Bayesian proportional resource allocation games

John N. Tsitsiklis, Yunjian XuAllerton 2010 · OpenReview

Abstract

We consider a proportional allocation mechanism that gives to each user an amount of a resource proportional to the user's bid. We study a corresponding Bayesian game in which each user has incomplete information on the state or type of the other users. We prove the existence of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, under some mild assumptions, we establish asymptotic efficiency: we show that the per user social welfare achieved at any Bayes-Nash equilibrium is asymptotically equal to the maximum possible.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{tsitsiklis2010bayesian,
  author = {John N. Tsitsiklis and Yunjian Xu},
  title = {{Bayesian proportional resource allocation games}},
  booktitle = {Allerton},
  year = {2010},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=hvZkbNa9ea},
}

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