Copeland voting: ties matter
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Abstract
We study the complexity of manipulation for a family of election systems derived from Copeland voting via introducing a parameter α that describes how ties in head-to-head contests are valued. We show that the thus obtained problem of manipulation for unweighted Copelandα elections is NP-complete even if the size of the manipulating coalition is limited to two. Our result holds for all rational values of α such that 0 < α < 1 except for α = 1/2. Since it is well known that manipulation via a single voter is easy for Copeland, our result is the first one where an election system originally known to be vulnerable to manipulation via a single voter is shown to be resistant to manipulation via a coalition of a constant number of voters.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{faliszewski2008copeland,
author = {Piotr Faliszewski and Edith Hemaspaandra and Henning Schnoor},
title = {{Copeland voting: ties matter}},
booktitle = {AAMAS},
year = {2008},
url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=qbOi8tKG5i},
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