CoverUp: Privacy Through "Forced" Participation in Anonymous Communication Networks

David M. Sommer, Aritra Dhar, Luka Malisa, Esfandiar Mohammadi, Daniel Ronzani, Srdjan CapkunIACR ePrint 2017 · OpenReview

TL;DR

This paper introduces CoverUp, a system that "forces" website visitors to become involuntary participants in anonymous communication networks (ACNs). By leveraging basic browser functionality, CoverUp creates a large anonymity set, enhancing privacy for voluntary users and even hiding their intention to use the ACN, while addressing ethical and legal concerns.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Anonymous Communication Networks (ACNs) like Tor rely on a large number of participants to provide strong privacy guarantees. However, they face a "vicious cycle": a low number of users leads to weak anonymity, making the ACN unattractive, which in turn further reduces user participation. Even when anonymity sets are large, the mere act of using an ACN can raise suspicion. This paper tackles this challenge by proposing a novel approach: "forced" participation, aiming to bootstrap ACNs and provide plausible deniability for voluntary users.

Methods

CoverUp utilizes a web-based system that leverages JavaScript to make website visitors involuntary participants in an ACN. The core idea is to embed a JavaScript snippet in cooperating websites (entry servers) that instructs visitors' browsers to generate constant-rate cover traffic to a mix server. Two applications are built on this: an anonymous feed (uni-directional) and an anonymous chat (bi-directional).

  • Entry Server: Hosts a webpage with an iframe request to the CoverUp server.
  • CoverUp Server: Serves a JavaScript code snippet to the visitor's browser.
  • JavaScript Code: Instructs the browser to generate constant-rate cover traffic to a mix server.
  • Mix Server: Acts as a central point for mixing traffic.
  • Voluntary Participants: Use a browser extension and an external application to actually retrieve feed content or send chat messages.
  • Involuntary Participants: Only generate cover traffic via the JavaScript code, without installing any additional software or retrieving content.

The system is designed to make involuntary participants indistinguishable from voluntary ones to an attacker, thereby expanding the anonymity set.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • "Forced" Participation as a Solution: The paper argues that by "forcing" participation, ACNs can break the user participation cycle and achieve stronger anonymity.
  • Indistinguishability is Key: The success of CoverUp hinges on making involuntary participants indistinguishable from voluntary ones to an attacker. This is crucial for both enhancing anonymity and providing plausible deniability.
  • Plausible Deniability for Voluntary Users: By blending in with involuntary traffic, voluntary users can claim they were "forced" to participate, thus hiding their intention to use the ACN.
  • Leveraging Existing Browser Functionality: CoverUp avoids requiring users to install complex software by using standard browser features like JavaScript and iframes.
  • Ethical and Legal Considerations Addressed: The authors proactively discuss and address potential ethical concerns about "forcing" participation and explore the legal implications for websites and users.

Key Results

  • Practical Performance: The implemented feed and chat applications demonstrated practical performance.
  • Strong Privacy Guarantees: CoverUp provides strong privacy guarantees, particularly by creating a large anonymity set that includes all website visitors.
  • Attacker Distinguishing Accuracy: With a year's worth of observations, an attacker could distinguish voluntary from involuntary users with an accuracy of only 56.3% in a realistic usage pattern, indicating a high level of privacy.
  • Low Overhead for Entry Servers: The computational overhead for entry servers is minimal (just an iframe tag).
  • Manageable Overhead for Involuntary Users: For non-mobile users, the traffic overhead (around 7.5MB per day) is considered negligible compared to streaming services.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Trust Assumptions: The bi-directional channel (chat) requires trusting the CoverUp server for integrity checks of the JavaScript code. A malicious CoverUp server could potentially inject malicious code.
  • Timing Leakage: While CoverUp aims to minimize timing leakage, the browser extension introduces some, which the authors acknowledge and discuss in their experimental evaluation.
  • Potential for Suspicious Behavior: The paper notes that voluntary participants might spend more time on entry servers, which could be a potential privacy leak. They suggest alerting users or automatically closing tabs to mitigate this.
  • Browser Profiling: The possibility of browser profiling to detect extensions is mentioned as a potential threat, though it's out of scope for this work.
  • Future Work: The authors suggest extending CoverUp to a peer-to-peer variant for improved bandwidth and latency, making the mix server a full HTTP proxy for browsing arbitrary web pages, and exploring browser modifications for more efficient and less leaky extensions.

Summary updated

Abstract

Many privacy-enhancing technologies, in particular anonymous communication networks (ACNs) as a key building block, suffer from a lack of a sufficient number of participants. Without high user participation, ACNs are vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks. The only ACN with a high number of participants (around 1.5 million users) is Tor. Yet, Tor is prone to traffic analysis attacks traffic pattern attacks. While other ACNs have been proposed that are even secure against global attackers, they are not scalable and suffer from a low number of participants, since even a perfect ACN can at most hide a user among all participating users. These ACNs are in a vicious circle: the lack of participants leads to low degree of anonymity, and a low degree of anonymity makes these ACNs unattractive for users. In this work, we break this vicious cycle by studying the question: Can an anonymous communication network be strengthened by "forced" participation? What privacy guarantees and performance can such an ACN provide? We develop CoverUp, a system that "forces" visitors of highly accessed websites (entry servers) to become involuntary participants of an ACN. CoverUp triggers users to participate in a centralized, constant-rate mix by leveraging basic functionality of their browsers to execute (JavaScript) code served by the entry servers. Candidates for entry servers could be universities or news sites. They would let a distinct CoverUp server provide (via an iframe) JavaScript code to the end-users' browsers, which in turn makes them participate in the ACN via a mix server. Visitors of these entry servers' websites become (involuntary) participants of an ACN, creating cover traffic for voluntary participants. For voluntary participants, we developed a browser extension that renders their CoverUp requests indistinguishable from the cover traffic of involuntary participants. We build two applications on top of CoverUp: an anonymous feed and a chat-both use an additional external CoverUp application. As the feed is uni-directional, we do not need to trust more than the client's machine. As the chat is bi-directional, we do need to trust the CoverUp and the mix server. We show that both achieve practical performance and strong privacy properties via experimental evaluations and an analysis. CoverUp renders voluntary and involuntary participants indistinguishable, thereby including all voluntary and involuntary participants into an anonymity set. Given this, CoverUp provides even more than mere anonymity: the voluntary participants can hide the very intention to use the ACN. As the concept of forced participation raises ethical and legal concerns, we discuss these concerns and describe how these can be addressed.
BibTeX
@article{sommer2017coverup,
  author = {David M. Sommer and Aritra Dhar and Luka Malisa and Esfandiar Mohammadi and Daniel Ronzani and Srdjan Capkun},
  title = {{CoverUp: Privacy Through "Forced" Participation in Anonymous Communication Networks}},
  journal = {IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.},
  year = {2017},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=H5-WAh2TB9l},
}

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