Can the Conditional Rebate Strategy Work? Signaling Quality via Induced Online Reviews

Lu Xiao, Qian Chen, Chaojie Wang, Jun WangJournal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research 2023 · DOI

TL;DR

This paper investigates the effectiveness of "conditional rebate" strategies, where sellers offer discounts for positive online reviews. Using a game theory model, they find that these strategies are only profitable for low-quality sellers in markets dominated by such products and when consumers are sufficiently sensitive to rebates. This practice distorts quality signals and can harm high-quality sellers and overall market efficiency.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

In the booming e-commerce landscape, online reviews are crucial for consumers making purchasing decisions. However, some sellers attempt to game this system by offering incentives, like rebates, to customers in exchange for positive reviews. This practice, known as a "conditional rebate strategy," can create a misleading impression of product quality. The paper aims to understand when and why sellers adopt this strategy, what the optimal rebate cost is, and how it impacts market dynamics, particularly for both low-quality (l-type) and high-quality (h-type) sellers. It addresses a gap in research concerning the specific mechanics and market consequences of this increasingly common manipulative practice.

Methods

The authors employ a signal game model based on Bayesian conditional probability. This is a standard approach in economics and game theory to model situations with asymmetric information. The model involves two stages:

  1. First Stage: Consumers make purchase decisions based on prior beliefs about product quality and price. Sellers, who know their product's true quality (high or low), decide whether to offer a conditional rebate.
  2. Second Stage: Consumers who purchased in the first stage provide reviews (positive or negative). These reviews act as signals, and subsequent consumers update their beliefs about product quality before making their own purchase decisions.

The model analyzes the optimal rebate cost (β*) for l-type sellers, considering their profit maximization objective. They compare equilibrium outcomes with and without the rebate strategy to assess its impact.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper. The study is theoretical and relies on a mathematical model rather than empirical data.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Conditional rebates are a double-edged sword: They can be a profitable strategy for low-quality sellers, but only under specific conditions.
  • Consumer sensitivity is key: The strategy only works if consumers are sufficiently sensitive to the offered rebates. If sensitivity is too low, the cost of the rebate outweighs the benefit.
  • Market composition matters: The strategy is most effective in markets dominated by low-quality products. In markets where high-quality products are prevalent, it backfires, harming both low-quality sellers (by not bringing sufficient benefits) and high-quality sellers (by distorting signals).
  • Quality signaling is disrupted: Induced positive reviews create a false signal of quality, making it harder for consumers to distinguish between genuinely good and bad products.
  • Price influences rebate cost: Higher product prices generally lead to higher optimal rebate costs for sellers.

Key Results

  • Preconditions for adoption: Low-quality sellers will adopt the conditional rebate strategy when consumer sensitivity to rebates reaches a certain threshold.
  • Optimal rebate cost (β*): This cost increases with product price (p) but its relationship with consumer sensitivity (ρ) and the proportion of high-quality products (α) is not always monotonic.
  • Market dominance of low-quality goods (low α): In this scenario, the conditional rebate strategy can increase demand and profits for l-type sellers. However, it decreases demand and profits for h-type sellers, potentially leading to h-type sellers exiting the market.
  • Market dominance of high-quality goods (high α): In this scenario, the strategy is less effective. The critical rebate sensitivity threshold increases, and the strategy may not even be profitable for l-type sellers. It can lead to a slight increase in h-type seller profits but significantly harms l-type sellers.
  • Impact on h-type sellers: When l-type sellers use conditional rebates, the demand and profit for h-type sellers are negatively affected, disrupting market order.

Limitations and Future Work

The authors acknowledge that their model is a simplification of real-world e-commerce dynamics. Some limitations and areas for future work include:

  • Collusion and Regulation: The paper touches upon collusive behavior in developing markets due to a lack of regulation. Future work could explore more detailed regulatory mechanisms and their effectiveness.
  • Platform Role: The study assumes platforms are passive. Investigating how platforms can actively manage or regulate such strategies would be valuable.
  • Consumer Behavior Nuances: The model simplifies consumer sensitivity and review behavior. More complex behavioral aspects could be incorporated.
  • Empirical Validation: While the theoretical findings are insightful, empirical studies are needed to validate these predictions in real-world e-commerce settings.
  • Product Types: The model focuses on experience goods. Extending the analysis to search goods or a mix of both could provide broader insights.

Summary updated

Abstract

Online reviews are an important part of product information and have important effects on consumers’ purchasing decisions. Some sellers try to manipulate the market by inducing online reviews. In this study, a signal game model based on Bayesian conditional probability is constructed to analyze the preconditions, decision-making process, and effect on market demand and profit of this behavior. The results show that first, when consumer sensitivity to rebates reaches a certain threshold, low-quality sellers will adopt a conditional rebate strategy to induce consumers to give positive reviews. Second, the optimal rebate cost (β*) is obtained, where β* increases with the product price (p), but it is not necessarily monotonic in consumers’ sensitivity to rebates (ρ) or the proportion of high-quality products (α). Third, the conditional rebate strategy can only work in a market dominated by low-quality goods. Using the conditional rebate strategy in a market dominated by high-quality goods will not bring benefits to low-quality sellers but will harm their profits. This study proposes that some developing online markets have collusive behaviors owing to a lack of regulations and laws, as well as consumers’ concern for small interests. Ensuring the orderly development of online markets will require joint efforts by platform enterprises, government agencies, and consumers.
BibTeX
@article{xiao2023can,
  author = {Lu Xiao and Qian Chen and Chaojie Wang and Jun Wang},
  title = {{Can the Conditional Rebate Strategy Work? Signaling Quality via Induced Online Reviews}},
  journal = {Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research},
  year = {2023},
  doi = {10.3390/jtaer19010004},
}
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