {2025},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=O6OugpQ1Pq},
  howpublished = {OpenReview},
  note = {Submitted to ICML 2025},
}
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