TL;DR
This paper explores how manufacturers and retailers can coordinate their decisions in a closed-loop supply chain to achieve carbon neutrality goals, considering government incentives, carbon pricing, and the retailer's fairness concerns. It finds that a cost-revenue sharing contract is best for overall supply chain utility and achieving Pareto optimality, while a cost-sharing contract is more effective for carbon neutrality itself.
What Problem Does This Paper Address?
Achieving carbon neutrality is a growing imperative for businesses, often involving complex strategies like carbon sink trading. However, the costs associated with these efforts, coupled with government regulations (subsidies, rewards, and punishments), can create financial strain and introduce "fairness concerns" among supply chain partners. Specifically, if one party perceives an unfair distribution of profits or burdens, it can lead to suboptimal decisions and hinder the overall effectiveness of the supply chain, including its carbon neutrality goals. This paper aims to address how to design contracts that can effectively coordinate these diverse interests and achieve both economic efficiency and environmental sustainability in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) context.
Methods
The authors employ a two-stage Stackelberg game model, a common framework for analyzing sequential decision-making in supply chains where a leader (manufacturer) makes decisions first, followed by a follower (retailer). They specifically model a closed-loop supply chain where products are recycled and remanufactured. The core of their methodological contribution lies in analyzing and comparing three different coordination contracts:
- Cost-Sharing Contract: Partners share the costs of carbon sink purchases and recovery efforts.
- Revenue-Sharing Contract: The manufacturer shares a portion of its revenue with the retailer.
- Cost-Revenue Sharing Contract: A combination of the above, where both costs and revenues are shared.
They analyze these contracts under various scenarios, including the impact of government subsidies, carbon neutral rewards and punishments, and the retailer's fairness concerns (modeled as a utility function that penalizes perceived unfairness). Numerical simulations are used to validate the theoretical findings.
Datasets
Not discussed in the paper. The study relies on assumed parameter values for numerical simulations, drawing inspiration from existing research.
Key Insights and Ideas
- Fairness is a Double-Edged Sword: While retailer fairness concerns can sometimes drive manufacturers to invest more in environmentally friendly practices, leading to higher overall utility, they can also hinder carbon neutrality progress by making retailers less motivated to participate in recycling.
- Contract Choice Matters: No single contract is universally optimal. The best choice depends on the specific goals (overall utility vs. carbon neutrality) and market conditions.
- Cost-Revenue Sharing for Pareto Optimality: The cost-revenue sharing contract is uniquely capable of achieving Pareto optimality, meaning no party can be made better off without making another worse off. This suggests it's the most robust for overall supply chain well-being.
- Cost-Sharing for Carbon Neutrality: For the specific goal of achieving carbon neutrality, the cost-sharing contract appears to be the most effective, likely due to incentivizing greater participation in recycling and carbon offsetting efforts.
- Government Incentives are Crucial: Government subsidies and, more importantly, well-calibrated rewards and punishments for carbon neutrality are vital for encouraging enterprise participation and achieving sustainability goals. Insufficient incentives can lead to companies bearing penalties rather than actively pursuing neutrality.
- Carbon Sink Price Volatility: High carbon sink prices can negatively impact both enterprise efficiency and carbon neutrality goals. Negotiating prices and favoring revenue-sharing contracts can mitigate these risks.
Key Results
- The cost-revenue sharing contract was found to be the most effective in achieving Pareto optimality for the entire supply chain.
- The cost-sharing contract was superior in achieving the carbon neutrality goal of the CLSC.
- Excessively high carbon sink prices are detrimental to both enterprise efficiency and carbon neutrality.
- When government rewards and punishments are low, enterprises prioritize higher supply chain utility, even if it means bearing penalties. Conversely, sufficiently high rewards and punishments encourage a focus on carbon neutrality.
- Numerical simulations showed that increasing the cost-sharing coefficient between manufacturers and retailers significantly improves overall supply chain utility and carbon neutrality progress.
Limitations and Future Work
The authors acknowledge several limitations and suggest avenues for future research:
- Broader Fairness Concerns: The study primarily focuses on retailer fairness concerns. Future work could explore fairness concerns of manufacturers, consumers, and suppliers, as well as other psychological tendencies like altruism.
- Expanded Decision Variables: The current model considers limited decision variables (pricing, carbon sink reserves). Future research could incorporate factors like recycling effort input, carbon emission reduction technologies, and product greenness.
- More Complex Supply Chains: The study uses a simplified two-stage model (one manufacturer, one retailer). Future research could extend this to multi-stage supply chains involving suppliers and recyclers, or models with multiple manufacturers and retailers to better reflect real-world scenarios.
Summary updated