Can't Touch This: Inertial HSMs Thwart Advanced Physical Attacks

Jan Sebastian Götte, Björn ScheuermannIACR Trans. Cryptogr. Hardw. Embed. Syst 2022 · DOI

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce a novel countermeasure against physical attacks: Inertial Hardware Security Modules (IHSMs). Conventional systems have in common that their security requires the crafting of fine sensor structures that respond to minute manipulations of the monitored security boundary or volume. Our approach is novel in that we reduce the sensitivity requirement of security meshes and other sensors and increase the complexity of any manipulations by rotating the security mesh or sensor at high speed—thereby presenting a moving target to an attacker. Attempts to stop the rotation are easily monitored with commercial MEMS accelerometers and gyroscopes. Our approach leads to an HSM that can easily be built from off-the-shelf parts by any university electronics lab, yet offers a level of security that is comparable to commercial HSMs. We have built a proof-of-concept hardware prototype that demonstrates solutions to the concept’s main engineering challenges. As part of this proof-of-concept, we have found that a system using a coarse security mesh made from commercial printed circuit boards and an automotive high-g-force accelerometer already provides a useful level of security.

Introduction

Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) serve as the critical "root of trust" for sensitive data, such as banking keys and cryptographic secrets. Traditionally, these devices are protected by a "security mesh"—a fragile foil with microscopic conductive traces wrapped around the internal circuitry. If an attacker attempts to drill or probe the mesh, the circuit is broken, and the device wipes its secrets. However, these traditional designs face two major hurdles: the extreme manufacturing complexity of nanoscopic meshes and the "heat trap" effect, where the protective envelope acts as a thermal insulator, limiting internal processing power.

The IHSM Concept: Security Through Motion

We propose a mechanical solution to these electronic challenges: Rotation. Instead of a static, fine mesh, an IHSM uses a coarse mesh made from standard, low-cost PCBs and spins it at high speeds (up to 1000 RPM). To an attacker, the mesh becomes a high-speed moving target that is nearly impossible to navigate without triggering a short or open circuit.

Conceptual diagram of the IHSM architecture showing the rotating mesh (2), internal payload (3), and inertial sensors (4).

To prevent an attacker from simply stopping the motor, the rotor is equipped with a commercial MEMS accelerometer (such as the automotive-grade AIS1120). This sensor monitors centrifugal force ($a = \omega^2 r$). If the rotation slows even slightly, the drop in g-force triggers a self-destruct mechanism. This approach allows a coarse, millimeter-scale mesh to provide the same effective security density as a static microscopic mesh.

Implementation and Prototype

We developed a proof-of-concept prototype using off-the-shelf components, including a Raspberry Pi and hobbyist drone motors. To solve the challenge of providing power and data to a spinning rotor without physical contact (avoiding unreliable slip rings), the system uses a stationary lamp pointing at solar cells for power and an infrared (IR) link for bidirectional data communication.

The proof-of-concept hardware prototype, featuring a modular frame and off-the-shelf electronic components.

To ensure unique security for every device, we developed a custom KiCAD plugin that uses randomized tree-growth algorithms to generate complex, non-repeating mesh patterns for the PCBs.

Key Results and Security Analysis

Our evaluation of the prototype yielded several key insights:

  • Braking Detection: Experimental measurements closely matched theoretical predictions. Above 300 RPM, the relative error of the braking detection was below 0.5%, making stealthy deceleration virtually impossible.
  • Attack Complexity: To successfully probe the mesh while spinning, a robotic attacker would need to match the rotor's position with an accuracy better than 50 parts per million (ppm). Manual attacks are precluded by physics; at 1000 RPM, the centrifugal force reaches ~100g, far beyond human tolerance.
  • Thermal Efficiency: Because the mesh is spinning, it only needs to cover every part of the payload once per revolution. This allows for longitudinal gaps that act as air vents, potentially allowing for 600W server-grade CPUs inside the HSM—a significant improvement over the ~30W limit of traditional designs.

Conclusion and Future Work

The IHSM demonstrates that high-level physical security can be achieved using accessible, off-the-shelf hardware. While the prototype successfully addresses core engineering challenges, future work will focus on mechanical longevity and integrating power and data transfer directly into motor windings to eliminate the need for optical components.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@article{gotte2022can,
  author = {Jan Sebastian Götte and Björn Scheuermann},
  title = {{Can't Touch This: Inertial HSMs Thwart Advanced Physical Attacks}},
  journal = {IACR Trans. Cryptogr. Hardw. Embed. Syst.},
  year = {2022},
  doi = {10.46586/tches.v2022.i1.69-93},
}
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