Abstract
Due to the open communications environment in wireless channels, wireless networks are vulnerable to jamming attacks. However, existing approaches for jamming rely on knowledge of the legitimate users' (LUs') channels, extra jamming power, or both. To raise concerns about the potential threats posed by illegitimate intelligent reflecting surfaces (IRSs), we propose an alternative method to launch jamming attacks on LUs without either LU channel state information (CSI) or jamming power. The proposed approach employs an adversarial IRS with random phase shifts, referred to as a "disco" IRS (DIRS), that acts like a "disco ball" to actively age the LUs' channels. Such active channel aging (ACA) interference can be used to launch jamming attacks on multi-user multiple-input single-output (MU-MISO) systems. The proposed DIRS-based fully-passive jammer (FPJ) can jam LUs with no additional jamming power or knowledge of the LU CSI, and it can not be mitigated by classical anti-jamming approaches. A theoretical analysis of the proposed DIRS-based FPJ that provides an evaluation of the DIRS-based jamming attacks is derived. Based on this detailed theoretical analysis, some unique properties of the proposed DIRS-based FPJ can be obtained. Furthermore, a design example of the proposed DIRS-based FPJ based on one-bit quantization of the IRS phases is demonstrated to be sufficient for implementing the jamming attack. In addition, numerical results are provided to show the effectiveness of the derived theoretical analysis and the jamming impact of the proposed DIRS-based FPJ.
Introduction
Wireless security is increasingly threatened by jamming attacks, which serve as a common form of Denial of Service (DoS). Traditionally, these attacks are categorized into Active Jammers (AJ), which consume significant power to broadcast noise, and Passive Jammers (PJ), which utilize Intelligent Reflecting Surfaces (IRS) to create destructive interference. However, conventional PJs face a significant hurdle: they typically require perfect Channel State Information (CSI) of the legitimate users (LUs) to effectively cancel signals. This paper introduces a novel threat—the Disco Intelligent Reflecting Surface (DIRS)—which functions as a fully-passive jammer (FPJ) requiring neither internal power nor knowledge of the LU's channel.
The DIRS Attack Model and Active Channel Aging
The core innovation of the DIRS is the concept of Active Channel Aging (ACA). Unlike a standard IRS that optimizes its phase shifts to assist communication, the DIRS acts like a digital "disco ball," rapidly and randomly toggling its reflecting elements to warp the wireless environment.
As illustrated in the system model, the attack operates in two distinct phases:
- Silent Pilot Phase: During the period when LUs send pilot signals for channel estimation, the DIRS remains silent (absorbing or not reflecting signals). This allows the Base Station (BS) to acquire a seemingly "clean" estimate of the direct channel ($H_d$).
- Randomized Data Phase: Once data transmission begins, the DIRS controller activates, applying rapidly changing random phase shifts ($\phi(t)$). This creates time-varying interference that "ages" the channel faster than the BS can adapt. The BS attempts to decode data using the now-obsolete CSI from the pilot phase, leading to significant decoding errors.
Methodology and Theoretical Analysis
The researchers evaluated this threat in a Multi-User Multiple-Input Single-Output (MU-MISO) system. Using standard 3GPP propagation models, they simulated an environment with a large-scale BS (256 antennas) serving multiple single-antenna users. The BS-DIRS link was modeled with Rician fading (line-of-sight), while other links utilized Rayleigh fading to represent rich scattering.
The study derived rigorous theoretical lower bounds for the "ergodic achievable rate"—the average data speed—considering both Zero-Forcing (ZF) and Maximum-Ratio Combining (MRC) receivers. These derivations allow for a predictable assessment of how a DIRS of a certain size ($N_D$ elements) will impact network performance.
Key Insights
- The Power Paradox: In a traditional jamming scenario, a user might overcome interference by increasing their transmit power. With a DIRS, this is counterproductive. Because the DIRS reflects the user's own signal as interference, increasing transmit power proportionally increases the interference power.
- Hardware Simplicity: The attack is robust against hardware limitations. A "1-bit" DIRS, which only flips between two phase states (0 and $\pi$), is nearly as effective as a surface with infinite phase precision.
- Immunity to Defenses: Because the DIRS reflects the legitimate signal itself, the interference occupies the exact same frequency and bandwidth as the data. This renders standard anti-jamming techniques, such as frequency hopping, completely ineffective.
Results and Performance Impact
Numerical simulations validated the theoretical analysis, showing that the DIRS can drive the achievable data rate of legitimate users toward zero as the number of reflecting elements increases. In a test case with 8 users and a 256-antenna BS, a DIRS with 4096 elements reduced the per-user data rate from approximately 12 bits/symbol to just 4 bits/symbol, even at high signal-to-noise ratios. This demonstrates that the DIRS-based FPJ can significantly outperform active jammers that are constrained by power budgets.
Conclusion
The DIRS represents a potent and difficult-to-detect threat to wireless infrastructure. While its effectiveness is currently limited by proximity—the jamming impact weakens as the DIRS is moved further from the BS—its ability to operate without CSI or power makes it a dangerous tool for adversarial actors. Future research is required to develop detection mechanisms and explore how multi-antenna users (MIMO) might mitigate ACA interference through spatial multiplexing.
Summary updated