Does Shared Responsibility Breed Unfairness

Raymond DuchSSRN 2012

Abstract

We conduct an online experiment in Denmark designed to explore responsibility attribution and how it shapes the strategic decisions of parties making up a governing coalition. In particular, we are interested in coalition decisions that result in unfair policies, i.e., policies that generate inequitable outcomes that are unpopular with a large component of the general electorate. We believe this provides important insight into the trade-offs elected decision makers confront between the benefits of adopting Pareto efficient policies, that frequently have the effect of increasing inequality, and the costs associated with voters punishing the government for what are likely to be unpopular policies for a significant element of the electorate. We implement a game resembling a collective Dictator game with punishment. The experimental results presented here confirm that Voter subjects do in fact punish unfair allocations by Party subjects. As allocations become increasingly unfair in regards to the recipients, the level of punishment increases -- a result consistent with much of the work on games of this nature. And there is some evidence that this punishment will be greater for decision makers with majority, as opposed to equally shared, voting power. Finally there is support for the conjecture posed in the title of this paper: Decision makers anticipate two features of the voters' punishment strategies: First they anticipate that voters will punish decision makers for unfair decisions -- and the more unfair the decision, the higher the punishment. Second, decision makers with more concentrated voting power anticipate that they will be held disproportionately responsible for unfair allocation decisions and therefore are less likely to support allocations -- or policies -- that may be Pareto efficient but result in inequitable outcomes.
BibTeX
@misc{duch2012does,
  author = {Raymond Duch},
  title = {{Does Shared Responsibility Breed Unfairness}},
  year = {2012},
  howpublished = {SSRN},
}

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