Conformal Online Auction Design

Jiale Han, Xiaowu DaiarXiv 2024 · arXiv · OpenReview

Abstract

This paper proposes the conformal online auction design (COAD), a novel mechanism for maximizing revenue in online auctions by quantifying the uncertainty in bidders' values without relying on assumptions about value distributions. COAD incorporates both the bidder and item features and leverages historical data to provide an incentive-compatible mechanism for online auctions. Unlike traditional methods for online auctions, COAD employs a distribution-free, prediction interval-based approach using conformal prediction techniques. This novel approach ensures that the expected revenue from our mechanism can achieve at least a constant fraction of the revenue generated by the optimal mechanism. Additionally, COAD admits the use of a broad array of modern machine-learning methods, including random forests, kernel methods, and deep neural nets, for predicting bidders' values. It ensures revenue performance under any finite sample of historical data. Moreover, COAD introduces bidder-specific reserve prices based on the lower confidence bounds of bidders' valuations, which is different from the uniform reserve prices commonly used in the literature. We validate our theoretical predictions through extensive simulations and a real-data application.

Introduction

In classical auction theory, the Myerson auction is considered the gold standard for revenue maximization. However, its practical application is often hindered by the requirement that the auctioneer knows the exact probability distribution of every bidder's valuation. In dynamic e-commerce environments like eBay or Google Ads, valuations are heterogeneous, items are unique, and market conditions shift rapidly.

Traditional approaches face several hurdles:

  • Unknown Distributions: Estimating precise valuation formulas for specific users and items is difficult.
  • Data Scarcity: Many bidders participate infrequently, making individual distribution estimation unreliable.
  • Overfitting: Empirical models often overfit historical data, leading to suboptimal reserve prices.

The Conformal Online Auction Design (COAD) addresses these challenges by creating an incentive-compatible mechanism that maximizes revenue using historical feature data without assuming specific value distributions.

Methodology: The COAD Framework

The COAD mechanism leverages conformal prediction to set optimal, bidder-specific reserve prices. The process is model-agnostic, allowing it to work with various machine learning algorithms such as Random Forests or Deep Neural Networks.

Overview of the COAD framework, illustrating the flow from historical data to real-time revenue maximization.

The framework operates in four primary steps:

  1. Uncertainty Quantification: Using historical data of bidder and item features, COAD constructs a distribution-free prediction interval $[ \hat{v}^L, \hat{v}^U ]$. This provides a coverage guarantee regardless of the underlying data distribution.
  2. Pseudo-Virtual Values: COAD introduces a "pseudo-virtual value" $c_i$. Instead of complex calculus, this value recalibrates a bid based on its relation to the lower confidence bound ($\hat{v}^L$), effectively setting a personalized floor for each bidder.
  3. Allocation Rule: The item is awarded to the bidder with the highest positive pseudo-virtual value. If no bidder exceeds their personalized floor, the auctioneer retains the item.
  4. Payment Rule: A modified second-price structure ensures the system remains Incentive Compatible (IC) and Individually Rational (IR). The winner pays the minimum bid required to have won.

Datasets and Evaluation

The researchers validated COAD through both real-world and synthetic datasets:

  • eBay Data: A dataset of 149 seven-day auctions for Palm Pilot M515 PDAs, including features like bidder ratings and seller identities.
  • Synthetic Simulations: Testing high-dimensional feature spaces and log-normal valuations (common in ad-tech) using Neural Networks and Polynomial Regression.
  • Robustness Tests: Scenarios where standard i.i.d. assumptions were violated were used to prove the robustness of the conformal approach.

Key Results

COAD demonstrates several advantages over traditional methods:

  • Revenue Superiority: In the eBay dataset, COAD consistently outperformed standard second-price auctions and empirical Myerson auctions in average revenue.
  • Bidder-Specific Reserves: By using individual features to set reserves, COAD extracts more revenue from "strong" bidders while maintaining the participation of "weak" bidders.
  • Data Efficiency: COAD can extract valuable information even from auctions with a single bidder, addressing "cold-start" scenarios more effectively than distribution-based methods.
  • Theoretical Guarantees: The authors proved that COAD provides a revenue guarantee that is at least a constant fraction of the optimal social welfare.

Limitations and Future Work

While robust, COAD has areas for further development. Current models do not account for budget constraints common in ad-tech, where bidders have daily caps. Future iterations could incorporate real-time budget information as a feature. Additionally, the current focus is on single-round auctions; future research may explore strategic bidding behavior over time, where bidders might attempt to manipulate the ML model to lower future reserve prices. Finally, the computational overhead of calculating conformal intervals in millisecond-scale real-time bidding (RTB) environments requires highly optimized implementations.

Summary updated

Abstract

This paper proposes the conformal online auction design (COAD), a novel mechanism for maximizing revenue in online auctions by quantifying the uncertainty in bidders' values without relying on assumptions about value distributions. COAD incorporates both the bidder and item features and leverages historical data to provide an incentive-compatible mechanism for online auctions. Unlike traditional methods for online auctions, COAD employs a distribution-free, prediction interval-based approach using conformal prediction techniques. This novel approach ensures that the expected revenue from our mechanism can achieve at least a constant fraction of the revenue generated by the optimal mechanism. Additionally, COAD admits the use of a broad array of modern machine-learning methods, including random forests, kernel methods, and deep neural nets, for predicting bidders' values. It ensures revenue performance under any finite sample of historical data. Moreover, COAD introduces bidder-specific reserve prices based on the lower confidence bounds of bidders' valuations, which is different from the uniform reserve prices commonly used in the literature. We validate our theoretical predictions through extensive simulations and a real-data application. All code for using COAD and reproducing results is made available on GitHub.
BibTeX
@misc{han2024conformal,
  author = {Jiale Han and Xiaowu Dai},
  title = {{Conformal Online Auction Design}},
  year = {2024},
  eprint = {2405.07038},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.07038},
}
Figure