Competitive Policy for Online Retailers' Intrusion in E-Commence

Feiyan Han, Sheng Chen, Bo LiJ. Theor. Appl. Electron. Commer. Res 2022 · DOI

TL;DR

This paper models the strategic choices of new online retailers entering a market dominated by an established online incumbent. It finds that opening physical stores can be a powerful strategy for new entrants, especially when consumers highly value service, allowing them to overcome the incumbent's advantages and potentially achieve higher profits.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

The e-commerce landscape is rapidly evolving, with a significant increase in online retail sales. As more companies enter this space, competition intensifies. Traditionally, new entrants have focused on pure online strategies. However, the rise of "new retail" models, integrating online and offline channels, presents a new avenue for market entry. This paper addresses the strategic dilemma faced by new entrants: should they adopt a pure online strategy, mirroring the incumbent, or embrace an online-offline integrated model? It specifically investigates how the incumbent's established advantages (like reputation) and different market coverage scenarios (partially, multiple, or fully covered markets) influence the entrant's optimal strategy and its success.

Methods

The authors employ a duopoly game model based on the Hotelling model to analyze the competitive dynamics between an incumbent online retailer (R₁) and a new entrant (R₂). R₁ benefits from an "incumbency advantage" (represented by parameter α), reflecting its established reputation and consumer familiarity. R₂ can choose between a pure online strategy or an online-offline integrated strategy, where the latter involves opening a physical store to offer offline services (represented by parameter s). The model considers consumer preferences for product quality, price, and service, as well as their sensitivity to these factors (represented by parameters β and t). The analysis involves deriving equilibrium prices, demands, and profits for both retailers under different market coverage scenarios.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Offline Stores as a Competitive Weapon: Opening physical stores isn't just about expanding reach; it's a strategic move that can significantly boost an entrant's competitiveness, especially when consumers are highly sensitive to service quality.
  • Incumbency Advantage is Not Always Dominant: While incumbents have advantages, they aren't insurmountable. Entrants can leverage offline services to level the playing field, particularly in markets where consumer service sensitivity is high.
  • Market Coverage Matters: The type of market coverage (partially, multiple, or fully covered) profoundly impacts the competitive landscape and the effectiveness of different entry strategies. In partially covered markets, direct competition is minimal, while in fully covered markets, competition is fierce.
  • Service Sensitivity is Key: The degree to which consumers value offline services is a critical determinant of success for entrants employing an online-offline strategy. Higher sensitivity translates to greater potential gains for the entrant.
  • Strategic Trade-offs: Entrants must balance the costs of providing offline services against the potential gains in price, demand, and profit. The optimal service level depends on consumer sensitivity and the incumbent's advantage.

Key Results

  • Partially Covered Market: In this scenario, the incumbent's advantage doesn't significantly impact the entrant. The entrant can set higher prices and gain market share by offering offline services, improving the customer experience.
  • Fully Covered Market: Here, competition is intense. Entrants offering offline services can gain an advantage, especially when consumers are highly sensitive to service. However, if the incumbent's advantage is too large, it can negatively impact both retailers' profits.
  • Multiple Equilibrium Market: This scenario presents a complex interplay. While the incumbent's advantage can still be a factor, the entrant's offline strategy can lead to higher profits, particularly when consumer sensitivity to service is high.
  • Profitability of Offline Stores: Across all market types, opening an offline physical store generally leads to higher profits for the entrant compared to a pure online strategy. This benefit is amplified when consumers are more sensitive to service.

Limitations and Future Work

The authors acknowledge several limitations:

  • Product Costs: The model does not explicitly consider the costs of products, which could significantly complicate the analysis.
  • Incumbent's Limited Strategy: The incumbent's strategic choices are limited to price adjustments. Future research could explore other defensive strategies for incumbents, such as opening their own physical stores or developing other competitive tactics.
  • Cooperation: The paper could explore scenarios where entrants and incumbents might cooperate, rather than solely compete.

Future research could also delve deeper into the impact of product variety, different types of offline services, and more complex consumer behavior models.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@article{han2022competitive,
  author = {Feiyan Han and Sheng Chen and Bo Li},
  title = {{Competitive Policy for Online Retailers' Intrusion in E-Commence}},
  journal = {J. Theor. Appl. Electron. Commer. Res.},
  year = {2022},
  doi = {10.3390/jtaer17040069},
}
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