Abstract The continued rise in oil prices and environmental concerns have made natural gas (NG) one of the world’s most important energy sources. As populations and economies grow, the demand for natural gas is increasing due to the expansion of the industrial and commercial sectors, as well as increased household incomes. The potential for significant increases in natural gas supply to meet growing demand makes decisions at all strategic, tactical and operational levels necessary in building new or restructuring existing natural gas transportation systems. In this paper, the multi-objective optimization of natural gas hydrate (NGH) transportation is proposed as a tool for supporting regulatory decisions. Three objective functions are involved in the formulation of the problem: minimization of subsidy costs, maximization of energy utilization, and maximization of profit for each NGH plant. As part of the design parameters for the NGH project, the regulatory agency must consider the entrepreneur’s return on investment and the needs of current and future consumers. In the absence of an optimization tool, this problem may result in unfair gas prices or a lack of investor interest. With a continuous increase in natural gas consumption, the proposed analysis examines growing markets. The mixed subsidy mechanism was applied to a typical example in order to demonstrate the performance of the proposed approach.
Introduction
As global energy demand rises alongside environmental concerns, natural gas (NG) has become a pivotal "bridge fuel" in the transition toward carbon neutrality. However, the logistical challenges of transporting natural gas from remote offshore reservoirs to growing markets remain significant. While pipelines and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) are the industry standards, Natural Gas Hydrate (NGH) technology has emerged as a promising alternative due to its milder storage conditions and cost-effectiveness over specific distances.
Despite its potential, NGH faces a major hurdle: high initial research and development (R&D) costs and substantial operating investments. These financial barriers often deter private investors. To address this, government intervention is necessary, but current subsidy policies frequently fail to balance the conflicting interests of the state, society, and private enterprises. This paper proposes a multi-objective optimization framework to design a "hybrid" subsidy policy—combining direct payments and tax breaks—to foster a sustainable NGH industry.
The Authority-Enterprise Framework
The core of the research is a bi-level, multi-objective programming model designed to find an equilibrium between two primary stakeholders: the regional authority (the "leader") and the NGH production plants (the "followers").
The Upper Model (Authority) represents the government's perspective. Its primary objectives are to minimize the total fiscal cost of subsidies while maximizing the regional energy utilization rate. The authority manages two policy "levers": a direct unit production subsidy ($P_{sub}$) and a corporate tax rate ($\delta_{tax}$).
The Lower Model (Enterprise) represents individual NGH plants. These entities respond to the authority's policy by determining their optimal production and transportation quantities ($Q_{ngh}$) to maximize their own net profits ($G_{NGH}$).
To solve this hierarchical problem, the authors employed a constraint transformation method. They converted the energy utilization objective into a constraint governed by a strategy parameter ($\beta$), which represents the government's level of ambition regarding energy efficiency. The bi-level problem was then reduced to a single-level optimization using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) approach.
Case Study: South Pars Gas Field
The model was validated using data from the South Pars offshore gas field in southern Iran, targeting four major Asian markets: Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and China. The dataset accounted for varying gas compositions (methane, ethane, and propane), different hydrate structures (Type I and II), and logistical factors such as round-trip distances ranging from approximately 19,000 km to 24,000 km.
Quantitative Outcomes
The analysis demonstrated that a "mixed" subsidy mechanism—using both direct subsidies and tax reductions—is more effective than a single-tool approach. By adjusting the strategy parameter $\beta$, the researchers mapped how the equilibrium shifts as the government prioritizes energy utilization.
As shown in the results, increasing the government's ambition ($\beta$ from 0.00 to 0.20) leads to:
- Policy Adjustments: The unit subsidy ($P_{sub}$) increases from 0.6100 to 0.6700, while the tax rate ($\delta_{tax}$) is lowered from 0.0420 to 0.0408.
- Production Growth: Higher incentives successfully drive production. For instance, Plant 4's production quantity ($Q_{ngh}$) rose from 5.64 to 6.53 units.
- Sustained Profitability: Despite the increased scale of operations, the hybrid policy ensures that plant profits ($G_{NGH}$) grow, maintaining investor interest.
- Fiscal Impact: The total cost to the authority ($F^{SUB}$) increases from 11.05 to 14.24, providing a clear metric for the fiscal investment required to achieve higher energy efficiency targets.
Conclusion
The proposed model provides a robust tool for regulatory decision-making, ensuring that NGH projects remain attractive to investors without imposing an undue fiscal burden on the state. By quantifying the trade-offs between subsidy costs and energy goals, the framework helps avoid "unfair" gas prices and market stagnation. Future research could enhance this model by incorporating dynamic gas compositions and explicit carbon emission metrics to further align NGH transportation policies with global sustainability objectives.
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