Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability

Felipe Balmaceda, Santiago R. Balseiro, José R. Correa, Nicolás E. Stier MosesGames Econ. Behav 2016 · DOI · OpenReview

Abstract

Highlights • We consider the classical principal–agent model with discrete number of effort levels. • Moral hazard and limit liability lead to inefficiencies in principal–agency relationships. • We provide simple parametric bounds for the social welfare loss of a problem instance. • We provide tight bounds for the worst-case social welfare loss (price of anarchy). • The worst-case social welfare loss ratio for linear and for arbitrary contracts coincide. Abstract We study a principal–agent problem with discrete outcome and effort level spaces. The principal and the agent are risk neutral and the latter is subject to limited liability. Quantifying welfare loss as the ratio between the first-best social welfare and that arising from the principal's optimal pay-for-performance contract, we provide simple parametric bounds for problem instances with moral hazard. Relying on that, we compute the worst-case welfare loss ratio among all problem instances with a fixed number of effort and outcome levels as a function of the number of possible effort levels and the likelihood ratio evaluated at the highest outcome. As extensions, we look at linear contracts and at cases with multiple identical tasks. Our work constitutes an initial attempt to quantify the losses arising from moral hazard when the agent is subject to limited liability, and shows that these losses are non-negligible in the worst case.
BibTeX
@article{balmaceda2016bounds,
  author = {Felipe Balmaceda and Santiago R. Balseiro and José R. Correa and Nicolás E. Stier Moses},
  title = {{Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability}},
  journal = {Games Econ. Behav.},
  year = {2016},
  doi = {10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.008},
}

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