TL;DR
This paper introduces a novel gateway that bridges the CAN/CANFD and SOME/IP protocols, crucial for modern in-vehicle networks. It addresses the growing need for secure data exchange by implementing three distinct security schemes, offering a balance between integrity, confidentiality, and performance.
What Problem Does This Paper Address?
Modern vehicles are increasingly complex, featuring a proliferation of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and a shift towards domain-centralized architectures. This evolution necessitates higher bandwidth communication, leading to the adoption of automotive Ethernet alongside traditional buses like CAN and CANFD. However, this increased connectivity also exposes vehicles to significant cybersecurity threats. A critical component in this new architecture is a gateway that can seamlessly translate data between these different protocols. Existing solutions often lack robust security mechanisms or fail to consider the overhead introduced by security measures, especially when dealing with the SOME/IP protocol, a popular middleware for service-oriented architectures in vehicles. This paper tackles the challenge of designing a CAN/CANFD to SOME/IP gateway that not only performs protocol conversion efficiently but also provides configurable cybersecurity protections against common attacks like frame forgery, tampering, and sniffing.
Methods
The core of this work is the design and implementation of a CAN/CANFD to SOME/IP gateway system. This system is modular, comprising five key components: a SOME/IP receive module, a CAN receive module, a protocol transform module, a security module, and a SOME/IP send module.
The novelty lies in the security module, which offers three distinct schemes:
- Scheme 1 (Integrity): Employs Message Authentication Codes (MAC) algorithms like AES128-CMAC and SHA256-HMAC to ensure message integrity, protecting against frame forgery and tampering.
- Scheme 2 (Integrity & Confidentiality): Utilizes Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms such as AES256-GCM and Chacha20-Poly1305. This scheme provides both integrity and confidentiality, defending against frame forgery, tampering, and sniffing.
- Scheme 3 (No Security): Serves as a baseline for performance comparison, with no security mechanisms implemented.
The gateway itself is implemented on an NXP-S32G development board, a multi-core heterogeneous platform with Arm Cortex-M7 and Cortex-A53 cores, supporting AES acceleration. The communication between the gateway and ADAS utilizes the SOME/IP protocol over UDP, while CAN/CANFD communication is handled via native Linux CAN sockets.
Datasets
Not discussed in the paper. The experiments utilize simulated CAN/CANFD messages generated by Vector's VN1610 interface card and CANoe software.
Key Insights and Ideas
- Configurable Security is Key: The ability to choose between different security strengths (integrity-only vs. integrity and confidentiality) is crucial for balancing security needs with performance requirements in diverse automotive applications.
- SOME/IP Overhead is Manageable: While SOME/IP is a more complex protocol than CAN, the gateway design effectively manages its overhead, demonstrating that it can be integrated into resource-constrained in-vehicle systems.
- Hardware Acceleration Matters: The NXP-S32G's built-in AES acceleration significantly boosts the performance of AES-based cryptographic algorithms, making them more competitive.
- Stream Ciphers Shine in Embedded Systems: Chacha20-Poly1305, a stream cipher, shows promising performance, especially for longer payloads, making it a strong candidate for embedded automotive applications.
- Security Overhead is a Worthwhile Investment: The added latency and resource consumption from security measures are relatively small compared to the overall communication latency and are deemed worthwhile for the protection offered.
Key Results
- Low System Resource Usage: The designed gateway exhibits low CPU usage (peak 5.9%) and RAM usage (peak 25.7 MB), making it suitable for devices running Linux.
- Minimal Latency Impact: The gateway introduces only a few microseconds of latency for protocol conversion and security processing, with the total latency (T4-T1) generally below 100 µs.
- Security Overhead is Acceptable: The latency introduced by security schemes (T3-T2) typically accounts for less than 25% of the total protocol conversion latency, a trade-off considered valuable for the security provided.
- Performance Differences: Scheme 3 (no security) is the fastest. Scheme 1 (integrity) is faster than Scheme 2 (integrity and confidentiality). Among Scheme 1 algorithms, AES128-CMAC performs better due to hardware acceleration. Among Scheme 2 algorithms, Chacha20-Poly1305 shows better latency than AES256-GCM, especially for larger payloads.
- Effective Load Ratio: The addition of security headers and tags reduces the effective load ratio of SOME/IP messages, but this is a necessary cost for data protection.
Limitations and Future Work
- DoS Attacks Not Addressed: The paper acknowledges that its cryptographic security mechanisms do not protect against Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. The authors suggest combining their approach with intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS) for a more comprehensive security solution.
- Future Applications: The authors envision the widespread adoption of this high-security gateway system with the increasing prevalence of autonomous vehicles and the need for robust in-vehicle communication.
- Further Optimization: While performance is good, continuous optimization of cryptographic algorithms and their integration with hardware could further reduce latency and resource consumption.
Summary updated