Cooperative vs. Non-Cooperative Metaverse Investment Strategies: A Bargaining Power Perspective

Guangcai Zhu, Shenyang Tong, Xusheng Tang, S. Kevin Zhou, Yi ZhengResearch Square 2025 · DOI

Abstract

This study investigates metaverse technology investment strategies in tourism supply chains, focusing on the interplay between Travel Service Providers (TSPs) and Online Travel Platforms (OTPs) under cooperative and non-cooperative frameworks. Using a game-theoretic approach, we analyze four investment models: non-cooperative TSP-led, non-cooperative OTP-led, cooperative TSP-led, and cooperative OTP-led. Key factors such as bargaining power, cost-sharing ratios, and consumer sensitivity to metaverse experiences are integrated to evaluate their impact on equilibrium decisions, profits, and social welfare. Our findings reveal that non-cooperative investment consistently outperforms cooperative strategies in profitability, as cost-sharing in cooperative models amplifies total costs despite higher investment intensity. Bargaining power critically shapes leadership roles, with stronger bargaining power incentivizing firms to lead investments. However, social welfare is maximized when the supply chain member with greater bargaining power leads non-cooperative investments, whereas cooperative models achieve higher welfare when the leading investor bears a larger cost share. The study contributes to operations management by elucidating how metaverse adoption reshapes tourism supply chain dynamics, offering actionable insights for optimizing investment governance, negotiation mechanisms, and cost allocation.

Introduction: The Metaverse Frontier in Tourism

The "metaverse economy" is projected to reach a staggering $3 trillion by 2031, with the tourism sector positioned at the vanguard of this digital transformation. From immersive virtual hotel tours to augmented reality (AR)-enhanced sightseeing, metaverse technology offers unprecedented opportunities to engage travelers. However, implementing these high-tech solutions requires significant capital investment within a fragmented supply chain.

This research addresses a critical strategic dilemma for industry stakeholders: How should upstream Travel Service Providers (TSPs), such as hotels and airlines, and downstream Online Travel Platforms (OTPs), such as Expedia or Booking.com, coordinate their metaverse investments? By examining the interplay of bargaining power and investment leadership, this study provides a roadmap for navigating these complex technological ventures.

Modeling Strategic Interactions

To analyze these dynamics, the researchers employed a game-theoretic approach, utilizing a two-period model solved via backward induction. The study constructed four distinct mathematical models to represent the primary market scenarios:

  1. Non-cooperative TSP-led: The TSP invests independently and utilizes an agency model for sales.
  2. Non-cooperative OTP-led: The OTP invests independently and utilizes a reselling model.
  3. Cooperative TSP-led: Both parties share investment costs, with the TSP spearheading the project.
  4. Cooperative OTP-led: Both parties share costs, with the OTP taking the lead.

The models integrate the Nash bargaining solution to determine how profits and costs are allocated based on the firms' relative power. Furthermore, the study accounts for "consumer sensitivity," measuring how much an enhanced metaverse experience actually drives market demand.

The Cooperation Paradox

One of the most striking findings of the study is the "Cooperation Paradox." While intuition might suggest that collaboration leads to better outcomes, the research reveals that non-cooperative investment consistently outperforms cooperative strategies in terms of firm profitability.

Although cooperative models result in higher "investment intensity"—meaning the technology itself is more advanced—the cost-sharing mechanisms required for cooperation actually amplify the total cost burden. This increased overhead often eats into the bottom line, leading to lower net profits for both the TSP and the OTP compared to independent, non-cooperative investment strategies.

Bargaining Power and Leadership

A firm’s inclination to lead a metaverse investment is directly tied to its bargaining power. The study demonstrates that stronger negotiators are more likely to take the lead because leadership allows them to strategically set retail prices and investment levels that align with their specific cost structures.

In non-cooperative settings, the investment leader always achieves higher profits than the follower. This is because the leader retains control over the retail price, allowing them to offset their investment costs more effectively through market positioning.

Balancing Profit and Social Welfare

The research highlights a significant misalignment between corporate profit motives and broader social welfare (the sum of consumer surplus and firm profits). While firms may prefer non-cooperative models for their higher profitability, social welfare is maximized under specific conditions:

  • In Non-cooperative Models: Welfare is highest when the firm with the strongest bargaining power leads the investment.
  • In Cooperative Models: Welfare increases as the leading investor bears a larger share of the total cost.

These findings suggest that policymakers and industry bodies may need to intervene or provide incentives to align private investment strategies with the public good.

Conclusion and Future Directions

This study provides essential strategic guidance for tourism enterprises navigating the integration of metaverse technology. It underscores that while cooperation may lead to superior technological outcomes, it does not always guarantee superior financial returns.

Future research should expand these findings by considering more complex "many-to-many" supply chain structures, multi-period dynamic models to track long-term ROI, and the impact of demand uncertainty or technological failure risks. As the metaverse continues to evolve, understanding these bargaining dynamics will be crucial for any firm looking to claim its stake in the digital future of travel.

Summary updated

Abstract

<title>Abstract</title> This study investigates metaverse technology investment strategies in tourism supply chains, focusing on the interplay between Travel Service Providers (TSPs) and Online Travel Platforms (OTPs) under cooperative and non-cooperative frameworks. Using a game-theoretic approach, we analyze four investment models: non-cooperative TSP-led, non-cooperative OTP-led, cooperative TSP-led, and cooperative OTP-led. Key factors such as bargaining power, cost-sharing ratios, and consumer sensitivity to metaverse experiences are integrated to evaluate their impact on equilibrium decisions, profits, and social welfare.Our findings reveal that non-cooperative investment consistently outperforms cooperative strategies in profitability, as cost-sharing in cooperative models amplifies total costs despite higher investment intensity. Bargaining power critically shapes leadership roles, with stronger bargaining power incentivizing firms to lead investments. However, social welfare is maximized when the supply chain member with greater bargaining power leads non-cooperative investments, whereas cooperative models achieve higher welfare when the leading investor bears a larger cost share.The study contributes to operations management by elucidating how metaverse adoption reshapes tourism supply chain dynamics, offering actionable insights for optimizing investment governance, negotiation mechanisms, and cost allocation. These results provide strategic guidance for tourism enterprises navigating metaverse integration, balancing competitive positioning with collaborative innovation.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{zhu2025cooperative,
  author = {Guangcai Zhu and Shenyang Tong and Xusheng Tang and S. Kevin Zhou and Yi Zheng},
  title = {{Cooperative vs. Non-Cooperative Metaverse Investment Strategies: A Bargaining Power Perspective}},
  booktitle = {Research Square},
  year = {2025},
  doi = {10.21203/rs.3.rs-7953417/v1},
}
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