An Empirical Evaluation of Quantum Kernel Stability in Network Intrusion Detection

Sreejonty Chakraborty, Adrita Rahman Tory, Muhammad Aminur Rahaman, Khondokar Fida HasanarXiv 2026 · arXiv

This study provides a sobering reality check for the application of Quantum Machine Learning (QML) in cybersecurity. While quantum kernel methods are often hailed as the next frontier for Network Intrusion Detection (NID), the authors demonstrate that current approaches are plagued by extreme instability and "classifier collapse"—failures that persist even when hardware noise is removed from the equation.

TL;DR

Quantum kernel methods for intrusion detection are currently outperformed by classical models like XGBoost in accuracy, speed, and stability. Crucially, the "fragility" of these quantum models isn't just a hardware noise problem; it's an intrinsic issue with how data is represented in quantum Hilbert space, leading to catastrophic failures that average accuracy metrics often hide.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are the "burglar alarms" of computer networks. For these systems to be useful, they must be predictable and stable; an operator needs to trust that the detection rate won't randomly plummet based on a different initialization seed.

Recent research has suggested that Quantum Kernel Methods—which map classical data into a high-dimensional quantum feature space—could improve detection. When these models underperform, researchers typically blame the "noise" (errors) inherent in current Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) devices. This paper investigates a critical question: Is hardware noise really the primary bottleneck, or is there a more fundamental problem with quantum kernels in this domain?

Methods

The authors conducted a rigorous, matched evaluation of the Pegasos-QSVC (a Quantum Support Vector Classifier) against classical heavyweights like XGBoost and RBF-SVM.

To isolate the effect of noise, they ran 56 quantum experiments across four different backends:

  1. Exact Noiseless Statevector: A perfect simulation with zero hardware error.
  2. Three Noise-Simulated Backends: (Lagos, Nairobi, and Perth) which mimic the error profiles of real IBM superconducting quantum processors.

The team used a standardized pipeline for all models, including PCA-based feature reduction to seven components and identical data splits, as shown in the experimental workflow below:

![Fig.

  1. Preprocessing and evaluation pipeline shared by every arm of the experiment.](/figures/art_cf51c7da26524885a4cb12b5df1d16b0)

Datasets

The study utilized two industry-standard benchmarks:

  • NSL-KDD: A refined version of the classic KDD Cup 99 dataset, designed to remove redundant records that bias evaluations.
  • ToN-IoT: A modern dataset capturing telemetry and network traffic from a medium-scale Internet of Things (IoT) testbed.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • The "Noise is the Culprit" Myth: Two of the eight observed "classifier collapses" occurred on the noiseless backend. This proves that better hardware alone won't fix the instability; the problem lies in the quantum representation itself.
  • Spectral Concentration: Analysis of the Kernel Gram matrices revealed that the quantum kernels suffer from "low effective rank." Essentially, the quantum mapping squashes the data into a very small portion of the available space, making it hard for the classifier to distinguish between "normal" and "attack" traffic.
  • The Danger of Averages: A model might have 90% average accuracy but fail completely on specific random seeds. In a security context, a "recall collapse" (where the model stops flagging attacks entirely) is a catastrophic failure, even if the average accuracy looks "mediocre" rather than "broken."
  • Noise as a "False" Signal: Interestingly, adding noise actually increased the effective rank of the kernel matrices (see Figure 4 below). However, this wasn't "good" rank; it was just random noise flattening the spectrum without adding any useful information for classification.

![Fig.

  1. Kernel effective rank, out of 150 samples, by backend and dataset. The noiseless kernel is the most concentrated.](/figures/art_c616eea311e94fb2b82488d349988d10)

Key Results

  • Performance Gap: XGBoost achieved 98.94% accuracy on NSL-KDD, while the quantum model averaged only 91.80%. On the harder ToN-IoT dataset, the gap widened significantly (99.41% vs. 82.98%).
  • Extreme Variance: The quantum model's performance varied by as much as 62 times more than XGBoost across different random seeds.
  • Degenerate Classifiers: 14.3% of quantum runs resulted in "collapse." These fell into two camps: "Recall Collapse" (refusing to flag anything) and "Trivial-Positive" (flagging everything as an attack). These failures appear as distinct clusters away from the ideal diagonal in precision-recall space:

![Fig.

  1. Precision against recall for all 56 runs, showing clusters of stable vs. collapsed runs.](/figures/art_a034a97dbf544c74a589a0c0923dfaa4)
  2. Computational Cost: Training a single noisy quantum model took over 2,000 seconds, while XGBoost finished in less than half a second—a factor of nearly 4,800x speed difference.

Limitations and Future Work

The authors acknowledge that their seed counts (4 to 8 per backend) are relatively small, meaning the 14.3% failure rate is an estimate rather than a precise frequency. Additionally, they only tested one specific quantum feature map (ZFeatureMap).

Future Work: The authors call for a new reporting standard in QML research that includes worst-run performance and explicit degeneracy tests. They suggest that future research should move away from simple fidelity kernels and explore "projected" or "bandwidth-tuned" kernels that might be more resistant to the spectral concentration issues identified here.

Summary updated

Abstract

Quantum kernel methods have been proposed for network intrusion detection, yet their performance limitations are often attributed to noise in current quantum hardware. This study evaluates that assumption through a controlled analysis of Pegasos-QSVC on the NSL-KDD and ToN-IoT datasets. We perform 56 quantum experiments using one exact noiseless statevector backend and three noise-simulated superconducting backends while keeping preprocessing, PCA features, data splits, and classical baselines identical. XGBoost achieves accuracies of 98.94% on NSL-KDD and 99.41% on ToN-IoT, compared with 91.80% and 82.98% for Pegasos-QSVC. The quantum model also exhibits substantially greater seed-dependent variability. Eight runs collapse into degenerate classifiers, including four recall-collapse cases and four trivial-positive classifiers. Notably, two failures occur on the noiseless backend, demonstrating that hardware noise is not a necessary condition for classi-fier collapse. Kernel Gram matrix analysis further reveals low effective rank and severe ill-conditioning even in the absence of noise, indicating intrinsic fragility in the learned quantum representation. These results show that average accuracy alone can conceal operationally unacceptable behavior and highlight the importance of reporting worst-case performance, seed-level variability, class-specific metrics, and explicit degeneracy tests in quantum intrusion detection studies.
BibTeX
@misc{chakraborty2026empirical,
  author = {Sreejonty Chakraborty and Adrita Rahman Tory and Muhammad Aminur Rahaman and Khondokar Fida Hasan},
  title = {{An Empirical Evaluation of Quantum Kernel Stability in Network Intrusion Detection}},
  year = {2026},
  eprint = {2611.12219},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.12219},
}
Figure