Dependence of Parking Pricing on Land Use and Time of Day

Fang Zong, Yanan He, Yixin YuanSustainability 2015 · DOI

TL;DR

This paper tackles the complex problem of optimizing urban parking pricing by employing a two-level game theory model. By considering the competing interests of the government and individual car users, it proposes an optimal pricing structure for Beijing that aims to reduce congestion, emissions, and improve overall urban mobility.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Urban areas worldwide grapple with increasing vehicle ownership and the resulting parking demand, which exacerbates traffic congestion and air pollution. A significant portion of this demand is concentrated in business zones and during peak hours, leading to inefficient parking facility utilization and increased cruising time for drivers searching for spots. Traditional parking pricing strategies often fail to account for the intricate interplay between government objectives (public benefit, traffic flow) and individual driver behavior (cost minimization, convenience). This paper addresses this gap by developing a model that can determine an optimal parking pricing structure that balances these competing interests.

Methods

The core of this research is a two-level game theory model. This model is structured as follows:

  • Level-1 Game (Government vs. Car Users): This represents the interaction between the government, aiming to maximize social benefits (including public good and revenue), and the collective of car users, who collectively aim to maximize their parking utility. The government sets the parking rates, and car users respond to these rates. This is modeled as a Stackelberg game, where the government (leader) sets prices first, and car users (followers) react.
  • Level-2 Game (Among Car Users): This level models the competition among individual car users as they choose their parking strategies (location and time) to maximize their personal utility, given the parking rates set by the government. This is modeled as a simultaneous game with imperfect information, as individual users make decisions without full knowledge of others' exact choices, but are influenced by the overall parking environment.

The model incorporates a Nash equilibrium concept to find stable outcomes where no player can unilaterally improve their situation by changing their strategy. The parking duration is modeled using a linear regression based on parking rates, and the value of time (vot) for different activities is estimated.

Datasets

The study utilizes parking survey data collected in Beijing in 2014. This survey involved home visit interviews with a sample of the Beijing population, gathering information on parking behavior for each car trip, including:

  • Parking starting time
  • Number of passengers
  • Walking distance and time to destination
  • Park leaving time
  • Mode of payment
  • Parking fee
  • Parking location

The final sample used for analysis consisted of 46,874 parking records from 138,480 respondents from 54,398 households.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Interdependence of Decisions: The research highlights that parking decisions are not made in isolation. Car users' choices are influenced by both government pricing strategies and the parking behavior of other users.
  • Game Theory as a Framework: Game theory provides a powerful lens to understand the strategic interactions and conflicts of interest between different stakeholders in the urban parking system.
  • Optimal Pricing is Dynamic and Location-Specific: The study demonstrates that a "one-size-fits-all" parking rate is suboptimal. Optimal pricing requires differentiation based on both location (business zone vs. outside) and time of day (peak vs. off-peak).
  • Encouraging Off-Peak and Off-Zone Parking: The proposed pricing structure aims to incentivize drivers to park outside business zones and during off-peak hours, thereby alleviating congestion in high-demand areas and times.
  • Balancing Public and Private Benefits: The model successfully integrates the government's objective of maximizing social welfare with individual car users' pursuit of maximizing their own utility.

Key Results

The study determined an optimal parking rate structure for Beijing:

  • Business zone, peak hours: 12.41 yuan/h
  • Business zone, non-peak hours: 11.12 yuan/h
  • Outside business zone, peak hours: 11.15 yuan/h
  • Outside business zone, non-peak hours: 10 yuan/h

These rates are designed to achieve a Nash equilibrium where both the government and car users achieve their optimal outcomes. The analysis of parking utilities shows that with these adjusted rates, car users are incentivized to choose parking strategies that are opposite to the dominant strategy of other users to avoid congestion costs. For instance, when the ratio of parking in business zones during peak hours reaches 0.237, car users' utilities for parking in business zones during peak hours and outside business zones during non-peak hours become equal, indicating a shift in preference.

Limitations and Future Work

The authors acknowledge several limitations:

  • Socio-demographic Attributes: Individual and household socio-demographic attributes of car users were not considered. These factors, such as employment location and the need to arrive at a specific time, can significantly influence parking decisions, even if they lead to negative utility.
  • Employer-Paid Parking: The study did not account for employer-paid parking, which can alter parking utilities for employees.
  • Parameter Estimation: Some parameters, like the value of time (vot) and parking duration, were estimated at a general level. Further studies could examine these at an individual level.

Future work could address these limitations by:

  • Developing a more comprehensive parking demand forecasting model that incorporates individual and household attributes, as well as employer-paid parking policies.
  • Investigating the impact of dividing car users into different player types (e.g., those with free parking vs. those who pay).
  • Conducting more granular analysis of parameters at an individual level.

Summary updated

Abstract

A key strategy of sustainable transportation, parking pricing can directly contribute to decreased greenhouse gas emissions and air pollution. This paper describes an optimal structure of parking rates in terms of parking locations and time of day. A two-level parking model based on game theory is established using parking survey data collected in Beijing in 2014. The model was estimated based on Stackelberg game and the Nash equilibrium. Using the two-level parking model, the optimal structure of parking rates for inside/outside business zones and during peak/off-peak hours was calculated. In addition, the relationship between the government (which represents the public benefit) and car users, as well as the relationships among car users in the parking system were investigated. The results indicate that equilibrium among all of the agents in the parking system can be obtained using the proposed parking rate structure. The findings provide a better understanding of parking behavior, and the two-level parking model presented in the paper can be used to determine the optimal parking rate to balance the temporal and spatial distribution of parking demand in urban areas. This research helps reduce car use and the parking-related cruising time and thus contributes to the reduction of carbon emissions and air pollution.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{zong2015dependence,
  author = {Fang Zong and Yanan He and Yixin Yuan},
  title = {{Dependence of Parking Pricing on Land Use and Time of Day}},
  booktitle = {Sustainability},
  year = {2015},
  doi = {10.3390/su7079587},
}
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