Color wave: A systematic evaluation of active screen illumination for injection attack detection in remote face authentication

Daniyar Kurmankhojayev, Elmurat Nigmatov, Dmitrii Gordin, Andrei Shadrikov, Mikhail Shkorin, Danijar Gabdullin, Vyacheslav ShenarXiv 2026 · arXiv

TL;DR

This paper introduces "Color Wave," a systematic approach to detecting biometric data injection attacks in remote face authentication by using randomized screen illumination. By analyzing the color, timing, and delay of facial reflections, the authors demonstrate that active illumination can effectively distinguish live users from deepfakes and replays, though it remains vulnerable to sophisticated, automated evasion strategies.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Remote face authentication is under siege from two main types of fraud. Most people are familiar with Presentation Attacks (PAD), where someone holds up a photo or a mask to a camera. However, a more insidious threat is the Injection Attack (IAD). In this scenario, the attacker bypasses the physical camera entirely, using software (like virtual cameras) to "inject" a video stream—such as a high-quality deepfake—directly into the authentication pipeline.

While active screen illumination (changing the screen color and watching for the reflection on the user's face) has been studied for PAD, its effectiveness against IAD is less understood. Specifically, can it stop a real-time deepfake that might be able to mimic these color changes? The authors set out to build a systematic evaluation protocol to find the breaking points of this defense mechanism.

Methods

The authors developed an implementation called Color Wave. The process follows a challenge-response logic:

  1. Challenge Generation: The device screen displays a randomized sequence of six colors (e.g., Red, Green, Blue, Cyan, Magenta, Yellow) with varying durations.
  2. Response Capture: The camera records the user's face. In a "bona fide" (genuine) session, the skin should reflect the screen's light with a specific physical lag.
  3. Analysis: The system evaluates three specific criteria:
  4. Color Agreement: A CNN-based predictor checks if the facial color matches the expected stimulus.
  5. Duration Matching: It verifies if the duration of the observed color response matches the duration of the screen stimulus.
  6. Response Delay: It measures the temporal lag. Genuine reflections usually appear within 50–150 ms.
Figure 2. Overview of the color wave method for injection attack detection.

The core physics of this interaction is captured in the stimulus-response behavior, where the face gradually brightens and then fades back as the screen changes.

Figure 3. Conceptual stimulus–response behavior for a single color stimulus.

Datasets

The study utilized two primary datasets:

  • Calibration Dataset: 6 subjects, 90 bona fide sessions used to train the color predictor and set decision thresholds.
  • Evaluation Dataset: 15 subjects, 1,128 sessions. This included 666 bona fide sessions and 462 attack sessions.
  • Attack Types: The authors categorized attacks into Static (photos), Prerecorded (videos), and Live (real-time deepfakes generated via DeepFaceLive).
Figure 1. Taxonomy of biometric data injection attacks by injection channel and injected-content

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Deepfakes have a "Lag" Signature: Even if a deepfake is sophisticated enough to swap a face in real-time, the computational overhead of generating the frames introduces a significant delay. While a real face responds in ~100ms, deepfake injections often showed delays exceeding 750ms, making them easy to flag.
  • Taxonomy Matters: The authors argue that for IAD, we should classify attacks by their temporal behavior (Static vs. Prerecorded vs. Live) rather than just how they were made. This helps researchers understand which specific part of the "Color Wave" (color, duration, or delay) will catch the attacker.
  • The "Automatic Evasion" Vulnerability: The most striking insight is that if an attacker builds a script to programmatically detect the screen color and instantly "recolor" the injected video, they can potentially bypass the system. This suggests that simple color changes are not a "silver bullet" against high-tier adversaries.

Key Results

  • Baseline Performance: Under controlled conditions (high screen brightness, low ambient light), the method achieved 100% accuracy in distinguishing genuine users from attacks.
  • Ablation Study: The "Stimulus-Response Agreement" (checking if the colors match) was the strongest individual signal, achieving an AUC of 0.954. However, combining all three criteria (color, duration, and delay) provided the most robust defense, reaching an Equal Error Rate (EER) of 0.093.
  • Environmental Sensitivity: The system is fragile. Low screen brightness or high ambient light "washes out" the signal, leading to high false rejection rates for genuine users.

Limitations and Future Work

The study highlights several practical hurdles:

  • Usability: Subject motion and dropped frames (common on older Android devices) can distort duration estimates, causing the system to fail genuine users.
  • Sophisticated Evasion: As mentioned, automated stimulus-conditioned attacks are a major threat.
  • Future Directions: The authors suggest moving beyond solid screen colors to spatially structured patterns (like grids or shapes). These would be much harder for an automated attack to "recolor" in real-time without introducing detectable artifacts or further delays. They also recommend integrating this as one layer in a multi-factor biometric system rather than a standalone solution.

Summary updated

Abstract

Remote face authentication requires protection against both presentation attacks and biometric data injection attacks prior to face matching. Methods based on active screen illumination appear promising for both by introducing randomized visual stimuli through the user's device screen and evaluating the corresponding facial responses. Although such methods have been more studied for presentation attack detection (PAD), their systematic evaluation for injection attack detection (IAD) remains limited. To address this gap, we first classify injected content into static images, prerecorded videos, and real-time deepfakes based on their expected responses to the challenge. We then adapt an active screen-illumination approach into an implementation we term color wave and develop a systematic, injection-specific evaluation protocol. The protocol examines detection effectiveness, generalization across operating conditions, robustness to signal degradation, and susceptibility to selected evasion strategies. The findings demonstrate a strong discriminative signal under controlled conditions but also reveal performance limitations under overexposure, low screen brightness, and subject motion, as well as vulnerabilities to selected evasion strategies. By relating detection outcomes to attack types and operating conditions, this study provides an interpretable assessment of when and why active screen illumination succeeds or fails as an IAD mechanism.
BibTeX
@misc{kurmankhojayev2026color,
  author = {Daniyar Kurmankhojayev and Elmurat Nigmatov and Dmitrii Gordin and Andrei Shadrikov and Mikhail Shkorin and Danijar Gabdullin and Vyacheslav Shen},
  title = {{Color wave: A systematic evaluation of active screen illumination for injection attack detection in remote face authentication}},
  year = {2026},
  eprint = {2611.12070},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.12070},
}
Figure