Analyzing the Role of the DSO in Electricity Trading of VPPs via a Stackelberg Game Model

Peng Wang, Xi Zhang, Luis BadesaarXiv 2025 · DOI · arXiv

Introduction

The rapid proliferation of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs), such as solar photovoltaics, wind turbines, and battery energy storage systems, has necessitated more sophisticated market participation strategies. Virtual Power Plants (VPPs) have emerged as a primary solution, aggregating diverse DERs to operate as a single controllable entity within the electricity market. However, a critical question remains regarding the optimal trading architecture: should VPPs interact directly with the wholesale power market, or should they trade through a local coordinator, such as a Distribution System Operator (DSO)? This paper investigates the economic implications of a DSO acting as a profit-seeking intermediary using a strategic game-theoretic approach.

The Stackelberg Game Framework

To model the interaction between a DSO and multiple VPPs, this study employs a Stackelberg Game. In this hierarchical model, the DSO acts as the "leader," moving first to set internal purchase and sale prices. The VPPs act as "followers," responding to these prices by optimizing their internal resource dispatch to minimize their own operating costs.

Structure of the bi-level Stackelberg game between the DSO and VPPs.

The DSO's objective is to maximize its profit, derived from the price spread between the wholesale market and the internal rates offered to the VPPs. Conversely, the VPPs manage micro-turbines, battery storage, and wind power to meet local demand at the lowest possible cost. This bi-level optimization problem is solved by applying Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions to transform it into a single-level Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC).

Trading Architectures: Mode 1 vs. Mode 2

The study compares two distinct trading modes to evaluate the impact of the DSO's involvement:

  • Mode 1 (Direct Trading): VPPs trade directly with the wholesale power market at prevailing market prices.
  • Mode 2 (DSO-Mediated Trading): The DSO acts as an intermediary, creating a local "trading cluster."
Comparison of direct wholesale trading (Mode 1) and DSO-mediated trading (Mode 2).

In Mode 2, the DSO facilitates local power sharing. For instance, if one VPP has a surplus of wind generation while another requires battery charging, the DSO can facilitate an internal trade. This local balancing reduces the net energy exchanged with the external grid, potentially increasing local efficiency. VPPs strategically shift their behavior—such as battery charging cycles—to align with the DSO's price signals.

Key Results and Economic Impact

The model was tested on a synthetic system of three VPPs with varying load profiles and wind generation capacities over a 24-hour horizon. The results demonstrate a "win-win" scenario for local participants:

  • VPP Cost Savings: VPPs achieved operating cost reductions of 0.13%, 2.94%, and 0.78%, respectively, compared to direct wholesale trading.
  • DSO Profitability: The DSO generated a trading profit of 1.134 k€, successfully finding a price "sweet spot" that incentivized participation while maintaining a margin.
  • Wholesale Market Impact: Revenue flowing into the wholesale market decreased by 22.68%.

This suggests that the economic gains for the DSO and VPPs are largely a redirection of funds away from the traditional wholesale level rather than purely new value creation, representing a zero-sum shift in the energy economy.

Conclusion and Regulatory Implications

While a strategic, profit-seeking DSO can successfully lower local costs, the resulting revenue loss for the wholesale market highlights a critical need for regulatory oversight. In reality, DSOs are often regulated utilities rather than purely selfish agents. Future research should explore how regulatory constraints, such as price caps, might alter the equilibrium of this Stackelberg game. Additionally, incorporating ancillary services like frequency response could reveal further revenue streams and stability benefits for decentralized energy trading.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@misc{wang2025analyzing,
  author = {Peng Wang and Xi Zhang and Luis Badesa},
  title = {{Analyzing the Role of the DSO in Electricity Trading of VPPs via a Stackelberg Game Model}},
  year = {2025},
  eprint = {2501.07715},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.07715},
}
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