TL;DR
China's new "Diagnostic Intervention Package" (DIP) payment system, designed to encourage hospitals to treat patients according to their level of care, has shown mixed results. While tertiary and secondary hospitals are handling more complex cases, primary care facilities are also seeing an increase in complexity, potentially leading to resource inefficiency and inequity. The reform, as it stands, has not effectively established the desired ordered health delivery system.
What Problem Does This Paper Address?
China faces a significant challenge in its healthcare system: overcrowded superior hospitals and underutilized primary healthcare facilities. This imbalance leads to inefficient use of medical resources and inequity in access to care. To address this, China introduced the "Diagnostic Intervention Package" (DIP), a case-based payment method intended to incentivize medical institutions to align their services with their functional positioning and capabilities. The core problem this paper investigates is whether this DIP reform successfully promotes the construction of an "ordered health delivery system," where patients are appropriately directed to different levels of care based on their condition.
Methods
The study employs an Interrupted Time Series Analysis (ITSA) to evaluate the impact of the DIP reform. This quasi-experimental design is well-suited for analyzing the effects of policy interventions by examining trends before and after the intervention. The researchers collected de-identified patient discharge data from a sample of medical institutions in Tai'an, a pilot city for the DIP reform, covering 18 months before and 18 months after the intervention. They analyzed several outcome variables related to case severity and service scope across different hospital levels.
Datasets
The study utilized de-identified patient discharge data from the information management system of the Tai'an Healthcare Security Administration. The dataset included approximately 794,191 discharge cases before the DIP reform (April 2020 - September 2021) and 1,014,112 discharge cases after the reform (October 2021 - March 2023). The data encompassed patient characteristics, hospital level, diagnosis, and procedure information.
Key Insights and Ideas
- Unintended Consequences for Primary Care: The DIP reform, while aiming to direct simpler cases to primary care, appears to be pushing more complex cases towards these facilities, potentially beyond their capacity and increasing their risk.
- "Upcoding" as a Potential Driver: Providers in primary care facilities may be "upcoding" cases to higher severity groups to increase reimbursement, contributing to increased case mix index and decreased proportion of primary DIP group cases.
- Tertiary Hospitals' Profit Motive: Even with the DIP reform, tertiary hospitals may be incentivized to take on more complex cases not only for their designated role but also for potential profit, especially if they have excess capacity.
- The Role of MIRC: The Medical Institution Rank Coefficient (MIRC) is a crucial component of DIP, aiming to balance payments across different hospital levels. However, its current settings might not be effectively steering patient flow as intended.
Key Results
- Tertiary and Secondary Hospitals: After the DIP reform, these hospitals saw an increase in the proportion of patients receiving complicated procedures and an increase in their case mix index (CMI). The proportion of primary-DIP-groups cases decreased, aligning with policy goals.
- Primary Healthcare Facilities: Unexpectedly, these facilities also saw an increase in the proportion of patients receiving complicated procedures and an increase in their CMI. However, the proportion of primary-DIP-groups cases and their coverage decreased, suggesting a shift away from simpler cases.
- Overall Impact: The study concludes that the DIP reform did not effectively promote the construction of the ordered health delivery system. Policymakers need to adjust economic incentives and implement restraint mechanisms.
Limitations and Future Work
The authors acknowledge several limitations:
- Index System: The absence of a specific index system for evaluating the ordered health delivery system in China makes it challenging to definitively assess the reform's impact. Further longitudinal observation is needed.
- No Control Group: The nationwide nature of the DIP/DRG reform and data limitations meant there was no suitable unaffected control group, limiting the ability to definitively attribute changes solely to the DIP reform.
- Interview-Based Evidence: While interviews revealed potential upcoding behaviors, the lack of an efficient regulatory system makes it difficult to quantify the extent of such practices.
- Generalizability: The study was conducted in a single pilot city (Tai'an), and considerable differences in economic development and medical conditions across China mean that payment reform impacts may vary in other cities.
Future work should involve longer-term observational studies, the development of more robust evaluation frameworks, and investigations into the effectiveness of different regulatory mechanisms to ensure the intended outcomes of payment reforms.
Summary updated