Beyond Vulnerabilities: A Survey of Adversarial Attacks as Both Threats and Defenses in Computer Vision Systems

Zhongliang Guo, Yifei Qian, Yanli Li, Weiye Li, Chun Tong Lei, Shuai Zhao, Lei Fang, Ognjen Arandjelovic, Chun Pong LauarXiv 2025 · DOI · arXiv

Introduction

Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have achieved remarkable success in computer vision but remain fundamentally fragile. Since the discovery of "adversarial examples" in 2014—inputs with imperceptible changes that trigger incorrect predictions—research has largely treated these as offensive security threats. This survey redefines the field by presenting adversarial attacks as a "dual-use" technology, bridging the gap between their role as system vulnerabilities and their emerging utility as defensive tools for privacy and intellectual property protection.

Taxonomy of Adversarial Attacks

The technical evolution of adversarial attacks can be categorized into three primary domains based on their operational space and objectives.

Pixel-Space Attacks (PSAs)

Pixel-space attacks represent the foundational methods in the field, modifying raw pixel values to induce misclassification. Early methods like the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) utilized a single-step gradient update for speed. Subsequent developments introduced iterative approaches like Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) and momentum-based variants like MI-FGSM to improve attack success and transferability across different models.

Optimization paths for FGSM, PGD, and MI-FGSM.
Technical summary of gradient-based attack formulas.

Physically Realizable Attacks

Moving beyond digital manipulation, physical attacks target sensors in the real world. Techniques such as Adversarial Patches, 3D-printed textures, and dynamic light projections (e.g., the SLAP method) demonstrate that DNNs can be fooled by environmental perturbations. Modern "Naturalistic Physical Adversarial Patches" (NPAP) have achieved over 80% success rates against robust detectors like YOLOv3, posing significant risks to autonomous vehicles and surveillance systems.

Latent-Space Attacks (LSAs)

The current frontier involves targeting high-level semantic representations or embeddings. By manipulating the latent manifold of generative models (such as VAEs or Diffusion models), attackers can create "unrestricted" adversarial examples. These images appear perfectly natural to humans but are mathematically "poisoned" for target AI architectures, often exhibiting superior transferability in black-box scenarios.

Adversarial Attacks as a Defensive Tool

A pivotal shift in recent literature is the application of adversarial noise for protection against malicious AI exploitation.

  • Privacy Protection: Adversarial perturbations can "immunize" personal photos against unauthorized facial recognition or biometric harvesting.
  • Intellectual Property: Tools like Anti-DreamBooth and Unlearnable Diffusion Perturbation (UDP) allow artists to add imperceptible noise to their portfolios. This prevents generative models from effectively training on their data, thereby protecting unique artistic styles from unauthorized mimicry.

Standard Benchmarks and Evaluation

Robustness is typically evaluated using standard computer vision datasets. ImageNet remains the primary benchmark for classification, while COCO and PASCAL VOC are used for object detection and segmentation. In the defensive context, face research datasets and generative model benchmarks are increasingly used to test the efficacy of "unlearnable" perturbations.

Key Insights and Future Directions

The survey highlights a transition from simple sign-based gradients toward more precise Raw Gradient Descent (RGD). While defensive applications show promise, significant challenges remain. "Adversarial purification"—where models attempt to "wash away" noise—continues to threaten the persistence of defensive perturbations. Furthermore, the rise of massive Foundation Models (e.g., CLIP) necessitates new frameworks for understanding vulnerability. Future research must address the computational efficiency of these methods to enable real-time deployment on consumer platforms and social media.

Summary updated

Abstract

Adversarial attacks against computer vision systems have emerged as a critical research area that challenges the fundamental assumptions about neural network robustness and security. This comprehensive survey examines the evolving landscape of adversarial techniques, revealing their dual nature as both sophisticated security threats and valuable defensive tools. We provide a systematic analysis of adversarial attack methodologies across three primary domains: pixel-space attacks, physically realizable attacks, and latent-space attacks. Our investigation traces the technical evolution from early gradient-based methods such as FGSM and PGD to sophisticated optimization techniques incorporating momentum, adaptive step sizes, and advanced transferability mechanisms. We examine how physically realizable attacks have successfully bridged the gap between digital vulnerabilities and real-world threats through adversarial patches, 3D textures, and dynamic optical perturbations. Additionally, we explore the emergence of latent-space attacks that leverage semantic structure in internal representations to create more transferable and meaningful adversarial examples. Beyond traditional offensive applications, we investigate the constructive use of adversarial techniques for vulnerability assessment in biometric authentication systems and protection against malicious generative models. Our analysis reveals critical research gaps, particularly in neural style transfer protection and computational efficiency requirements. This survey contributes a comprehensive taxonomy, evolution analysis, and identification of future research directions, aiming to advance understanding of adversarial vulnerabilities and inform the development of more robust and trustworthy computer vision systems.
BibTeX
@misc{guo2025beyond,
  author = {Zhongliang Guo and Yifei Qian and Yanli Li and Weiye Li and Chun Tong Lei and Shuai Zhao and Lei Fang and Ognjen Arandjelovic and Chun Pong Lau},
  title = {{Beyond Vulnerabilities: A Survey of Adversarial Attacks as Both Threats and Defenses in Computer Vision Systems}},
  year = {2025},
  eprint = {2508.01845},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.01845},
}
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