An Authentication and Secure Communication Scheme for In-Vehicle Networks Based on SOME/IP

Bin Ma, Shichun Yang, Zheng Zuo, Bosong Zou, Yaoguang Cao, Xiaoyu Yan, Sida Zhou, Jichong Li2022 · DOI

TL;DR

This paper introduces a novel authentication and secure communication scheme for in-vehicle networks that utilize the SOME/IP protocol over Ethernet. By modifying the SOME/IP payload and employing symmetric cryptography, the scheme provides mutual authentication and data protection against common cyber threats with minimal overhead, paving the way for more secure connected vehicles.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Modern vehicles are rapidly evolving into "intelligent networked vehicles" (ICVs), integrating numerous Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and relying on high-bandwidth communication like Ethernet. This increased connectivity, while enabling advanced features, also exposes vehicles to a growing number of cybersecurity threats. While much research has focused on securing Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communications, securing the internal in-vehicle network (IVN) itself, especially with the emerging adoption of Ethernet and protocols like SOME/IP, remains a critical challenge. Existing solutions often target older bus systems like CAN or V2X, leaving a gap for securing the new generation of Ethernet-based IVNs. This paper aims to fill that gap by providing a robust and efficient security solution tailored for SOME/IP in in-vehicle environments.

Methods

The proposed solution consists of two main parts: an authentication scheme and a secure communication scheme.

  • Authentication Scheme: This scheme uses a Safety & Security Controller (SSC) as a Key Management Center (KMC). It involves three phases:
  • Initialization: Pre-setting long-term symmetric keys between the SSC and Domain Controllers (DCs), and selecting cryptographic algorithms (SHA256 for hashing, AES256 for encryption).
  • Registration: DCs maintain a list of communicable DCIDs, while the SSC stores DCID-to-key pairs.
  • Authentication & Key Agreement: This phase uses a four-message interaction between two DCs (DCa and DCb) with the SSC acting as an intermediary. It leverages symmetric encryption, nonces, and timestamps to achieve mutual identity authentication and establish a temporary session key (SKa,b). This process is designed to be triggered periodically or during specific vehicle states (start, idle, park) to minimize impact.
  • Secure Communication Scheme: This scheme builds upon the established session key and modifies the SOME/IP payload. It divides the payload into three parts:
  • Sub-header: Contains protocol version, AEAD algorithm ID, and length information (sent in plaintext).
  • Sub-payload: The actual encrypted data, protected using an Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm (e.g., AES256-GCM or Chacha20-Poly1305) and the session key.
  • Sub-tag: A Message Authentication Code (MAC) generated over the sub-header and sub-payload, ensuring integrity.

This approach aims to provide confidentiality and integrity without altering the fundamental SOME/IP data frame structure.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper. The evaluation relies on an experimental platform built with embedded devices.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Targeting SOME/IP on Ethernet: The paper directly addresses the security needs of the emerging automotive Ethernet infrastructure using the SOME/IP protocol, a crucial step for securing next-generation vehicles.
  • SSC as a Centralized KMC: Utilizing a dedicated Safety & Security Controller as a KMC simplifies key management and authentication processes within the complex in-vehicle network.
  • Hybrid Approach for Efficiency: Combining symmetric cryptography for session keys with AEAD for data protection offers a balance between security strength and computational efficiency, essential for resource-constrained embedded systems.
  • Minimal Payload Modification: Modifying only the SOME/IP payload, rather than the entire frame structure, ensures compatibility and ease of integration with existing SOME/IP implementations.
  • Performance Trade-offs: The study highlights that while AEAD algorithms add latency, it's often overshadowed by the inherent latency of the SOME/IP communication model itself, suggesting that the security overhead is manageable.

Key Results

  • Security Verification: Formal security analysis using Proverif confirmed that the authentication scheme provides mutual authentication and ensures the confidentiality of session keys. Informal analysis demonstrated resistance to eavesdropping, replay, man-in-the-middle, and masquerading attacks.
  • Authentication Overhead: The total calculation overhead for authentication is approximately 3T<sub>rand</sub> + 10T<sub>enc</sub> + T<sub>hash</sub>. The total latency for authentication is 77.3 ms, with CPU usage around 1% and RAM usage around 4 MB per communication party. This is considered acceptable, especially since authentication is not constantly active.
  • Secure Communication Latency: The additional latency introduced by AEAD algorithms (AES256-GCM and Chacha20-Poly1305) is minimal, ranging from 0.03% to 6.97% compared to plaintext communication. The overall latency for secure communication (T2-T1) varies from 12.1 ms to 614.8 s, largely dependent on the effective-load length and the SOME/IP communication model. Chacha20-Poly1305 showed slightly lower additional latency, making it suitable for embedded systems.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Performance on High-End Platforms: While the study uses NXP-IMX6ULL boards, the authors suggest that CPU usage would be even lower on higher-performance platforms.
  • Integration with Existing Systems: The paper focuses on the core security scheme. Future work could explore seamless integration into existing automotive software stacks and hardware.
  • Scalability: While SOME/IP is scalable, the performance impact of the security scheme on very large-scale in-vehicle networks with hundreds of ECUs could be further investigated.
  • Key Management for Large Networks: The current KMC model is suitable for a domain-centralized architecture. For more complex or distributed architectures, advanced key management strategies might be needed.

The authors conclude that their proposed scheme is well-suited for promoting the adoption of SOME/IP in in-vehicle networks and contributing to enhanced automotive cybersecurity.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@misc{ma2022authentication,
  author = {Bin Ma and Shichun Yang and Zheng Zuo and Bosong Zou and Yaoguang Cao and Xiaoyu Yan and Sida Zhou and Jichong Li},
  title = {{An Authentication and Secure Communication Scheme for In-Vehicle Networks Based on SOME/IP}},
  year = {2022},
  doi = {10.3390/s22020647},
}
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