Decreasing Wages in Gig Economy: A Game Theoretic Explanation Using Mathematical Program Networks

Pravesh Koirala, Forrest LainearXiv 2024 · DOI · arXiv

Abstract

In standard competitive markets, firms vying for the same labor pool typically bid up wages. However, the gig economy presents a paradox: despite a stable duopoly between platforms like Uber and Lyft, driver earnings have plummeted. This paper employs Mathematical Program Networks (MPNs) to analyze this "race to the bottom." We prove that for a profitable duopoly to persist in a two-sided market, platforms must effectively make drivers indifferent between them, often resulting in collusion to maintain minimum wage levels. Our findings suggest that market forces are insufficient to ensure fair compensation, necessitating regulatory intervention.

The Gig Economy Paradox

The intuition that competition benefits workers is failing in the ride-sharing sector. Drivers are frequently compensated at the 10th percentile of wage earners, with base pay rates experiencing a sharp decline over the last decade. For instance, Uber's base pay per mile reportedly dropped by 57% between 2014 and 2022.

This trend is particularly concerning when contrasted with the rising costs of vehicle ownership. While pay rates have fallen, the expenses associated with maintenance, fuel, and insurance have climbed significantly, creating a widening gap in driver net income.

Comparison of declining Uber driver pay rates and rising US auto ownership costs.

Theoretical models of two-sided markets often predict a "tipping effect," where network externalities lead to a natural monopoly. The existence of a stable, long-term duopoly like Uber and Lyft, where both firms remain profitable while driver welfare declines, requires a new theoretical explanation.

Methodology: Mathematical Program Networks

To address this, we utilize Mathematical Program Networks (MPNs), a framework that unifies multilevel programming and Nash Equilibrium problems. Unlike static models, MPNs allow for a sequential game structure that captures the hierarchical decision-making process:

  1. Platforms: Set rider prices and driver commissions.
  2. Drivers: Observe offers and allocate their labor across platforms (multi-homing).
  3. Passengers: Evaluate prices and wait times (influenced by driver supply) to choose a service.

This structure explicitly models cross-side externalities (more drivers reducing wait times) and same-side externalities (passenger congestion).

Key Theoretical Insights

Our analysis yields several critical insights into the stability of gig economy duopolies:

The Indifference Requirement

We demonstrate that for a duopoly to remain stable, drivers must be rendered "indifferent" between the competing platforms. If one platform offered a marginally better deal, the "tipping effect" would cause the entire driver pool to migrate, leading to the collapse of the competitor.

Collusion as a Structural Necessity

The mathematical equilibrium for a stable, profitable duopoly only occurs under conditions of tacit collusion. While platforms could theoretically collude on both sides of the market, our model suggests that single-sided collusion on wages is the most likely outcome. This strategy is easier to maintain than price-fixing for consumers, allows for flexible dynamic pricing, and is less likely to attract antitrust scrutiny.

Conclusion and Policy Implications

The "race to the bottom" in driver wages is not a market glitch but a natural game-theoretic outcome of platform competition in two-sided markets. Because the stability of the duopoly relies on keeping driver compensation at a minimum, market forces alone will not reverse the trend of declining earnings.

Our research validates the necessity of policy intervention. To protect driver welfare and ensure a sustainable labor model, government-mandated minimum wage floors are required to counteract the inherent structural pressures of the gig economy.

Summary updated

Abstract

Gig economy consists of two market groups connected via an intermediary. Popular examples are rideshares where passengers and drivers are mediated via platforms such as Uber and Lyft. In a duopoly market, the platforms must compete to attract not only the passengers by providing a lower rate but also the drivers by providing better wages. While this should indicate better driver payout, as platforms compete to attract the driver pool, real world statistics does not indicate such. This goes completely against the intuition that the worker side of a gig economy, given their importance, should always earn better. We attempt to answer the low wages of drivers in the gig economy by modeling the ridesharing game between duopoly platforms, drivers, and passengers using Mathematical Program Networks. Our model is parsimonious, expressive, models the same-side and cross-side externalities of the economy, and has interpretations under both single-homing and multi-homing regimes. We derive the conditions for the existence of a profitable duopoly and show that it can only happen if the platforms collude together to pay the bare minimum to the drivers. This not only answers why drivers are paid less but also provides strong managerial insights to any interested policy maker.
BibTeX
@misc{koirala2024decreasing,
  author = {Pravesh Koirala and Forrest Laine},
  title = {{Decreasing Wages in Gig Economy: A Game Theoretic Explanation Using Mathematical Program Networks}},
  year = {2024},
  eprint = {2404.10929},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.10929},
}
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