Defaults: a double-edged sword in governing common resources

Eladio Montero-Porras, Rémi Suchon, Tom Lenaerts, Elias Fernández DomingosarXiv 2024 · DOI · arXiv

Introduction

Managing shared resources—from global fisheries to local irrigation systems—frequently encounters the "tragedy of the commons." In these scenarios, individual rational self-interest often leads to collective over-consumption and the eventual depletion of the resource. To combat this, policy-makers have increasingly turned to "nudges," specifically default options, to steer behavior toward sustainability without restricting individual choice. This study investigates the efficacy and persistence of such defaults in dynamic social dilemmas.

Experimental Methodology

The researchers conducted a behavioral experiment with 412 participants, structured into a three-stage workflow to isolate the effects of personality and risk on resource extraction behavior. The core of the study utilized a Common Pool Resource Dilemma (CPRD) game where groups of four coordinated resource extraction over 10 rounds.

Experimental design and game mechanics of the Common Pool Resource Dilemma (CPRD).

As shown in Figure 1, the workflow consisted of:

  1. Social Value Orientation (SVO): A test to classify participants into altruistic, pro-social, individualistic, or competitive types.
  2. Risk Assessment: An incentivized task to measure individual risk aversion.
  3. CPRD Treatment Groups: For the first five rounds, participants were assigned to one of three conditions:
  4. Pro-social Default: A pre-selected extraction value of 11 tokens (the social optimum).
  5. Self-serving Default: A pre-selected value of 23 tokens (individually beneficial but collectively damaging).
  6. Control: No pre-selected default.

In rounds 6–10, all defaults were removed to test for behavioral persistence or "spillover effects."

Results and Analysis

The study revealed a significant asymmetry in the power of defaults. Key findings include:

  • Initial Impact: During the first five rounds, the Self-serving group extracted significantly more tokens ($\bar{x} \approx 18.8$) compared to the Control ($\bar{x} \approx 15.9$) and Pro-social ($\bar{x} \approx 15.1$) groups.
  • Decay of Influence: The Pro-social nudge's effectiveness relative to the control group disappeared after round 3, even while the nudge was still active. In contrast, the self-serving default remained influential throughout the intervention period.
  • Post-Nudge Convergence: In rounds 6–10, all groups stabilized at an extraction rate of approximately 16 tokens per round. The history of a pro-social nudge did not prevent an immediate return to over-extraction once the guide was removed.

Discussion: The Asymmetry of Nudging

The results highlight that it is notably easier to nudge individuals toward greed than toward cooperation. The self-serving default successfully anchored participants to high extraction levels, whereas the pro-social default's influence was fleeting.

Furthermore, the study found no evidence of "stickiness." The nudge failed to build lasting habits or internalize sustainable norms. One of the most striking findings was the "corruption of the cooperative": the self-serving default had its strongest impact on naturally pro-social individuals, effectively teaching them to extract more than they would have in the absence of a nudge. Conversely, risk-averse individuals were the most likely to comply with any default, perceiving it as the "safe" or "standard" path regardless of its social impact.

Conclusion

While defaults are a powerful tool in the policy-maker's kit, they are a double-edged sword in the context of shared resources. A "good" default has a fleeting positive effect, but a "bad" default can rapidly erode cooperative behavior, particularly among those naturally inclined to help. For nudges to be effective in governing the commons, they may need to be combined with other interventions that foster long-term habit formation and social norm internalization, rather than relying on the temporary influence of a pre-selected choice.

Summary updated

Abstract

Extracting from shared resources requires making choices to balance personal profit and sustainability. We present the results of a behavioural experiment wherein we manipulate the default extraction from a finite resource. Participants were exposed to two treatments -- pro-social or self-serving extraction defaults -- and a control without defaults. We examined the persistence of these nudges by removing the default after five rounds. Results reveal that a self-serving default increased the average extraction while present, whereas a pro-social default only decreased extraction for the first two rounds. Notably, the influence of defaults depended on individual inclinations, with cooperative individuals extracting more under a self-serving default, and selfish individuals less under a pro-social default. After the removal of the default, we observed no significant differences with the control treatment. Our research highlights the potential of defaults as cost-effective tools for promoting sustainability, while also advocating for a careful use to avoid adverse effects.
BibTeX
@misc{monteroporras2024defaults,
  author = {Eladio Montero-Porras and Rémi Suchon and Tom Lenaerts and Elias Fernández Domingos},
  title = {{Defaults: a double-edged sword in governing common resources}},
  year = {2024},
  eprint = {2403.06796},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.06796},
}
Figure