Deterministic, Strategyproof, and Fair Cake Cutting

Vijay Menon, Kate LarsonIJCAI 2017 · DOI

TL;DR

This paper explores the fundamental challenge of dividing a divisible good (like a cake) among agents in a way that is both fair and strategyproof, meaning agents have no incentive to lie about their preferences. The authors prove several impossibility results, showing that for deterministic mechanisms, achieving all these desirable properties simultaneously is often impossible, even under restricted conditions.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

The "cake cutting problem" is a classic fair division problem where a divisible resource (the "cake") needs to be partitioned among multiple agents. The goal is to achieve a "fair" allocation, often defined by criteria like proportionality (each agent gets at least 1/n of their perceived value) or envy-freeness (no agent prefers another's share). A crucial aspect in real-world scenarios is "strategyproofness": ensuring agents cannot benefit by misrepresenting their true valuations. This paper delves into the limitations of deterministic mechanisms (those that always produce the same output for the same input) in achieving strategyproofness and fairness, particularly for agents with piecewise constant valuations. They investigate how restrictive assumptions, like "non-wastefulness" (no valuable cake is left unallocated) and "contiguous allocations" (each agent receives a single piece), impact the possibility of designing such mechanisms.

Methods

The paper employs a mechanism design approach, focusing on direct-revelation mechanisms where agents explicitly state their valuation functions. The core methodology involves constructing specific valuation profiles designed to expose contradictions in the assumed existence of a mechanism with the desired properties. This often involves:

  • Constructing "worst-case" valuation profiles: These profiles are carefully crafted to exploit potential weaknesses in a mechanism, forcing agents to reveal their true preferences or demonstrating how a deviation can lead to a better outcome.
  • Proof by contradiction: The authors assume a mechanism with the desired properties exists and then show that by using these constructed profiles, an agent can either gain by misreporting (violating strategyproofness) or the allocation fails to meet fairness criteria.
  • Analyzing different constraints: The paper systematically examines the impact of constraints like "non-wastefulness" and "contiguous allocations" on the possibility of achieving strategyproof and proportional outcomes.
  • Connecting to the Robertson-Webb model: For some results, they establish a connection between direct-revelation mechanisms and the query-based Robertson-Webb model, showing how approximations in one can translate to properties in the other.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper. The paper focuses on theoretical impossibility results and algorithmic constructions rather than empirical evaluation on datasets.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Deterministic mechanisms face severe limitations: Even with relatively simple valuation functions (piecewise constant) and desirable fairness criteria (proportionality), deterministic mechanisms struggle to be both strategyproof and fair.
  • Non-wastefulness is a strong constraint: The "non-wasteful" property, while seemingly benign, significantly restricts the possible allocations and contributes to impossibility results. Removing it, while still facing challenges, opens up slightly more possibilities.
  • Contiguous allocations are also restrictive: Requiring agents to receive single, contiguous pieces of cake further limits mechanism design, leading to impossibility results even when non-wastefulness is relaxed.
  • Approximate properties are still hard to achieve: The paper shows that even approximate versions of strategyproofness and proportionality are difficult to guarantee simultaneously with deterministic mechanisms.
  • A bridge between models: The connection drawn between direct-revelation and Robertson-Webb models is valuable for understanding how results in one setting inform the other, especially when dealing with approximate properties.

Key Results

The paper presents several strong impossibility results:

  • Theorem 1: For $n \ge 2$ agents, there is no deterministic, non-wasteful mechanism that is $\epsilon_1$-strategyproof and $\epsilon_2$-proportional for any $\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2$ such that $3\epsilon_1 + \epsilon_2 < 1$. This strengthens a prior result by showing that even approximate strategyproofness and proportionality are impossible under these conditions.
  • Theorem 4: For $n \ge 2$ agents, there is no deterministic mechanism that makes contiguous allocations and is strategyproof and $\epsilon$-proportional for any $0 < \epsilon < 1$.
  • Proposition 5: A stronger version of Theorem 4 for two agents, showing impossibility for $\epsilon_1$-strategyproofness and $\epsilon_2$-proportionality when $\epsilon_1 + \epsilon_2 < 1/2$.
  • Proposition 6: Establishes a connection between direct-revelation and Robertson-Webb models. If a deterministic direct-revelation mechanism exists with certain properties (strategyproofness, proportionality, envy-freeness) for piecewise constant valuations, then a mechanism in the Robertson-Webb model exists that achieves approximate versions of these properties using a limited number of queries.
  • Theorem 8: Presents a modified Even-Paz algorithm that is proportional and $\epsilon$-strategyproof for $n$ agents, with $\epsilon$ depending on whether $n$ is even or odd. For $n=2$ or $n=3$, this modified algorithm offers better $\epsilon$ bounds than the original Even-Paz algorithm.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Open question on general allocations: The paper leaves open the question of whether strategyproof and $\epsilon$-proportional mechanisms exist for arbitrary (non-contiguous) allocations when removing the non-wasteful constraint.
  • Non-wastefulness remains a challenge: The difficulty in achieving non-wastefulness alongside other desirable properties is highlighted, with an example showing how attempts to make a mechanism non-wasteful can break strategyproofness.
  • Deterministic vs. Randomized: The paper focuses on deterministic mechanisms. The authors note that randomized mechanisms have shown more promise in achieving strategyproofness and fairness, and resolving the limits of determinism is crucial for understanding the landscape of fair division.
  • General valuation functions: While piecewise constant valuations are studied, extending these results to more general valuation functions (like piecewise linear) remains an area for future work.
  • Minimum $\epsilon$ for proportional and $\epsilon$-strategyproof mechanisms: A key open problem is to determine the minimum achievable $\epsilon$ for which a deterministic, proportional, and $\epsilon$-strategyproof mechanism exists for $n \ge 2$ agents.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@inproceedings{menon2017deterministic,
  author = {Vijay Menon and Kate Larson},
  title = {{Deterministic, Strategyproof, and Fair Cake Cutting}},
  booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year = {2017},
  doi = {10.24963/ijcai.2017/50},
}
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