Coordinating a supply chain with a quality assurance policy via a revenue-sharing contract

Tiaojun Xiao, Danqin Yang, Houcai ShenInternational Journal of Production Research 2010 · DOI

Abstract

Abstract This paper explores coordination of a (global) supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer via a revenue-sharing contract, where a product quality assurance policy is provided and the utility of consumer is sensitive to product (physical) quality, service quality (i.e., reciprocal of delivery lead-time) and retail price. We assume that the supply chain operates in a make-to-order (MTO) environment and a defective product is returned to the manufacturer for remanufacturing free. We give the optimal service quality and pricing decisions of the decentralised supply chain, its coordination mechanism and the Pareto condition of coordination mechanism. In the decentralised setting, although a higher defective rate of the final product implies a higher cost for the manufacturer, the optimal service quality first decreases and then increases and the optimal retail price decreases as the defective rate increases, which differs from the effects of the unit remanufacturing cost due to the service reliability constraint and the effects of the defective rate on the market scale and lead-time sensitivity; when the supply chain is coordinated, comparing to the traditional models without considering service quality, the manufacturer charges the retailer a higher unit wholesale price. The effect of the defective rate on the Pareto range of coordination mechanism is inconsistent with that of the unit production cost because the defective rate directly influences the demand rate. Keywords: game theoryquality assurancerevenue-sharingsupply chain coordination management Acknowledgements We would like to thank the anonymous referees and the guest editors for their many helpful suggestions and insightful comments, which have significantly improved the content and presentation of this paper. This research was supported in part by: (i) the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grants 70971060, 70671055 and 70731002; (ii) Program for 'New Century Excellent Talents in University' (NCET-07-0426) of the Ministry of Education, China; (iii) the Provincial Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu under Grant BK2008273; and (iv) the University Research Innovation Plan of Jiangsu Province for Postgraduate under Grant CX08B-038R. Notes Note 1. We have extended the two-stage model to the three-stage supply chain model by considering the unit wholesale price decision of the supplier for the standard key component and find that a revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the three-stage supply chain. We omit the three-stage setting in this paper to save space.
BibTeX
@article{xiao2010coordinating,
  author = {Tiaojun Xiao and Danqin Yang and Houcai Shen},
  title = {{Coordinating a supply chain with a quality assurance policy via a revenue-sharing contract}},
  journal = {International Journal of Production Research},
  year = {2010},
  doi = {10.1080/00207543.2010.508936},
}

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