Cryptographic and Financial Fairness

Daniele Venturi, Daniele Friolo, Fabio Massacci, Chan Nam Ngo, Daniele Venturi 0001IEEE Trans. IFS 2022 · DOI

TL;DR

This paper introduces "financial fairness" as a crucial, yet often overlooked, aspect of cryptographic protocols that involve monetary penalties. It argues that even if a protocol is cryptographically secure, it can be unfair if participants experience different net present costs due to the timing and amounts of their deposits and refunds, especially in real-world financial scenarios. The authors analyze existing protocols and propose new ones, highlighting the trade-offs between security, efficiency, and this new notion of financial fairness.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Multi-party computation (MPC) allows multiple parties to jointly compute a function on their private inputs without revealing those inputs. A key property is "cryptographic fairness," ensuring that corrupted parties don't learn the output if honest parties don't. However, achieving this perfectly is impossible without assumptions like an honest majority. Recent trends use monetary penalties (cryptocurrencies) to incentivize honest behavior. These "penalty protocols" aim to ensure that if a party aborts, honest participants are compensated.

The problem this paper addresses is that existing penalty protocols, while cryptographically sound, often fail to consider the financial implications for participants. In real-world financial transactions, the timing of money matters. Receiving money later is less valuable than receiving it now due to factors like inflation and opportunity cost (the "time value of money"). This paper argues that a protocol can be "cryptographically fair" but "financially unfair" if honest participants face different net present costs of participation, even if they all eventually get their money back. This financial unfairness can hinder adoption, especially for smaller players.

Methods

The authors introduce a formal definition of financial fairness, which states that the net present cost of participation must be the same for all honest players, regardless of whether other parties cheat. This cost is calculated by discounting all cash inflows and outflows based on a party's individual discount rate.

They then:

  • Analyze existing penalty protocols: They review and categorize protocols like Ladder, Multi-Lock, Insured MPC, and others, evaluating them against cryptographic security, efficiency (rounds, transactions, script complexity), and their newly defined financial fairness.
  • Propose a new protocol (Compact Multi-Lock - CML): This protocol aims for both cryptographic and financial fairness, though it achieves security under sequential composition rather than universal composability.
  • Conduct theoretical analysis: They prove impossibility results for certain scenarios and formally demonstrate the financial unfairness of protocols like the Ladder protocol under specific conditions.
  • Perform empirical simulations: They simulate protocol executions on a realistic Bloomberg Tradebook scenario using Bitcoin, analyzing transaction fees, execution times, and script complexity to quantify the practical impact of financial fairness.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper. The authors use simulated data based on real-world financial parameters (e.g., Bitcoin transaction fees, interest rates from the US Federal Reserve).

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Financial Fairness is Crucial: The paper convincingly argues that financial fairness is not just a theoretical nicety but a practical necessity for the adoption of MPC protocols in real-world financial applications. The "time value of money" can create significant disadvantages for some participants.
  • Ladder Protocol's Unfairness: The Ladder protocol, a prominent example, is shown to be financially unfair because it requires different deposit amounts and lock times for different parties, leading to significant opportunity cost differences.
  • Multi-Lock Protocol's Fairness: In contrast, the Multi-Lock protocol is financially fair because all parties deposit and withdraw the same amount at the same time.
  • Trade-offs Exist: There's a constant tension between achieving strong cryptographic security (like Universal Composability), efficiency, and financial fairness. Sometimes, relaxing one can improve others.
  • Real-world Impact: The simulations on a Bloomberg Tradebook scenario demonstrate that financial unfairness can translate to substantial monetary losses for participants, especially those who are "last" in the protocol's sequence.

Key Results

  • Formal Definition of Financial Fairness: A rigorous definition is provided, allowing for quantitative analysis.
  • Impossibility Results: The paper proves that certain approaches, like simple round-robin rotations, generally fail to achieve financial fairness.
  • Analysis of Existing Protocols: Protocols like Ladder are shown to be financially unfair, while Multi-Lock is financially fair.
  • Empirical Validation: Simulations on a realistic trading scenario show that financial unfairness can lead to significant opportunity costs (e.g., a party losing up to 0.49% of its deposit). For instance, in the Ladder protocol, the last party (P55) could lose almost $5K on a single contract due to opportunity costs.
  • New Protocol (CML): A protocol is proposed that achieves financial fairness and cryptographic fairness under sequential composition, offering a potential alternative.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Universal Composability vs. Financial Fairness: The paper highlights that achieving Universal Composability (UC) security, especially in the plain model, can be challenging while maintaining financial fairness and efficiency. The proposed CML protocol achieves security under sequential composition, which is a weaker guarantee.
  • Assumptions on Discount Rates: While the definition of financial fairness is general, the analysis often assumes specific discount rates. The paper acknowledges that real-world discount rates can vary and are influenced by risk aversion and other factors.
  • Open Problems: The authors suggest several open problems, including:
  • Designing protocols that achieve UC security with the same efficiency and financial fairness as CML.
  • Exploring alternative compensation rules beyond "pro-rata" (e.g., Clayton's rule).
  • Investigating the impact of socio-economic factors (trust, market anticipation) and technical factors (usability) on financial fairness.
  • Developing methods to compile financially unfair protocols into fair ones without sacrificing efficiency.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@article{venturi2022cryptographic,
  author = {Daniele Venturi and Daniele Friolo and Fabio Massacci and Chan Nam Ngo and Daniele Venturi},
  title = {{Cryptographic and Financial Fairness}},
  journal = {IEEE Trans. IFS},
  year = {2022},
  doi = {10.1109/tifs.2022.3198852},
}

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