Cutting through the Confusion: A Measurement Study of Homograph Domains in Ethereum Name Service

Jianwei Huang, Sridatta Raghavendra Chintapalli, Mengxiao Wang, Guofei GuWWW 2025 · OpenReview

TL;DR

While the Ethereum Name Service (ENS) brings human-readable names to the blockchain, inconsistent implementation of "normalization" standards across wallets and dApps has created a massive security loophole. Researchers found that over 60% of wallets and 80% of dApps resolve ENS names inconsistently, allowing attackers to use "invisible" homoglyph characters to hijack transactions in otherwise trusted applications.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

In the traditional web (DNS), we’ve long dealt with "homograph attacks"—think paypaI.com (with a capital 'I') instead of paypal.com. To prevent this in the Web3 world, the Ethereum Name Service (ENS) introduced a normalization standard (ENSIP-15) to ensure that visually similar Unicode characters are either converted to a canonical form or disallowed entirely.

However, the authors identify a critical gap: unlike DNS, where normalization is often handled by centralized registries or browsers, ENS normalization happens "off-chain" at the application level. If a wallet uses an outdated or custom normalization library, it might resolve a malicious domain (containing invisible or look-alike characters) to an attacker's address, even if that domain is considered "invalid" by the official ENS standard. Because blockchain transactions are immutable and "one-shot," a single successful homoglyph attack results in an immediate, irreversible financial loss.

Methods

The researchers developed a novel, automated tool to detect normalization inconsistencies in mobile applications without needing access to their source code. Their approach involves:

  1. Trace Collection: Using Frida, a dynamic instrumentation toolkit, they hooked into the runtime of Android APKs to record all function calls.
  2. Trace Analysis: They fed the apps specific inputs (like test.eth) and monitored the execution traces to identify which functions were responsible for ENS resolution and normalization.
  3. Differential Testing: Once the normalization API was identified, the tool automatically tested it against a massive set of known homoglyph domains.
  4. Library Probing: For applications that rely on server-side APIs (which are harder to inspect), they developed a "probing" technique. By sending a specific sequence of 4 to 13 queries, they could fingerprint which underlying normalization library the server was using based on how it handled specific edge-case characters.

Datasets

The study evaluated a broad cross-section of the Web3 ecosystem:

  • 264 dApps, including 67 cryptocurrency wallets collected from the official ENS ecosystem list.
  • 13 popular Web3 libraries across multiple languages (JavaScript, Python, Go, Java, etc.), including ethers.js, web3.js, and eth-ens-namehash.
  • The ENS official database was used to provide a complete list of registered domains for testing.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • The "One-Shot" Danger: In DNS, a user might notice a fake website's poor design or a missing SSL certificate. In ENS, the attack happens inside a trusted wallet's UI. If the wallet says alice.eth resolves to 0x123..., the user has no reason to doubt it, even if the "real" alice.eth is a different address.
  • Invisible Killers: The most dangerous characters aren't just look-alikes (like 'o' vs 'ο'); they are "ignored" characters like the Zero-Width Joiner (U+200D). A malicious actor can register a domain that looks identical to a famous one, and inconsistent apps will resolve it without warning.
  • The "Beautifier" Paradox: Recent efforts to make ENS names look better by re-adding formatting characters for display have actually worsened the problem, as these "beautified" strings often re-introduce the very characters normalization is supposed to strip.
  • Standard Fragmentation: The community moved from ENSIP-1 to ENSIP-15, but many developers are still stuck on older versions or are using general Unicode standards (like UTS46) that aren't strict enough for the high-stakes environment of crypto.

Key Results

The findings paint a worrying picture of the current Web3 landscape:

  • Widespread Inconsistency: 214 out of 264 dApps and 41 out of 67 wallets failed to produce consistent resolution results.
  • Library Failures: 11 out of 13 major Web3 libraries were found to be inconsistent with the official ENS normalization standard.
  • Real-World Impact: Popular apps like MathWallet (with over 1 million users) were found to be vulnerable. In their case study, they showed that MathWallet's server-side resolution would successfully resolve domains containing disallowed, invisible characters, violating ENSIP-15.
  • Quantifiable Risk: The researchers identified 4,330 registered domains that resolve to different addresses depending on which library an application uses.

Limitations and Future Work

The authors acknowledge that while their tool is highly effective at finding technical inconsistencies, it cannot easily capture "contextual" factors. For example, the specific font a wallet uses or its UI layout might make a homoglyph more or less obvious to a human eye.

Additionally, the paper notes the emerging complexity of ENS domains being "rented" through third-party smart contracts, which adds another layer of resolution logic that needs to be audited. Future work will likely focus on creating more robust, language-agnostic normalization "oracles" that applications can query to ensure they are always following the latest security standards.

Summary updated

Abstract

In recent years, the Ethereum Name Service (ENS) has garnered significant attention within the community for enabling the use of Unicode in domain names, thereby facilitating the inclusion of a wide array of character sets such as Greek, Cyrillic, Arabic, and Chinese. While this feature enhances the versatility and global accessibility of domain names, it concurrently introduces a substantial security vulnerability due to the presence of homoglyphs—characters that are visually similar to others across Unicode and ASCII sets. These similarities can be exploited in homoglyph attacks, posing a distinct threat to domain name integrity. This study investigates the prevalence and security implications of homoglyph domains within the ENS ecosystem, revealing that these domains present a more pronounced security concern compared to their counterparts in the traditional Domain Name System (DNS). Despite community efforts to counteract this issue through a normalization process prior to domain resolution, our analysis uncovers significant discrepancies in how the normalization processes are applied across various applications. This inconsistency could result in the same domain name being resolved to different addresses in different applications, underscoring a critical vulnerability. To systematically evaluate this inconsistency, we designed a tool for detecting application-level discrepancies in domain normalization process without requiring access to the application’s source code. Our evaluation on hundreds of real-world Web3 applications identifies widespread deviations from established homoglyph mitigation practices, with more than 60% digital wallets and 80% dApps (decentralized applications) not able to produce consistent ENS resolving results, potentially impacting millions of users. This analysis underscores the urgent need for a standardized implementation of normalization processes to safeguard the integrity and security of ENS domains.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{huang2025cutting,
  author = {Jianwei Huang and Sridatta Raghavendra Chintapalli and Mengxiao Wang and Guofei Gu},
  title = {{Cutting through the Confusion: A Measurement Study of Homograph Domains in Ethereum Name Service}},
  booktitle = {The Web Conference},
  year = {2025},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=NdudrFgLmT},
}
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