Abstract
Media-based modulation (MBM) is a recently proposed modulation scheme which has the advantages of increased spectral efficiency and improved performance. In this paper, a physical layer security (PLS) scheme is proposed for the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) media-based modulation system using generalized spatial modulation (GSM) to resist the passive eavesdropping from a multiple-antenna eavesdropper. Secure mapping rules between the information bits and the transmit patterns are designed based on the abundant legitimate channel realizations of the MIMO MBM system. Due to the independent fading of the legitimate link and the eavesdropping link, the designed mapping rules are unavailable and appear random to the eavesdropper. Therefore, the correct detection of the information bits at the eavesdropper is prevented, which is validated through bit error rate (BER) analysis and simulations. The ergodic secrecy rate is analyzed and a tight closed-form approximation is derived. Simulation results show that the proposed secure GSM MBM scheme outperforms the existing secure MBM schemes without consuming jamming power or requiring eavesdropper’s channel state information.
Introduction
As wireless communication systems transition toward 6G, the dual requirements of high spectral efficiency and robust security become increasingly critical. Media-Based Modulation (MBM) has emerged as a promising candidate for next-generation systems. By employing radio-frequency (RF) mirrors to alter the radiation patterns of an antenna, MBM effectively utilizes the wireless environment to carry additional information. However, the broadcast nature of wireless channels inherently exposes data to passive eavesdropping.
Traditional Physical Layer Security (PLS) techniques, such as Artificial Noise (AN), typically involve intentional jamming to obscure the signal from unauthorized receivers. These methods often suffer from high power consumption and require the transmitter to possess Channel State Information (CSI) of the eavesdropper—a condition rarely met in practical, non-cooperative scenarios. This paper addresses these challenges by proposing a secure mapping scheme that leverages the natural randomness of the legitimate channel.
Proposed Methodology: Secure Random Mapping
The researchers propose a PLS scheme for MIMO systems combining Generalized Spatial Modulation (GSM) with MBM. The core innovation lies in using the unique wireless channel between the transmitter (Alice) and the legitimate receiver (Bob) as a dynamic, shared secret key.
The Mapping Process
- Channel Fingerprinting: Alice and Bob estimate the unique multi-path fading characteristics of their shared channel. Due to the physics of wireless propagation, this "fingerprint" is unique to their physical locations.
- Power-Based Sorting: Alice calculates the channel power for every possible combination of antenna and mirror patterns. She then sorts these patterns based on their respective power levels.
- Dynamic Mapping Rule: Instead of a static bit-to-signal mapping, Alice and Bob establish a dynamic rule based on the sorted power levels.
Because an eavesdropper (Eve) is located at a different physical position, she observes a completely independent channel. Consequently, her version of the sorted power levels will differ fundamentally from Bob's. To Eve, the mapping between information bits and transmit patterns appears as pure, undecipherable noise.
Performance Evaluation
The proposed scheme was validated using Monte Carlo simulations based on the Rayleigh block fading channel model, simulating rich scattering environments typical of urban or indoor settings.
Bit Error Rate (BER) Performance
Simulation results reveal a significant performance gap between the legitimate and eavesdropping links. While Bob’s BER decreases as the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) improves, Eve’s BER remains consistently at 0.5, regardless of the SNR or the number of antennas she utilizes. In digital communication, a BER of 0.5 signifies that the receiver is performing no better than random guessing.
Secrecy Rate and Robustness
The authors derived a tight closed-form mathematical approximation for the ergodic secrecy rate, facilitating performance prediction without exhaustive simulation. The results indicate that the proposed scheme achieves a higher secrecy rate than existing MBM security methods, particularly when the eavesdropper possesses multiple antennas. Furthermore, the scheme maintains security even under slight channel correlation, although extreme correlation can impact the overall data rate.
Discussion and Future Directions
The proposed random mapping scheme offers several key advantages:
- Energy Efficiency: It provides "zero-power" security, as it does not require the transmission of extra jamming signals.
- Independence: The scheme is effective without any knowledge of the eavesdropper's location or channel state.
- Simplicity: It utilizes the inherent randomness of the environment as a built-in cryptographic resource.
Limitations
The primary limitation is the sensitivity to CSI accuracy. If the channel estimate is noisy or becomes outdated due to high mobility, Bob's decoding performance will degrade. Additionally, this work focuses on passive eavesdropping; future research is required to address active threats such as spoofing or pilot contamination.
Conclusion
By transforming the unique characteristics of the wireless channel into a dynamic mapping key, the proposed secure GSM-MBM scheme provides a robust and energy-efficient solution for physical layer security. This approach represents a significant step toward securing high-speed wireless communications in the 6G era.
Reference: Z. Gao, S. Bai, X. Liao and M. Liu, "Anti-Eavesdropping Scheme Based on Random Mapping for GSM-MBM Systems," in IEEE Access, vol. 8, pp. 48416-48427, 2020, doi: 10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2978111.
Summary updated