Calls for Caution in Genome Engineering Should Be a Model for Similar Dialogue on Pandemic Pathogen Research
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Ideas and Opinions17 November 2015Calls for Caution in Genome Engineering Should Be a Model for Similar Dialogue on Pandemic Pathogen ResearchMarc Lipsitch, DPhil, Kevin Esvelt, PhD, and Thomas Inglesby, MDMarc Lipsitch, DPhilFrom Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health and Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts, and University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania., Kevin Esvelt, PhDFrom Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health and Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts, and University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania., and Thomas Inglesby, MDFrom Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health and Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts, and University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.Author, Article, and Disclosure Informationhttps://doi.org/10.7326/M15-1048 SectionsAboutFull TextPDF ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack CitationsPermissions ShareFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail Recently, 18 leading researchers in science and biotechnology published an unprecedented statement in Science calling for great caution in the application of new CRISPR/Cas9 (clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats/CRISPR-associated protein 9) technologies to editing of the human germline (1). These technologies allow molecular biologists to modify genomes in ways that were previously difficult or impossible, creating the potential to treat disease by correcting genetic defects. However, these methods also allow genome modification in the germline that would be passed on to the organism's progeny.The statement called for the development of a thorough understanding of ethics and safety around ...References1. Baltimore D, Berg P, Botchan M, Carroll D, Charo RA, Church G, et al. Biotechnology. A prudent path forward for genomic engineering and germline gene modification. Science. 2015;348:36-8. [PMID: 25791083] doi:10.1126/science.aab1028 CrossrefMedlineGoogle Scholar2. Oye KA, Esvelt K, Appleton E, Catteruccia F, Church G, Kuiken T, et al. Biotechnology. Regulating gene drives. Science. 2014;345:626-8. [PMID: 25035410] doi:10.1126/science.1254287 CrossrefMedlineGoogle Scholar3. Esvelt KM, Smidler AL, Catteruccia F, Church GM. Concerning RNA-guided gene drives for the alteration of wild populations. Elife. 2014:e03401. [PMID: 25035423] doi:10.7554/eLife.03401 CrossrefMedlineGoogle Scholar4. Wain-Hobson S. H5N1 viral-engineering dangers will not go away. Nature. 2013;495:411. [PMID: 23538789] doi:10.1038/495411a CrossrefMedlineGoogle Scholar5. Rey F, Schwartz O, Wain-Hobson S. Gain-of-function research: unknown risks [Letter]. Science. 2013;342:311. [PMID: 24136951] doi:10.1126/science.342.6156.311-a CrossrefMedlineGoogle Scholar6. Lipsitch M, Inglesby TV. Moratorium on research intended to create novel potential pandemic pathogens [Editorial]. MBio. 2014;5. [PMID: 25505122] doi:10.1128/mBio.02366-14 CrossrefMedlineGoogle Scholar7. Lipsitch M, Galvani AP. Ethical alternatives to experiments with novel potential pandemic pathogens. PLoS Med. 2014;11:e1001646. [PMID: 24844931] doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001646 CrossrefMedlineGoogle Scholar8. Cambridge Working Group. Cambridge Working Group Consensus Statement on the Creation of Potential Pandemic Pathogens (PPPs). Cambridge, MA: Cambridge Working Group; 2014. Accessed at www.cambridgeworkinggroup.org on 18 November 2014. Google Scholar9. InterAcademy Panel on International Issues. IAP Statement on Biosecurity. Trieste, Italy: InterAcademy Panel on International Issues; 2005. Accessed at www.interacademies.net/File.aspx?id=5401 on 2 December 2013. Google Scholar10. White House Blog. Doing Diligence to Assess the Risks and Benefits of Life Sciences Gain-of-Function Research. 17 October 2014. Accessed at www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/10/17/doing-diligence-assess-risks-and-benefits-life-sciences-gain-function-research on 30 July 2015. Google Scholar Author, Article, and Disclosure InformationAffiliations: From Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health and Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts, and University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.Financial Support: Dr. Lipsitch received sabbatical funding from the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health. Dr. Esvelt is supported by the Wyss Institute for Biologically Inspired Engineering. Dr. Inglesby is supported by the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center.Disclosures: Disclosures can be viewed at www.acponline.org/authors/icmje/ConflictOfInterestForms.do?msNum=M15-1048.Corresponding Author: Marc Lipsitch, DPhil, Professor of Epidemiology, Director, Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics, Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, 677 Huntington Avenue, Kresge Building, Room 506G, Boston, MA 02115.Current Author Addresses: Dr. Lipsitch: Professor of Epidemiology, Director, Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics, Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, 677 Huntington Avenue, Kresge Building, Room 506G, Boston, MA 02115.Dr. Esvelt: Wyss Institute for Biologically Inspired Engineering, Harvard Medical School, CLSB 528-2C, 3 Blackfan Circle, Boston, MA 02115.Dr. Inglesby: UPMC Center for Biosecurity, 621 East Pratt Street, Suite 210, Baltimore, MD 21202.Author Contributions: Conception and design: M. Lipsitch, T. Inglesby.Drafting of the article: M. Lipsitch, K. Esvelt, T. Inglesby.Critical revision of the article for important intellectual content: M. Lipsitch, K. Esvelt, T. Inglesby.Final approval of the article: M. Lipsitch, K. Esvelt, T. Inglesby.Administrative, technical, or logistic support: T. Inglesby.This article was published online first at www.annals.org on 8 September 2015. PreviousarticleNextarticle Advertisement FiguresReferencesRelatedDetails Metrics Cited byThe ethics of clinical applications of germline genome modification: a systematic review of reasonsAdaptive Risk Management of Gene Drive Experiments 17 November 2015Volume 163, Issue 10Page: 790-791KeywordsDisclosureEpidemiologyGenetic diseasesPathogensPopulation statisticsPrevention, policy, and public healthResearch laboratoriesSafetyScientists ePublished: 8 September 2015 Issue Published: 17 November 2015 Copyright & PermissionsCopyright © 2015 by American College of Physicians. All Rights Reserved.PDF downloadLoading ...
BibTeX
@article{lipsitch2015calls,
author = {Marc Lipsitch and Kevin M. Esvelt and Thomas V. Inglesby},
title = {{Calls for Caution in Genome Engineering Should Be a Model for Similar Dialogue on Pandemic Pathogen Research}},
journal = {Annals},
year = {2015},
doi = {10.7326/m15-1048},
}Loading related content...