Attribution Mechanisms for Ancillary Service Costs Induced by Variability in Power Delivery

Francesca Bona, Nicolas Gast, Jean‐Yves Le Boudec, Pierre Pinson, Dan-Cristian TomozeiIEEE Transactions on Power Systems 2016 · DOI

TL;DR

As renewable energy sources increase, so does variability in power delivery, leading to significant ancillary service costs. This paper proposes new mechanisms to attribute these costs fairly among market participants, moving beyond current systems that socialize these expenses. By analyzing different attribution metrics, the authors demonstrate how to create more equitable and efficient electricity markets that incentivize responsible power delivery.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

The increasing integration of renewable energy sources like wind and solar into power grids introduces significant variability in electricity generation. This variability necessitates ancillary services to maintain grid stability and reliability. Currently, the costs associated with these services, particularly those related to power fluctuations (as opposed to energy imbalances), are often socialized, meaning they are spread across all electricity consumers. This approach doesn't incentivize generators or consumers to manage their power delivery profiles effectively, potentially leading to inefficient market outcomes and hindering the integration of renewables. The paper addresses the need for a mechanism to accurately attribute these power-related regulation costs to the participants who induce them, thereby promoting more responsible behavior and a fairer cost distribution.

Methods

The authors propose a framework for attributing power-regulation costs based on an "energy-neutral power profile." This profile represents a participant's power delivery minus their average power delivery over a given time interval, effectively isolating the variability component. They then introduce four distinct metrics to quantify this variability and attribute costs:

  • Power Capacity Metric: Based on the maximum absolute deviation of the energy-neutral power profile (L∞ norm).
  • Integrated Mismatch Metric: Based on the integral of the absolute value of the energy-neutral power profile raised to a power k (Lk norm).
  • Mileage Metric: Based on the integral of the absolute value of the derivative of the energy-neutral power profile, capturing the rate of change.
  • Contribution Metric: Based on the inner product of a participant's energy-neutral profile and the total energy-neutral profile of all participants. This metric is unique in that it can be positive or negative, indicating whether a participant's fluctuations help or hinder the system.

The paper then analyzes these metrics using a game-theoretical framework to understand their impact on market participants' strategic behavior and their resilience to collusion. Numerical simulations are conducted using data from Western Denmark and Germany to evaluate the practical implications of these mechanisms.

Datasets

The paper utilizes two primary sources of data for its analysis:

  • Western Denmark Data: Hourly resolution data for the year 2014 was obtained from the Transmission System Operator (Energinet.dk) to assess power-related regulation costs.
  • Germany Data: Ancillary service procurement and usage data for the year 2014 was retrieved from the online platform for control reserve tendering (www.regelleistung.net) for the four German Transmission System Operators (TSOs).

For the simulation studies, wind power producer profiles were generated using the CorWind simulation tool, based on spectral methods and meteorological data. Demand fluctuations were also simulated.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Power Variability Costs are Non-Negligible: The analysis of German and Danish data reveals that power-related regulation costs, induced by fluctuations, are not insignificant and can vary considerably throughout the year.
  • Contribution Metric is Key for Fairness: The "Contribution Metric" stands out because it can assign negative costs (i.e., revenues) to participants whose power fluctuations help stabilize the grid. This incentivizes beneficial variability, unlike the other metrics that primarily penalize any deviation.
  • Sub-Additivity of Other Metrics: The Power Capacity, Integrated Mismatch, and Mileage metrics are sub-additive. This means that if a group of participants colludes and acts as a single entity, their attributed costs will be less than the sum of their individual costs. This creates an incentive for collusion, which is undesirable.
  • Nash Equilibrium Behavior: The game-theoretical analysis shows that participants tend to adjust their production profiles to minimize their costs under each metric. The Contribution Metric leads to outcomes where participants are rewarded for helping the system, while others tend to flatten their profiles as much as possible.
  • Time Resolution Matters: The study indicates that reducing the time resolution for calculating energy-neutral profiles (e.g., from hourly to 15-minute intervals) can lead to a decrease in overall power-regulation costs, as fluctuations are captured at a finer granularity.

Key Results

  • In Western Denmark, the overall cost induced by power-related services was 9.9% of that for energy-related regulation services in 2014. For Germany, this figure was 18.1%.
  • The numerical simulations demonstrated that the Contribution Metric leads to lower total regulation costs in Nash equilibria compared to the other three metrics, and is closer to the theoretical optimal allocation.
  • For the Contribution Metric, power costs can be both positive and negative, reflecting a participant's contribution to grid stability. For the other three metrics, costs are always non-negative, primarily penalizing variability.
  • When comparing a single hour versus a full month in the Danish case study, the differences in cost attribution among suppliers become less pronounced over longer periods, though differences in contributions remain.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Multi-Area Setup: The current proposal is for a single-area setup. The authors suggest that evaluating how these mechanisms would function in interconnected, multi-area electricity markets is crucial.
  • Storage and Demand Response Integration: The paper posits that these attribution mechanisms could facilitate the deployment of storage and demand response solutions, which are vital for renewable energy integration. Further evaluation of this potential is recommended.
  • Computational Complexity: While the Contribution Metric offers desirable properties, its estimation is more complex, requiring synchronized measurements and potentially higher communication costs compared to the other metrics.
  • Idealized Assumptions: The numerical evaluation made simplifying assumptions, such as a non-strategic load and perfect forecast for some scenarios. Relaxing these assumptions in future work would provide a more comprehensive understanding.

Summary updated

Abstract

The increased penetration of renewable energy sources in existing power systems has led to necessary developments in electricity market mechanisms. Most importantly, renewable energy generation is increasingly made accountable for deviations between scheduled and actual energy generation. However, there is no mechanism to enforce accountability for the additional costs induced by power fluctuations. These costs are socialized and eventually supported by electricity customers. We propose some metrics for assessing the contribution of all market participants to power regulation needs, as well as an attribution mechanism for fairly redistributing related power regulation costs. We discuss the effect of various metrics used by the attribution mechanisms, and we illustrate, in a game-theoretical framework, their consequences on the strategic behavior of market participants. We also illustrate, by using the case of Western Denmark, how these mechanisms may affect revenues of the various market participants.
BibTeX
@article{bona2016attribution,
  author = {Francesca Bona and Nicolas Gast and Jean‐Yves Le Boudec and Pierre Pinson and Dan-Cristian Tomozei},
  title = {{Attribution Mechanisms for Ancillary Service Costs Induced by Variability in Power Delivery}},
  journal = {IEEE Transactions on Power Systems},
  year = {2016},
  doi = {10.1109/tpwrs.2016.2598760},
}
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