Computing Best-Response Strategies in Infinite Games of Incomplete Information

Daniel M. Reeves, Michael P. WellmanUAI 2004 · OpenReview

TL;DR

This paper introduces the first algorithm for computing best-response strategies in a broad class of infinite games with incomplete information. This algorithm is crucial for finding equilibria in complex scenarios where traditional methods struggle, and it can be iterated to find Bayes-Nash equilibria for many games.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Game theory often deals with situations where multiple agents make decisions that affect each other's outcomes. When agents have private information (their "type"), these are called games of incomplete information. While solving finite games (where actions and types are limited) is well-studied, infinite games (with continuous actions or types) present a significant challenge. Existing algorithms struggle with these continuous spaces, often resorting to approximations that can be misleading. This paper tackles the problem of efficiently computing optimal strategies (best responses) for agents in a specific, yet rich, class of infinite games, paving the way for finding equilibria in these complex environments.

Methods

The core contribution is a constructive proof and a corresponding algorithm for computing best-response strategies. The authors define a class of two-player games where payoffs are piecewise linear in agent types and actions, and depend on linear comparisons of actions. Their algorithm leverages this structure:

  • Piecewise Linear Strategies: They show that if an agent's opponent plays a piecewise linear strategy, the agent's best response will also be a piecewise linear strategy.
  • Constructive Proof: The proof derives an algebraic expression for expected utility and then identifies the action that maximizes it. This involves carefully partitioning the action space and analyzing the resulting piecewise polynomial.
  • Iterative Best Response: For symmetric games, they start with a seed strategy and repeatedly compute the best response to the current strategy. For asymmetric games, they do this for both players simultaneously. This iterative process can converge to a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, where each agent's strategy is a best response to the others.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper. The paper focuses on theoretical contributions and algorithmic development, demonstrating its approach on existing and newly defined game structures rather than on empirical datasets.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Bridging Finite and Infinite: The paper provides a crucial bridge between the well-understood world of finite games and the more challenging realm of infinite games by offering a concrete method for handling continuous action spaces.
  • Structure is Key: The specific structure of the games (piecewise linear payoffs and linear action comparisons) is what makes the problem tractable. This highlights the importance of identifying and exploiting structural properties in computational game theory.
  • Best Response as a Building Block: The algorithm for computing a single best response is fundamental. Iterating this process is a natural and effective way to search for equilibria in many cases, even if it doesn't guarantee convergence for all games.
  • Approximations Can Deceive: The paper demonstrates with examples (like the discretized first-price sealed-bid auction) how finite approximations can lead to qualitatively different and potentially misleading equilibria compared to the true infinite game solution.

Key Results

  • Polynomial-Time Algorithm: The paper presents an algorithm that computes a piecewise linear best-response strategy in polynomial time with respect to the game's parameters (number of payoff regions, opponent's strategy pieces, and type distribution pieces).
  • Confirmation of Known Equilibria: The algorithm successfully recovers known Bayes-Nash equilibria for several standard games, including the first-price sealed-bid auction and the Vickrey auction, validating its correctness.
  • Discovery of New Equilibria: The approach also identifies new equilibria in games like the Supply Chain game and the Shared-Good auction, demonstrating its utility for exploring novel game structures.
  • Iterative Convergence: For several examples, the iterated best-response algorithm converges to a Bayes-Nash equilibrium within a few iterations, showcasing its practical effectiveness.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Convergence Guarantee: While the iterated best-response algorithm works well for many games, the paper acknowledges that it does not guarantee convergence for all games in their class. Characterizing the specific conditions under which convergence is guaranteed is an open goal.
  • Pure Strategies: The current method focuses on pure strategies. Extending the algorithm to handle mixed strategies in infinite games would be a significant next step.
  • Generalization: While the defined class of games is broad, there are many other types of infinite games (e.g., with non-linear payoffs or action comparisons) for which this algorithm would not directly apply.
  • Scalability: While polynomial in the defined parameters, the complexity can still grow significantly with the number of pieces in strategies and type distributions. Further optimizations or alternative approaches might be needed for extremely complex scenarios.

Summary updated

Abstract

We describe an algorithm for computing best response strategies in a class of two-player infinite games of incomplete information, defined by payoffs piecewise linear in agents' types and actions, conditional on linear comparisons of agents' actions. We show that this class includes many well-known games including a variety of auctions and a novel allocation game. In some cases, the best-response algorithm can be iterated to compute Bayes-Nash equilibria. We demonstrate the efficiency of our approach on existing and new games.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{reeves2004computing,
  author = {Daniel M. Reeves and Michael P. Wellman},
  title = {{Computing Best-Response Strategies in Infinite Games of Incomplete Information}},
  booktitle = {Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence},
  year = {2004},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=26Q5-slwsK},
}
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