Competition and Collusion in Two-Sided Markets with an Outside Option

Cristian Chica, Yinglong Guo, Gilad LermanSSRN 2023 · DOI

TL;DR

This paper introduces a novel model for analyzing competition and collusion in two-sided markets, crucially incorporating the concept of an "outside option" for users. This allows for a more realistic understanding of how platform pricing, market participation, and consumer surplus are affected by factors like user heterogeneity, network effects, and the availability of alternatives.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Two-sided markets, where platforms connect distinct groups of users (e.g., buyers and sellers, drivers and riders), are ubiquitous. Existing models often assume "full market coverage," meaning all users participate. This paper addresses the limitation of this assumption by introducing an "outside option" – the choice for users not to participate in any platform. This is crucial because, in many real-world markets (like dating apps or ride-sharing), users have significant alternatives. The paper aims to understand how this outside option, alongside competition and collusion among platforms, influences market outcomes like prices, participation, and consumer welfare.

Methods

The authors develop pricing formulas that explicitly account for the normalized net deterministic utility users derive from joining a platform versus their outside option. This shifts the analysis from prices to utilities, a common technique in platform economics. They then use backward induction to solve their model, first analyzing user behavior (stage 2) and then platform strategic decisions (stage 1) under both competitive and collusive scenarios. Key to their analysis is the use of the Gumbel distribution for user preferences, which allows for tractable derivations of equilibrium outcomes. They also introduce sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of equilibria in both competitive and collusive settings.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • The Outside Option Matters: Ignoring the outside option can lead to significant over or underestimation of equilibrium prices and consumer surplus.
  • Collusion's Downside: Under small cross-side externalities, collusion generally leads to lower user utility, reduced market participation, and higher prices for both sides compared to competition.
  • Heterogeneity is Key: The impact of the outside option on prices and consumer surplus is highly dependent on the degree of user heterogeneity in tastes.
  • Competition's Nuanced Effects: Increasing competition can either raise or lower prices and consumer surplus, depending on the interplay of user heterogeneity, network effects, and the outside option's value.
  • Dating Apps as a Case Study: The model's insights are illustrated with examples from the dating app market, showing how factors like population heterogeneity and platform dominance influence pricing and user experience.

Key Results

  • Competition vs. Collusion: With small cross-side externalities, competition leads to higher normalized net deterministic utility, greater market participation, and lower prices compared to collusion.
  • Outside Option's Impact: The effect of an increased outside option on prices and consumer surplus can be either positive or negative, depending on user heterogeneity and network externalities.
  • Competition's Impact on Prices: Increasing competition can decrease prices when user heterogeneity is high, but can increase prices when within-side externalities are positive and user heterogeneity is low.
  • Competition's Impact on Participation: Increased competition consistently leads to higher market participation.
  • Competition's Impact on Consumer Surplus: Consumer surplus generally increases with competition, though in certain scenarios with concentrated markets and few platforms, it can decrease.

Limitations and Future Work

The authors acknowledge that their model relies on specific assumptions, such as the Gumbel distribution for preferences and linear network externality functions. They suggest future research could extend the model to incorporate:

  • Multi-homing: Allowing users to join multiple platforms simultaneously.
  • Platform Asymmetries: Introducing different marginal costs for platforms.
  • Reinforcement Learning: Analyzing how AI-driven pricing algorithms interact with platform competition and collusion.
  • Different Probability Distributions: Exploring the implications of other distributions for user preferences.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@misc{chica2023competition,
  author = {Cristian Chica and Yinglong Guo and Gilad Lerman},
  title = {{Competition and Collusion in Two-Sided Markets with an Outside Option}},
  year = {2023},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.4641282},
  howpublished = {SSRN},
}
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