Computing Stackelberg strategies in stochastic games

Joshua Letchford, Liam MacDermed, Vincent Conitzer, Ronald Parr, Charles L. Isbell Jr.SIGecom Exch 2012 · DOI · OpenReview

Abstract

Significant recent progress has been made in both the computation of optimal strategies to commit to (Stackelberg strategies), and the computation of correlated equilibria of stochastic games. In this letter we discuss some recent results in the intersection of these two areas. We investigate how valuable commitment can be in stochastic games and give a brief summary of complexity results about computing Stackelberg strategies in stochastic games.
BibTeX
@article{letchford2012computing,
  author = {Joshua Letchford and Liam MacDermed and Vincent Conitzer and Ronald Parr and Charles L. Isbell Jr.},
  title = {{Computing Stackelberg strategies in stochastic games}},
  journal = {SIGecom Exch.},
  year = {2012},
  doi = {10.1145/2509002.2509011},
}

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