Building Collaborative Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure Protection: Empirical Evidence of Collective Intelligence Information Sharing Dynamics on ThreatFox

Eric Jollès, Sébastien Gillard, Dimitri Percia David, Martin Strohmeier, Alain MermoudCRITIS 2022 · OpenReview

Abstract

This article describes three collective intelligence dynamics observed on ThreatFox, a free platform operated by abuse.ch that collects and shares indicators of compromise (IoCs). These three dynamics are empirically analyzed with an exclusive dataset provided by the sharing platform. First, participants’ onboarding dynamics are investigated and the importance of building collaborative cybersecurity on an established network of trust is highlighted. Thus, when a new sharing platform is created by abuse.ch, an existing trusted community with ’power users’ will migrate swiftly to it, in order to enact the first sparks of collective intelligence dynamics. Second, the platform publication dynamics are analyzed and two different superlinear growths are observed. Third, the rewarding dynamics of a credit system is described—a promising incentive mechanism that could improve cooperation and information sharing in open-source intelligence communities through the gamification of the sharing activity. Overall, our study highlights future avenues of research to study the institutional rules enacting collective intelligence dynamics in cybersecurity. Thus, we show how the platform may improve the efficiency of information sharing between critical infrastructures, for example within Information Sharing and Analysis Centers using ThreatFox. Finally, a broad agenda for future empirical research in the field of cybersecurity information sharing is presented—an important activity to reduce information asymmetry between attackers and defenders.

Introduction

In the persistent cat-and-mouse game of cybersecurity, attackers often maintain a structural advantage through collaboration and tool-sharing. Conversely, defenders frequently operate in silos, leading to significant information asymmetry. While Cybersecurity Information Sharing (CIS) platforms aim to bridge this gap, they face social and institutional hurdles such as reputational risk, legal constraints (e.g., GDPR), and the "free-rider" problem. This paper investigates how ThreatFox, a project by the abuse.ch collective, overcomes these barriers to foster a thriving collaborative ecosystem.

Methodology and Dataset

The researchers applied an institutional economics framework to analyze an exclusive dataset provided by abuse.ch for the ThreatFox platform. The study spans from March 8, 2020, to July 4, 2022, encompassing 767,396 IoCs contributed by 106 identifiable "reporters" and numerous anonymous users. The analysis focused on three core dynamics: onboarding, publication growth, and the impact of symbolic rewards.

The ThreatFox web interface allows users to browse and search a massive database of community-contributed IoCs.

Onboarding Dynamics: The Power of Inherited Trust

A critical finding of the study is that ThreatFox did not build its community from scratch. Instead, it leveraged a "network of trust" established by previous abuse.ch projects like URLHaus and MalwareBazaar. This inheritance allowed for a massive influx of "power users" within the first five days of the platform's launch.

Following this initial surge, the arrival of new reporters settled into a steady linear growth rate ($a_{reps} = 0.19$). The data reveals a stark "10/90 rule": approximately 10% of users contribute roughly 98% of the IoCs. The platform's success is largely attributed to its ability to cater to and incentivize this small, highly active core of contributors.

Publication Dynamics: Superlinear Growth

The volume of shared IoCs on ThreatFox does not grow linearly; rather, it follows a superlinear curve. This suggests that as the community expands, the productivity of the collective intelligence increases at an accelerating rate. The researchers identified two distinct phases of this growth:

  1. Initial Migration Phase: The first 111 days exhibited a very high growth exponent ($\beta = 2.52$), likely representing the migration of existing datasets by power users.
  2. Steady-State Sharing: The subsequent phase maintained a strong superlinear growth ($\beta = 2.15$), reflecting the real-time sharing of new cyber events.
The arrival of IoCs follows a superlinear growth function, indicating a healthy and accelerating collective intelligence process.

Rewarding Dynamics: Gamification and Incentives

ThreatFox utilizes a symbolic credit system to gamify the sharing process. While these credits have no monetary value, they serve as a reputation mechanism. The study found that specific "IoC requests"—where users ask for information on a particular threat—combined with credit rewards can trigger significant spikes in activity. For instance, in a case study of the Formbook botnet, 80% of shared domains were contributed immediately following a targeted community request.

Conclusion and Future Directions

The empirical evidence from ThreatFox demonstrates that successful cybersecurity information sharing relies on a combination of inherited trust, low executional costs, and effective gamification. However, challenges remain, such as the "Anonymity Paradox," where anonymity encourages sharing but can complicate trust verification.

Future research should focus on developing "universal performance indicators" for CIS platforms and exploring peer-review metrics to replace subjective confidence levels. By understanding these institutional rules, defenders can better organize collective intelligence to protect critical infrastructure and reduce the information advantage held by attackers.

Summary updated

Abstract

This article describes three collective intelligence dynamics observed on ThreatFox, a free platform operated by abuse.ch that collects and shares indicators of compromise. These three dynamics are empirically analyzed with an exclusive dataset provided by the sharing platform. First, participants’ onboarding dynamics are investigated and the importance of building collaborative cybersecurity on an established network of trust is highlighted. Thus, when a new sharing platform is created by abuse.ch, an existing trusted community with ’power users’ will migrate swiftly to it, in order to enact the first sparks of collective intelligence dynamics. Second, the platform publication dynamics are analyzed and two different superlinear growths are observed. Third, the rewarding dynamics of a credit system is described - a promising incentive mechanism that could improve cooperation and information sharing in open-source intelligence communities through the gamification of the sharing activity. Overall, our study highlights future avenues of research to study the institutional rules enacting collective intelligence dynamics in cybersecurity. Thus, we show how the platform may improve the efficiency of information sharing between critical infrastructures, for example within Information Sharing and Analysis Centers using ThreatFox. Finally, a broad agenda for future empirical research in the field of cybersecurity information sharing is presented - an important activity to reduce information asymmetry between attackers and defenders.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{jolles2022building,
  author = {Eric Jollès and Sébastien Gillard and Dimitri Percia David and Martin Strohmeier and Alain Mermoud},
  title = {{Building Collaborative Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure Protection: Empirical Evidence of Collective Intelligence Information Sharing Dynamics on ThreatFox}},
  booktitle = {CRITIS},
  year = {2022},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=IWLd90IKB4-},
}
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