Benefits of marriage as a search strategy

Davi B. CostaarXiv 2021 · DOI · arXiv

TL;DR

This paper models marriage as a search strategy in large societies using a stochastic matching process. It finds that marriage can increase average utility compared to remaining single, offering a data-driven piece of advice: marry when your partner's affinity is "a sigma above average." The model also suggests that centralized matching (like a dating app) could lead to higher societal utility than decentralized, individual decisions.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

The paper tackles the fundamental question of whether marriage is a beneficial search strategy. It explores the trade-off between the potential benefits of finding a more compatible partner by remaining single and the risks of being left by a current partner or missing opportunities. While traditional economic models often focus on stable matching (like the Gale-Shapley algorithm), this work investigates a more dynamic, agent-based approach in large, complex societies where perfect information and coordination are unlikely. It aims to understand how individual decision-making in a stochastic environment, particularly the decision to marry, impacts overall societal well-being.

Methods

The authors introduce a computational model of mate searching and marriage. Agents have preferences represented by an "affinity matrix." The system evolves in discrete steps where agents randomly match. The core innovation is the introduction of a "marriage" decision: agents stop searching if their affinity with a partner exceeds a certain threshold ($\Lambda$). This threshold is interpreted as a societal parameter influencing marriage behavior. The model simulates this process for various $\Lambda$ values and analyzes the average utility and variance of agents. They also develop an analytical framework for the large-N limit (infinite agents) to derive theoretical predictions.

Datasets

The paper compares its model's output to real-world data on the share of married individuals over time (specifically, men in England and Wales). This comparison serves as an empirical validation of the model's ability to capture societal trends in marriage formation. No new datasets were created for this research.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Marriage as a "Good Enough" Strategy: The model suggests that continuously searching for the "perfect" partner might be less optimal than settling for a "good enough" one. The advice "don't marry the first person you like and don't search for the love of your life, but get married if you like your partner more than a sigma above average" encapsulates this.
  • Societal Utility vs. Individual Choice: The authors demonstrate that a centrally planned, stable matching (like Gale-Shapley) yields higher average utility than the decentralized, stochastic matching in their model. This implies that individual search strategies, while natural, might lead to a sub-optimal societal outcome.
  • Marriage as a Risk Management Tool: Marriage, by stopping the search, protects individuals from the risk of being left by their partner or missing out on opportunities, which can lead to higher average utility in certain scenarios.
  • The Role of the Marriage Threshold ($\Lambda$): The parameter $\Lambda$ significantly influences the outcomes. Too low a threshold leads to marrying too early, while too high a threshold approaches the no-marriage scenario. An intermediate value, around "one sigma above average," appears to maximize societal utility.

Key Results

  • The average utility in the system with marriage can be higher than in the system without marriage, especially for intermediate marriage thresholds ($\Lambda \approx \sigma$).
  • The average utility achieved in the stochastic model is consistently lower than that obtained from a stable matching (Gale-Shapley algorithm), suggesting potential gains from coordinated matching.
  • The model's prediction for the evolution of the fraction of married couples shows good agreement with real-world data on marriage rates in England and Wales.
  • An analytical expression for the evolution of utility in the large-N limit was derived.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Homogeneity Assumption: The model initially assumes a homogeneous society where preferences are drawn from the same distribution. While the authors explore some variations, real societies are heterogeneous, and this simplification might limit applicability.
  • Time-Independent Affinity: The affinity between agents is assumed to be constant. In reality, relationships evolve, and affinities can change over time, which could lead to divorce or relationship dissolution. The authors suggest that incorporating time-dependent affinity could model divorce.
  • Ignoring Divorce: The current model does not account for the pain or cost of breaking up, which is a significant aspect of real-world relationships.
  • Simplified Decision Rules: The decision rules for matching and marriage are relatively simple. More complex preference structures and decision-making processes could be explored.
  • Future Work: The authors suggest exploring the $t \to \infty$ limit more thoroughly, conducting more systematic empirical comparisons, investigating time-dependent affinities to model divorce, and exploring the possibility of a quantum mechanical analog for the system's evolution. They also propose using the model to advise agents on selectivity in marriage based on societal values of $\Lambda$.

Summary updated

Abstract

We propose and investigate a model for mate searching and marriage in large societies based on a stochastic matching process and simple decision rules. Agents have preferences among themselves given by some probability distribution. They randomly search for better mates, forming new couples and breaking apart in the process. Marriage is implemented in the model by adding the decision of stopping searching for a better mate when the affinity between a couple is higher than a certain fixed amount. We show that the average utility in the system with marriage can be higher than in the system without it. Part of our results can be summarized in what sounds like a piece of advice: don't marry the first person you like and don't search for the love of your life, but get married if you like your partner more than a sigma above average. We also find that the average utility attained in our stochastic model is smaller than the one associated with a stable matching achieved using the Gale-Shapley algorithm. This can be taken as a formal argument in favor of a central planner (perhaps an app) with the information to coordinate the marriage market in order to set a stable matching. To roughly test the adequacy of our model to describe existent societies, we compare the evolution of the fraction of married couples in our model with real-world data and obtain good agreement. In the last section, we formulate the model in the limit of an infinite number of agents and find an analytical expression for the evolution of the system.
BibTeX
@misc{costa2021benefits,
  author = {Davi B. Costa},
  title = {{Benefits of marriage as a search strategy}},
  year = {2021},
  eprint = {2108.04885},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.04885},
}
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