Cap-and-Trade Emissions Regulation: A Strategic Analysis

Frank Cheng, Yagil Engel, Michael P. WellmanIJCAI 2019 · OpenReview

TL;DR

This paper models the US auto market to analyze the impact of cap-and-trade emissions regulations on firms and consumers. It finds that while cap-and-trade improves overall economic efficiency compared to a hard-cap, consumers disproportionately bear the cost through higher vehicle prices, as firms strategically use credit trading to segment the market.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Environmental regulations, particularly those aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions, are increasingly important for industries like automotive manufacturing. Cap-and-trade systems are a popular regulatory tool, allowing firms to buy and sell emissions credits to meet targets efficiently. However, analyzing the effectiveness of these systems in complex, concentrated industries with differentiated products (like the US auto market) is challenging. Unlike homogeneous markets (e.g., electricity), auto manufacturers strategically interact, setting prices for a variety of vehicles that influence each other's demand and profits. This paper aims to understand how strategic firm behavior, particularly in the emissions credit market, affects overall economic efficiency and the distribution of costs between firms and consumers under cap-and-trade regulations.

Methods

The authors employ an agent-based microeconomic model of the US personal vehicle market. They simulate firm behavior and market dynamics across four scenarios:

  1. Unregulated: A baseline with no emissions constraints.
  2. Hard-cap: Firms must meet emissions targets individually without trading credits.
  3. Price-takers credits trading: Firms can trade credits, but assume they are price-takers in the credit market, meaning they accept a single market-clearing price.
  4. Strategic bidders credits trading: This is the core innovation. Firms actively participate in a double auction for credits, using heuristic bidding strategies (defined by "impatience" and "shading" parameters) to influence credit prices and quantities. This scenario models firms considering both their vehicle production and their credit market behavior strategically.

The model uses a nested-logit consumer demand function, reflecting real-world vehicle features and consumer preferences, and assumes firms are profit-maximizing Bertrand competitors. Nash equilibria are computed using iterative best-response (IBR) for pricing games and empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA) for the more complex strategic credit trading scenarios.

Datasets

The paper states that the parameters for vehicle demand ($\phi$), costs ($\Sigma$), and regulatory credit assignments ($\kappa$) are based on "real data and government guidance" and provided by their "industry sponsor." No specific public datasets are mentioned.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Consumers bear the brunt: Cap-and-trade, while improving overall efficiency, shifts costs to consumers through higher prices, especially for polluting vehicles.
  • Strategic segmentation: Firms use credit trading to strategically segment the vehicle market. For example, a firm that needs many credits might abandon high-pollution vehicles, while another that can generate credits might focus on them. This reduces competition and allows firms to maintain higher prices and profits.
  • Strategic bidding dampens effects: When firms behave strategically in the credit market (i.e., bid strategically rather than acting as price-takers), credit trading volume decreases. This weakens the market segmentation effect, leading to slightly more competition and a better outcome for consumers (though firms also make less profit).
  • Industrial organization matters: A more fragmented auto market (where each product is made by a different firm) leads to higher overall welfare under cap-and-trade compared to a concentrated or monopolistic market. Fragmentation maintains competitive forces across vehicle segments.
  • Cap-and-trade is better than hard-cap: Despite the cost shift to consumers, cap-and-trade is significantly more efficient than a hard-cap regulation, allowing firms to preserve profits more effectively.

Key Results

  • Welfare: In the baseline scenario (3 firms, 14 vehicle types), cap-and-trade with price-taker credit trading leads to higher aggregate welfare than a hard-cap. Strategic credit trading further improves consumer surplus but slightly reduces firm profits compared to price-taker trading.
  • Profit vs. Consumer Surplus: Firms' profits under cap-and-trade with strategic trading are close to or even exceed those in the unregulated case, thanks to market segmentation. Conversely, consumer surplus consistently decreases with regulation, especially when credit trading is introduced.
  • Credit Trading Volume: Strategic bidding in the credit market leads to a significant reduction in the volume of credits traded compared to the price-taker scenario. This is attributed to firms strategically shading their bids to avoid unfavorable price movements.
  • Market Structure Impact: The fragmented market scenario shows the highest welfare among regulated scenarios, indicating that a diverse industrial landscape benefits cap-and-trade.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Simplifications: The model assumes complete information among firms regarding competitors' costs and consumer demand. It also assumes static costs, demand, and regulatory assignments over time, which is a simplification for convenience.
  • Heuristic Strategies: The strategic credit trading model relies on heuristic bidding strategies rather than a fully derived equilibrium for credit market behavior. The authors acknowledge that this is a simplification to make the problem tractable.
  • Future Work: The authors suggest that a deeper, reproducible explanation of the strategic credit trading model is provided in supplemental materials. Future work could explore more sophisticated bidding strategies or incorporate dynamic elements into the model. The paper also highlights the need for caution to ensure that price hikes due to cap-and-trade do not become an undue burden on consumers in oligopolistic markets.

Summary updated

Abstract

Cap-and-trade schemes are designed to achieve target levels of regulated emissions in a socially efficient manner. These schemes work by issuing regulatory credits and allowing firms to buy and sell them according to their relative compliance costs. Analyzing the efficacy of such schemes in concentrated industries is complicated by the strategic interactions among firms producing heterogeneous products. We tackle this complexity via an agent-based microeconomic model of the US market for personal vehicles. We calculate Nash equilibria among credits-trading strategies in a variety of scenarios and regulatory models. We find that while cap-and-trade results improves efficiency overall, consumers bear a disproportionate share of regulation cost, as firms use credit trading to segment the vehicle market. Credits trading volume decreases when firms behave more strategically, which weakens the segmentation effect.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{cheng2019cap,
  author = {Frank Cheng and Yagil Engel and Michael P. Wellman},
  title = {{Cap-and-Trade Emissions Regulation: A Strategic Analysis}},
  booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year = {2019},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=zOAIbFIftCg},
}
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